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1 Introduction 
Corporate measurements and strategic decisions frequently rely on a forcefield of internal 
and external interests. Within this forcefield, management and boards are sometimes 
constrained to take drastic actions and find themselves in situation where it is necessary 
 to reduce the overall amount of personnel employed. Among the many different labels 
of such reductions in workforce, downsizing is one of the more frequently applied and 
researched terms. In today´s competitive markets and globally spanning networks, 
“[D]downsizing has turned into one of the inevitable out comes of living in a global world 
where continual adjustments to products, services, and the price of labor are needed to 
remain competitive” (Kets de Vries & Balazs, 2014). 
This competitive edge might be a key to future company success on a local and global 
scale for German companies. With shortening product cycles and rapidly changing 
technological requirements, companies need to adapt their strategies, organizational 
layout and workforce continuously. Since globalization fosters global competitiveness, 
the economy and its inherent players do share common up or downward trends and need 
to transform, secure, or restructure their business. In the aftermath of the crisis in 2000 
and 2008, Germany and its players could prove their efficient mechanisms when it comes 
to the securitization of working places. During the recession in 2008, US unemployment 
jumped 10.1%, the largest peak in three decades, whereas German unemployment fell to 
7.5%, towards a decade low and clearly below the 10.1% Eurozone average (Blackstone, 
2010). Traditional downsizing oftentimes consists of large-scale layoff, which is a rather 
reduction-oriented strategy for cost-saving. This does hold lesser benefits in the German 
context, due to legal compensation and layoff requirements. Even though a liberalization 
towards more downsizing friendly regulation has been taken place since 2008, 
downsizing and its implications still vary from more employer-friendly jurisdictions such 
as the US, UK or China (Bhankaraully, 2018). This trend towards global adaptation is 
conjoining a more integrated financial accounting and reporting standard, supporting 
international efforts to facilitate higher transparency and comparability among a firm´s 
operation and trans-border cash flows (Vicente-Lorente & Suarez-Gonzalez, 2007). 
If corporations are faced with the necessity to largely adapt and restructure their 
organization and portfolio, they usually do this under the aspect of profitability and 
efficiency. Since corporate profitability stands at the core of financial health, the right 
amount of workforce for the respective strategy is crucial (Gandolfi, 2013). Of similar 
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importance are the financial implications of the undertaken restructuring to shrink the 
amount of workforce employed and the associated overhead cost including pension 
obligations. Their compatible decrease is vital to free financial capacity and achieve the 
targeted transformation, when needed. Hence, the relation between corporate downsizing 
in Germany and financial performance is of greatest importance to academia and 
managerial decision makers in the country context (Datta et al., 2010).  
2 Problem Definition 
Organizational efficiency, restructuring, and downsizing are frequent business topics, 
related to economic efficiency. Besides, the reduction of workforce caused by 
technological improvements and the digitization of businesses might result in an over-
capacity of human labor throughout whole industries (Popescu, Sabie, & Comanescu, 
2016). In some instance, the new economy is driving workforce reduction trends since 
the internet crisis in 2000. These restructuring tendencies can result in a reduction of 
human personnel in personnel intensive industries, such as manufacturing or financial 
services. Corporations handle this within a forcefield of megatrends such as demographic 
changes, continuous education, and new work environment (Horx, 2017). Whilst almost 
all publicly traded companies oblige to financial measurements as their key index for 
corporate health, these performance indicators are of central importance for the 
management and shareholders. Therefore, to be competitive, corporations need to take 
the impact of financial shareholders into account, when failing strategic decisions. 
Consequently, financial profitability is one of the most important determents for the 
creation of financial value (Black, Wright, Bachman, & Davies, 1998). Before 
undergoing a restructuring and change in operational or strategic direction, management 
needs to develop a theoretical understanding about the impact of restructuring, and 
adapting workforce, on their respective financial outcomes (Toffler, 1984). This paper 
intends to establish a deeper understanding of downsizing as a strategic measurement, to 
establish a qualitative foundation for corporate decision making. Therefore, the key 
purpose of this paper is the question, “How downsizing as part of a strategy influences 
German corporation´s profitability”. 
Even though an extensive body of academic literature on how organizational downsizing 
as a strategy for restructuring emerged and developed over time, a scarcity of academic 
work focuses on how downsizing influences individual corporate profitability and how 
the outcomes of downsizing measurements vary from industry to industry in a single 
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country (Brauer & Laamanen, 2014). This thesis complements existing research, to 
theorize around the relationship between organizational downsizing and firm 
performance of DAX members, by applying an organizational restructuring perspective 
in Germany. 
This paper establishes a direction and general recommendation for the success of HR 
related downsizing measurements within certain economic settings. In contrast to most 
research, the legal framework of a singular country, an industry specific comparison of 
the process, and individual corporate results will play a major role in the development of 
academic statements. Results consist of the development of fundamental propositions, to 
allow further research to quantify and deepen evidence-driven research in the field of 
downsizing in Germany. Therefore, propositions for downsizing and its efficiency, 
measured by financial key data and externally perceived performance are established as 
findings in this paper to answer the following research questions: 
i. How do German DAX members apply downsizing? 
ii. How do DAX members perform in a three-year period after a downsizing? 
iii. How do DAX downsizers perform within an inter-industry comparison in Germany? 
The research approach departs from the widely used quantitative analysis to confirm the 
success of downsizing measurements based on financial econometrics through regression 
models. A case-based approach allows for an individual analysis and firm comparison, to 
support the development of propositions. Furthermore, this paper does not merely analyse 
the relationship between the size of downsizing activities and corporate performance. The 
overall aim is to analyse and create valid propositions for successful downsizings in a 
country-specific framework.  
3 Course of Investigation  
The following thesis consists of two parts, a literature review including chapters four and 
five, and an empirical analysis from chapter six to nine. The literature review establishes 
a theoretic foundation of the underlying topic to facilitate a gradual research in the 
empirical analysis. The research conceptualizes around two topics, separately handled 
inside the literature review but combined in the analysis part. This allows for suggested 
links in the research field of downsizing. Throughout the successive chapters of the thesis, 
propositions evolve from these links. 
To begin with, chapter four introduces the premier part of the literature review. The term 
corporate restructuring is depicted and narrowed on the reduction of human assets, known 
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as organizational restructuring. This part consists of seven sections reviewing the relevant 
aspects of downsizing to restructure and commences with a traditional term description 
and definition. Before downsizing is introduced as a form of organizational restructuring, 
a section concludes an overview of different restructuring categories. The restructuring 
mode follows and links this section to the chapter´s core, downsizing as a strategy and 
tool for organizational restructuring. Here, downsizing and its historic development 
introduce the strategic aspects and specific implications of the strategy. The legal aspects 
of the strategy in its local context, Germany, follow this part to set a benchmark for the 
later analysis before the impact of downsizing on corporate performance, including 
relevant statistical measurements throughout prior studies, are examined. Chapter four 
serves overall to create clear connections between downsizing and profitability. It 
establishes a foundation for the later analysis of how downsizing impacts corporate 
profitability.  
The second part of the literature reviews continues in chapter five with the analysis of 
profitability and ways to measure balance-sheet and income based KPIs. To establish a 
successful foundation for the latter case analysis, the following logic is applied: the first 
section reviews the concept of profitability, before current ways to measure profitability 
are introduced. We continue with financial measurements in downsizing studies and the 
introduction of frequent measurements for downsizing. Lastly, downsizing and economic 
settings, which are driving forces behind the result of downsizings, close the section.  
Chapter six commences with the methodology on data collection and analysis. It 
highlights the undergone analysis, the limitations in the German downsizing landscape 
and introduce foundations for the later proposition development. 
Subsequently, chapter seven introduces research findings on a case by case base. The 
resulting six cases are introduced and analysed first in an intra-industry and second in a 
inter-industry comparison. Subsequently, results of the inter-industry comparison are 
described and evaluated. Thereupon, five propositions, including three sub-propositions 
on the impact of downsizing on corporate profitability in Germany are derived in chapter 
eight. The propositions closely examine a potential generalizability of the established 
evaluation and allow a critical look on the impact of downsizing on DAX corporations. 
The undertaken analysis is then reflected in chapter nine, enabling a critical view of the 
obtained results derived from the underlying analysis, before the thesis is concluded in 
chapter 10. 
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4 Corporate Restructuring 
Chapter four introduces the foundation of restructuring and downsizing as a means to 
restructure. To begin with, restructuring is analysed, including its various archetypes, 
before downsizing as a strategy is introduced. As downsizing and its financial 
implications on corporate profitability is the core of this study, downsizing approaches, 
strategies, and state-of-the-art research results create a comprehensive foundation for the 
latter case comparisons. 
4.1 Term and Definition 
Corporate restructuring refers to a change in a company´s structure, related to the 
economic business structure or business model of a company. In its nature, restructuring 
influences either geographic scope, business segmentation, or profit centres. Taking into 
account that organizations are legal entities, restructuring relates to the change in legal 
structures based on the respective company law, redefining, for example an 
organization´s legal entity or form, as well (Teichmann, 2015). Economically, corporate 
restructuring is a radical method, that allows coping with rapid market or product changes 
within or from outside the industry. Therefore, restructuring mainly relies on the 
economic necessity to preserve or regain corporate competitiveness (Enderwick, 1989). 
Companies have two fundamental strategies from which to choose according to Markides 
(1995), when it comes to secure competitiveness: Refocus or diversify its business. Horne 
and Wachowicz´s (2013) definition broadly sub-summarizes corporate restructuring as 
“[A]any change in a company’s capital structure, operations, or ownership that is outside 
its ordinary course of business” (Horne & Wachowicz, p. 697, 2013). 
Corporate Restructuring combines a set of discrete measures, usually targeting the 
expanding competitiveness of an enterprise to increase corporate value or performance 
through a distinct set of measurements or activities (Crum & Goldberg, 1998). Often 
guided by a major change in a company´s organization or configuration, corporate 
restructuring leads the transformation of a company´s assets in combination with a shift 
in corporate strategy and successively conclude in changes of the corporate structure 
(Hoskisson & Turk, 1990). The success of these measurements relies on the interplay of 
internal and external factors supporting the restructuring activity. To create value 
internally, operations and financials such as sales and margin growth or reduction in 
working capital, also need to be fostered from the inside. External factors allow increasing 
the value of a restructuring by enhancing potential, arising through corporate divesture 
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(sell-off, mergers, acquisitions, alliances), that need external players to allow for 
successful value creation (Das & Basu, 2004). 
 
4.2 Restructuring Classification 
The described changes influence the way corporations structure their business, financials, 
operations, and governance (Gibbs, 1993). Changes occur mainly within the operational, 
investment, financing, or governance layout of a company, as these areas allow for 
greatest or fastest impact on assets and strategy. Successively, corporate restructuring 
activities can be classified into portfolio restructuring, financial restructuring and 
organizational restructuring (Bowman & Singh, 1993). 
Portfolio restructuring combines the sell and purchase of wanted or unwanted assets and 
asset types, what might result in a mix of assets owned. This includes divestiture, 
liquidation, asset sale or spin-offs of businesses and operations. While spin-offs and sell-
offs can result in gains for the restructuring company, acquisitions and divestments 
generate no improvements on average (Bowman et al., 1999), even though these results 
change possibly over time since they diverge from finding to finding (Baker and Kiymaz 
2011). Overall, managers tend to either sharpen their corporate focus of action through a 
portfolio restructuring, raise the capital needed or reduce the impact of languishing 
operations by liquidizing divisions (Bowman & Singh, 1993).  
Financial restructuring summarizes transformations of a company´s capital structure and 
tends to include structural changes in core and peripheral financial entities. These include 
leveraged buyouts, leveraged recapitalizations and debt for equity swaps (Horne & 
Wachowicz, 2013). Organizations financial structures primarily exist to facilitate 
corporate cash flows, funds, cash, or credit. The financial structure serves as the strategic 
and contractual decision, determining the value-added of various business entities and the 
flow of cash among them. The corporate financial structure combines the following 
elements: the scale of the investment base, the combination of active investments and 
reserves, the investment focus and choice of revenue sources, the reinvestment rate, the 
mix of equity and debt, the degree and cost of corporate overhead including the durability 
of compensation and benefit contracts as well as the allocation of expenditures amid 
contemporary and future revenue potential (Donaldson, 1994). 
Lastly, organizational restructuring as a means to facilitate portfolio or financial 
restructuring, and sometimes described as a by-product of the former restructuring classes 
(Prechel, 1994). It allows managers to significantly alter the firm´s structure by reducing 
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diversification, streamlining processes, shrinking workforce and products, rebuilding 
divisions, and flattening hierarchies. Findings of Bowman et al. (1999) suggest that the 
pure usage of employee-related restructurings, without further activities, has a negative 
impact on corporate financial performance. Benefits in flexibility, communication, and 
overall financial improvement are reached if human-related restructuring is combined 
with further organizational, financial or portfolio restructuring (Bowman et al., 1999). 
Accordingly, executives need to deploy organizational restructuring in combination with 
financial or portfolio restructuring to be successful to reach the prime goals of corporate 
restructuring: reduce the cost base, increase productivity and improve performance 
(Bowman & Singh, 1993). 
The outcomes of corporate restructurings may have positive or negative effects on a 
firm’s financial performance. To decide if a restructuring process is successful analysts 
use sequences of intermediate effects. In terms of portfolio restructuring, these include 
greater control of remote entities, a higher strategic focus or greater economies of scale 
and scope. In case of financial restructurings, intermediary effects include greater 
emphasize on cashflow, working capital improvements and adapted managerial 
compensation. Rather different are the intermediary effects for organizational 
restructuring as they foster rather intangible measurements such as reduced turnover, 
greater corporate efficiency through higher employee satisfaction or improved 
communication (Bowman et al., 1999). 
All the above mentioned short- to midterm effects influence corporate financial 
performance, thereby exhibit a longer lasting effect on corporate profitability. Since these 
effects are ultimately perceptible in a time horizon spanning one to five or even more 
years after the downsizing announcement, a pure focus on market performance to assess 
the success of restructuring activities is less comprehensive than a combination of market 
and accounting performance (Bowman et al., 1999). 
 
4.3 Organizational Restructuring Modes  
As stated, Bowman & Singh´s (1993, 1999) definition of the restructuring types, is still 
valid to date: portfolio, financial and organizational restructuring. These build the 
foundation for later restructuring procedures. Before categorizing the type of 
restructuring, it is necessary to understand if restructuring activities are constructed by 
the management or prescribed by external circumstances. Prescribed restructurings have 
multiple reasons varying from industry to industry. One example is the introduction of 
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disruptive technologies, pushing sales from offline to online, shrinking quantities of 
offline sales, and including margin erosions. Constructed divestures include abandoning 
core business, restructuring due to poor strategic fit of divisions, reverse synergies, poor 
performance, negatively influencing capital market factors and cash-flow needs (Baker 
& Kiymaz, 2011). Constructed and prescribed restructurings lead to certain activity 
modes, which arrive in various forms and depend on the internal and external corporate 
situation at the time of realization (Buth, Hermanns, & Bächstädt, 2014). 
Depending on the chosen mode, varying measurements, activities, and resources enable 
a successful procedure for the management. Enderwick (1988) summarized the following 
six restructuring modes: intensification, investment and technical change, rationalization, 
deintegration, collaboration, and incremental internationalization. Each restructuring 
mode arrives with varying forms of restructuring: Intensification establishes increased 
productivity through contractual flexibility, flexible working practices, and concession 
bargaining. Labor process is continuously intensified without reorganizing the workforce 
and processes. Investment and technical change lead to new production methods such as 
automation or flexible manufacturing systems accompanied by a RiW (Reduction in 
Workforce). A strategy of rationalization involves the elimination of capacities 
divestment, changes in production lines or transfer of businesses also accompanied by 
possible reductions in labor. Deintegration as a mode leads to reduced levels of 
organizational integration by the outsourcing of operations previously undertaken 
internally. Autonomy within business units is widened by organizational changes like the 
introduction of mobile offices and intrapreneuring and accompanied by possible 
reductions in labor. Further modes do not include downsizing but display a stable or 
growing workforce: collaboration through partnerships and incremental 
internationalization by internationalizing and increasing overseas investment. These 
modes partly require an adaptation of workforce and therefore foster downsizing. Overall, 
modes tend to be mixed to realize a corporate goal through managerial action. 
Downsizing relates to half the strategies applied and a great number of restructuring 
activities. 
These modes can occur in the overall organization or certain areas, while differentiating 
through different activities per area. Earle, Estrin, & Leshchenko (1996) identify the 
following activities per area: 
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Nr. Strategic Area Activity 
1 Production 
• Change: area of activity, product mix, inventory 
policy, product quality, technology, use of resources 
• Closing of plant or shop. 
• Dispose assets 
• Seek foreign consulting service 
• Place new investments. 
2 Investment 
• Reduce: future bank borrowing, outstanding 
receivables 
• Obtain new non-bank and bank loans 
• Lengthen period of payables 
• Reschedule loans & change bank connections 
• Seek foreign investors. 
3 Employment 
• Increase: Labor, wages, & wage differentials 
• Decrease: Labor, wages, & social benefits 
• Modify internal wage scheme. 
4 Marketing 
• Increase: Marketing effort, market reach, product 
price relative to competition 
• Drop product price below competition 
• Change distribution network & suppliers. 
Table 1. Restructuring Activities in Atrategic Areas; Adapted from: Earle, Estrin, & Leshchenko (1996) 
Even though organizational restructuring fosters reorganizations within the firm that does 
not necessarily involve activities, related to the sale or disposal of assets or parts of the 
portfolio, the intensity of these activities is of vital interest for financial observers.  
 
4.4 Downsizing and Organizational Restructuring 
Downsizing as part of organizational restructuring is categorized, likewise to 
restructuring, into proactive (constructed) and reactive (prescribed) and aims at a higher 
efficiency for corporations. Oftentimes, reactive employee downsizing is triggered by 
poor performance, grown costs or decline in demand within a negative market response, 
while proactive downsizing derives from expected future market needs and predicted 
adaptations to sustain a competitive advantage (Gunderson, Verma, & Verma 1997; 
Hillier et al., 2007). Corporate procedures will be downsized when keeping the 
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organization stagnant is less beneficial than the outcome of the restructuring and 
downsizing foregoing. This conclusion can be derived by comparing the net present 
values of cash flows from stagnation versus the ones expected from the cost savings 
(Elayan, Swales, Maris, & Scott, 1998). 
Downsizing actions should cut costs inside the corporation and increase the efficiency, 
while keeping everything else constant and least erupted. Therefore, the overall goal is 
improved financial performance. However, positive financial outcomes and the true value 
of different downsizing strategies is of prominent controversial (Farrell & Mavondo, 
2005). Most companies downsize to reach certain outcomes, usually reducing overall 
expenses (oftentimes related to overhead and SG&A), grow profits, reach higher 
cashflows, and improve productivity. The following table summarizes the most important 
outcomes assumed by decision makers: 
The desired outcome Percentage of firms achieved outcome 
Reduced expenses 46% 
Increased profits 32% 
Improved cashflow 24% 
Increased productivity 22% 
Increased competitive advantage 19% 
Reduced bureaucracy 17% 
More efficient decision making 14% 
Increased customer satisfaction 14% 
Higher Sales 13% 
Higher market share 12% 
Improved product quality and innovation, 
technological advances, and takeover. 
> 10% 
Table 2. The Desired Outcome of Downsizing Programs; Adapted from Atwood, Coke, Cooper, & Loria (1995) 
Taking these expected outcomes into consideration, Mirabal and DeYoung (2005) 
describe downsizing overall as a reactive strategy utilized to tackle one or more of the 
following situations: the transformation of the organizational structure, loss of market 
share and revenue caused by industrial or technological disruptions, or M&A. Reality 
shows that downsizing is usually the result of restructuring caused by decreasing prior 
earnings, lowering demand, and cost cuttings (Chen, Mehrotra, Sivakumar, & Yu, 2001).  
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4.5 Downsizing as a Tool for Strategic Restructuring  
4.5.1 Historical Development of Downsizing 
Corporations constantly safeguard profitability by measuring efficiency to deliver a better 
performance. Like efficiency programs, downsizings are frequently applied by managers, 
to enhance corporate profitability. 
Sheaffer, Carmeli, Steiner-Revivo, and Zionit (2009) comprehensively state downsizing 
as a relevant management strategy. By selectively choosing to decrease workforce-related 
costs, corporations improve the short- and long-term cost base of the firm. Consequently, 
to decrease the cost base, downsizing can result from various combinations of 
restructuring activities. Nevertheless, varying strategic approaches utilize downsizing as 
a form of restructuring but not a particular restructuring strategy (Wilkinson, 2004). 
Straightforward, it describes a reduction in size or simply a decrease in volume of 
personnell employeed. Downsizing is foremost a tool of the organizational restructuring 
process, targeting the reduction of sales by divesting disadvantageous and unprofitable 
product lines or the reduction of workforce in terms of establishing a more efficient and 
leaner pool of human resources. Consequently, a valid measurement for the downsizing 
activity is the change in sales per employee, that reflects the efficiency of the 
restructuring. Sales p.e. allow optimization in four ways: increase sales greater than 
employees, increase sales with stable or reducing workforce, decrease employees with 
stable or increasing sales and decrease employees greater than sales (Roll Buhner, 
Rasheed, & Rosenstein, 1997).  
A controversy around the term is analysed by Mentzer (1996). Downsizing varies from a 
deliberate action to any RiW. While some researchers classify it as the sole action and 
purpose of reducing the number of employees, others label it as a term with a far greater 
influence than just a pure reduction of human resources. 
One of the most comprehensive meaning for downsizing is offered by Dewitt (1998): 
used as a general description to execute cost-saving programs through one or more waves 
of layoffs. According to Dewitt, downsizing strategies are grouped into three 
subcategories: retrenchment, downscaling, and downscoping. Retrenchments facilitate 
the cutback in personnel staff while sustaining corporate scope and even increase output. 
Usually, retrenchment is facilitated through centralization and the merging or 
specification of operations. Product or line-specific costs can be enhanced by the 
relocation of resources and the productivity increased by specified and central operations. 
A downside might be the combination of troubling and efficient operations to have a 
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higher negative effect on the efficient operation. Downscaling allows for horizontal RiW, 
leading to a lower overall output while sustaining the scope and product lines. The 
approach is used to allow for an adaptation of output to the level of market demand. 
Negative effects are a reduction in the scope of product lines and a reduced a corporation’s 
capability in meeting its competition. Subcategory three is downscoping, which flattens 
the vertical scope of the workforce. By reducing resources and operations, management 
is shrinking output and adapts to the market needs (Dewitt 1998). 
As downscoping is labelled to be the most widespread form of downsizing, Dewitt (1998) 
summarized five approaches resulting from two vertical and three horizontal downscaling 
practices. Backward and forward deintegration reduce the vertical scope of the firm, while 
customer downscaling, market withdrawal and line pruning decrease the horizontal scope. 
Forward deintegration reduces resources in the production, distribution and retail stream 
top-down. Backward deintegration reduces the company´s input into the production 
process. To cut the horizontal scope, customer downscaling allows unprofitable business 
relationships to be cut and physical as well as human resources to be decreased. Line 
pruning, originally introduced by Kotler (1965), is another approach to horizontally 
downsize and defines the sale or elimination of manufacturing and distribution rights, 
enabled by workforce reductions. Market withdrawal, a term developed by Porter (1976), 
leads to a reduction in the scope and scale of the firm as it impacts whole markets and 
countries. 
By categorizing downsizing into revenue refocusing, cost cutting and plant closure, 
Charlos and Chen (2002) apply a more practical approach to Dewitt´s definition. They 
analyse the meaning of the terms within a business environment, spotlighting the direct 
actions taken to realize downsizing through workforce reduction. These categories are 
applied and display the final stage of the reduction of human resources within the scope 
of a restructuring program. 
The reason downsizing is applied, range from lower overheads and the connected cost 
base to faster decision making. An improved productivity, smoother corporate 
communication, and execution, rising intrapreneurial behavior or greater corporate 
earnings are further drivers. It can be followed, that the major reasons behind downsizing 
activities is to enhance corporate efficiency and accordingly gain a competitive advantage 
(Kets de Vries & Balazs, 2014). 
Even though the positive effects seem daunting, restructuring may be prescribed, what 
makes it almost impossible to realize the advantageous effects. In some cases, downsizing 
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is inevitable to secure the survival of a firm by providing necessary cash-flows. Layoffs 
as part of downsizing applied by corporations to avoid bankruptcy or severe cash shortage 
closely follow business cycles (Farber & Hallock, 2008). This phenomenon has been 
observed since the 1970s and did not change fundamentally over the past four decades, 
lastly seen in 2008 when the mortgage crisis hit the world economy (Sheaffer et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, Chalos and Chen (2002) conclude that the most relevant reasons behind 
downsizing are revenue refocusing, plant closure and the reduction of organizational 
slack. Their sample of Fortune 500 companies analysed between 1993 till 1995 proves 
that the largest part of downsizing announcements was due to revenue refocusing (37%), 
followed by retrenchment (35%), plant closure (21%) and a smaller portion derived from 
M&As (3%).  
Chalos and Chen (2002) deduct that companies reducing personnel generally have an 
increased long-term debt per asset, or debt solvency, which could lead to future 
downsizings. Corporations need to increase profitability and foster their balance sheet to 
meet competition. A study by De Meuse et al. (1994) shows that profitability between 
downsizing and non-downsizing companies strongly differs, as downsizers clearly show 
lower profitability. In terms of RiW Casico, Young and Morris (1997) examined 3.628 
companies from the U.S. over a 15 year period from 1980 till 1994 to find out that 59% 
percent downsized five percent at least once. They distinguish companies that restructure 
less than five percent between five percent and 15% and above 15% to find out, that one 
in three cases was corporations downsizing more than 15%. Corporations struggling with 
profitability were most likely to downsize above five percent and vice versa for high 
profitability corporations. Industry-wise, manufacturing firms were most likely to 
downsize more than five percent, succeeded by retail and service corporations. These 
three amounts for 57% of all U.S. downsizings above five percent between 1980 and 
1994. Substantial downsizing does rely on the percentage of workforce reduction, but 
varies in different U.S. studies: While Chen et al. (2001) state a median workforce 
reduction of 4.55% with an average size of 8.94% from 1990 till 1995, Elayan et al. 
(1998) stress that the size of layoffs in Wall Street announcements, between 1979 till 
1991, stagnates largely between four and 6.8%. Further studies support Chen´s and 
Elayan´s findings: Love and Nohira (2005) calculate means of 7.1% in the year of the 
downsizing announcement and four and a half peprcent in the year after the 
announcement. These statistically significant reductions in personnel are summarized by 
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Casico et al. (1997), labelling substantial downsizing as a reduction between five and 
15% in the workforce. A comparable table of studies is to be found in Appendix 1.4. 
Besides downsizing, further management practices have developed over time. One 
example is Rightsizing, a term that originated from downsizing, and found solid 
recognition among researchers. The term differentiates from downsizing in that it is an 
integrated part of the organization, its structure, process, products, and people. 
Rightsizing is based on permanent process analysis, a common understanding of the 
firm´s mission, and shared vision. The terms different in that downsizing refers to a single 
action while rightsizing combines multiple actions within an ongoing process (Hitt, 
Keats, Harback, & Nixon, 1994). Nevertheless, rightsizing is achieved through either 
workforce reductions, or asset reductions, or both. This results typically in decreased 
costs or increased earnings through margin improvements and greater competitiveness 
through increased flexibility (Cascio et al., 1997). 
 
4.5.2 The Strategic Background 
Downsizing has been most researched in the U.S., where it became relevant in the 1970s 
due to large-scale layoffs. At the end of a predictable long-term growth period, the topic 
aroused academic interest, as U.S. competitivity was challenged by aspiring economies. 
Management paradigms resulting from the overwhelming economic situation including 
long-term growth and predictable economic growth were challenged by restructuring, 
plant closure, downsizing and mass layoffs (Handel, 2005). 
Farber & Hallock (2008) took a close look at lay-off announcements and found out, that 
these closely follow business cycles. Lay-offs derived from restructuring, downsizing or 
plant closure are characterized as a reaction strategy to unfavorable market conditions 
and allow for rapid impact on business performance. The interdependency between 
business cycles and reactive downsizing has been observed as long as the 1970s, 
wherefore downsizing is an accepted and dominant business strategy. 
Even though downsizing started as a reactive strategy to economic cycles, the strategy 
gained acceptance as a proactive approach to steer the business in economically booming 
times. Especially companies which were in an economically challenging position adopted 
downsizing as a strategic approach to proactively manage times of crisis (Handel, 2005; 
Gandolfi & Littler, 2012). 
Besides the move from reactive to proactive Gandolfi & Littler (2012) categorize the 
development of downsizing into three different historical phases. From the mid-1970s to 
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mid-1980s, from mid-1980s to early 2000s and early 2000s till present. Three levels 
characterize each phase, namely: level of practice, level of discourse and level of strategy. 
The first, level of practice describes the effects on inputs such as job cuts, plant closures 
or outsourcing. This phase is characterized by plant closure and small to medium layoffs, 
which were permanent or non-permanent. The first wave of downsizing to mid 1980s 
affected mostly blue-collar workforce and lower white-collar workers. The terminology 
downsizing was solemnly used in academic research and business communication. Main 
reasons for downsizing were reactions on the effects of the recession and corporate 
bankruptcy. Downsizing was not foreseen as a measurement, thus, no part of strategic 
plans (Gandolfi & Littler, 2012). 
The second, level of disclosure, examines management rhetoric’s, analysing the language 
of downsizing. It appeared from the mid-1980s to early 2000s was a period of plant 
closures, mass layoffs and outsourcing. Job cuts were focused on lower and middle white-
collar workers to generate leaner, and meaner organizational structures, resulting in 
competitive advantages. Large corporations applied massive downsizing e.g., GM´s 
74.000 layoffs or IBM´s 85.000 employee reduction. Based on research and experience, 
companies applied downsizing more strategically, especially among the ones at the lower 
end of the profitability span. Through a more common use, the terminology developed, 
and corporations were keener on publicly announcing the measurement in order to 
achieve a significant effect on Wall Street, pushing their stock price. Managers enforcing 
downsizing showed strength and were appreciated by Wall Street. Downsizing was 
applied more heavily as a proactive HR strategy, proving managerial effectiveness and 
foresight (Gandolfi & Littler, 2012).  
Lastly, the level of strategizing examines the effects on capital markets fostered by the 
announcement. In this phase of downsizing from the early 2000s to present, layoffs 
became smaller by number, compared to previous phases. Downsizing as a restructuring 
measurement is numerically supported by additional restructuring activities. The number 
and variation of inputs increased by mixing plant closure, layoff, outsourcing, the usage 
of contingent labor and effects caused by natural attrition. The rhetoric usage of the term 
was closer to the first phase from the mid-1970s to mid-1980s, but still more 
enthusiastically than in both periods before. The impact of downsizing announcements 
on Wall Street shrunk, what led to a creative upgrade of the term. Rightsizing, resizing, 
streamlining or personnel restructuring gained in number to replicate the positive effects 
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on Wall Street previously accomplished by downsizing, while levels of disclosure rose 
(Gandolfi & Littler, 2012). 
Downsizing developed from a pure reactive application to a strategy of choice for many 
companies. Over the historic adaptation of the term, its effects, and the profound 
understanding as a valid business strategy, Mirabal & DeYoung (2005) state that it 
developed to a selected strategy for corporations around the world in the mid-1990s. 
Today, corporations favor the strategy, not in terms of its strategic value for stock 
markets, but as an adaptive and anticipatory strategy used to proactively steer business 
(Gandolfi & Littler, 2012). 
4.6 Strategic Implementation of Downsizing 
According to Appelbaum & Donia (2006), the ultimate goal of downsizing is to achieve, 
maintain or even increase corporate productivity and thus gain a competitive advantage. 
Over the last four decades, downsizing as a strategy developed constantly. While the 
strategy´s application varies, the fundamental reasons to implement and apply are 
consistent. Downsizing as a strategy is a distinct reaction to one or more of the following 
situations: loss of market share or revenues due to industrial or technological changes, 
industry consolidation is driven by M&A activity, adapting organizational structures and 
the common belief that leaner is better (Mirabal & DeYoung, 2005). 
Nevertheless, downsizing should not serve as a short-term strategy used to boost profits 
and cut current costs. Management needs to ensure, that downsizing actions are 
introduced on a profound basis and backed-up with the right justification. The strategic 
alignment needs to be well-thought-out, effective and integrated into an overall strategy. 
This indicates that downsizing on its own should not be a strategy´s core but rather a tool 
of a corporate strategy (Appelbaum & Donia, 2006). 
 
4.6.1 Gandolfi´s Downsizing Archetypes 
Dewitt´s three downsizing approaches (1998) were introduced in the previous chapter. 
All combine cost cuts in human resources, a decrease in the number of organizational 
layers and the plant setup. Gandolfi (2013) confirms the three approaches including 
interdependencies and differences. Additionally, Gandolfi (2013) gives a profound 
differentiation between two archetypes and implementation strategies. He categorizes the 
two archetypes into reinforcement (convergence) and reorientation, both widely used and 
acknowledged in business (Mirabal & DeYoung, 2005). Before choosing one of the two 
types, companies need to analyse if their internal operations fit their business model. If 
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there is a strategic fit between these, companies need to find out, if their business 
operation fit the external requirements to sustain competitiveness (Appelbaum, Everard, 
& Loretta, 1999). This defines which model a company should choose to succeed its 
downsizing activities (Gandolfi, 2013). The first downsizing archetype reinforcement 
(convergence) allows for moderate changes in organizations, achieved on a lower level 
of change compared to the reorientation approach. Different from the reorientation 
approach, the reinforcement approach targets change in the company´s mission, strategy, 
and structure. Even though occurring on a smaller stage, layoffs and RiW are a central 
part of the reinforcement model (Freeman & Cameron 1993; Gandolfi 2013).  
Reinforcement fosters a less radical approach to changes in work rather than structure, to 
increase the stability of systems, technology, and management. Consequently, this 
downsizing process is ahead of the organizational redesigning, targeting higher efficiency 
and emphasizing business model and operational efficiency (Gandolfi, 2013). Even 
though the approach successfully reduces costs, the effectiveness of this model is unclear, 
as overall layoffs lead to uncertainty among the workforce causing potential loss of 
human capital over the process (Cameron, 1994). 
Reorientation is a more radical but non-continuous type. It fosters changes in structure 
before changes in work driving change in systems, technology, and management. The 
model excludes RiW through layoffs and specifies on finding new operational processes 
and business opportunities. Compared to reinforcement, the strategy sets restructuring 
and redesigning ahead of downsizing to realize new operational and business efficiency 
(Gandolfi, 2013). Both approaches are compared transparent in Table 1 Appendix 1.1. 
 
4.6.2 Downsizing Implementation Strategies 
Gandolfi (2013), Mirabal and DeYoung (2005), and Cameron (1994) distinguish three 
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Table 3. Characteristics of Implementation Strategies, Adapted from Gandolfi (2013) 
Workforce reduction targets the number of people and can be implemented quite fast 
through overhead and FTE (full time equivalent) forecast. It pays off rather shortly and 
hinders long-term adaptation through layoffs, a hiring freezes, early retirements, or 
retrenchments. The organizational redesign focuses on jobs and business units, targeting 
work itself and takes medium long to be implemented. Corporations following an 
organizational redesign strategy, endure until the implementation pays off, when 
abolishing functions, or whole units, redesigning jobs, re-layering the organization or 
change working schemes. The systemic strategy is the last and is focused on corporate 
culture, targeting the status quo process and takes the longest to be implemented. The 
strategy targets a long-term change, that does not include short-term cost savings. 
Usually, the strategy is implemented through process simplification, bottom-up changes, 
continuous improvements and high staff involvement (Gandolfi, 2013). 
Workforce reduction directly targets a reduction in the number of employees through 
layoffs, cutbacks, natural fluctuation, and hiring freeze. Measurements are initiated 
reactive to improve profitability and corporate efficiency in the short-run. The 
implementation fosters a cut in the cost base through instant reductions in human-related 
costs (Gandolfi, 2013). Farrell and Mavondo (2005) doubt the success of the strategy, as 
rapid cost cutting on workforce basis usually has negative long-term effects on corporate 
profitability, efficiency, and overall perception of the organization as a strategic actor. 
The second implementation strategy, organizational redesign, reduces the amount of work 
instead of the size of the workforce. Redesigning departments and jobs, merging and 
reducing units instead of cutting these takes more time to implement. Therefore, the 
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implementation strategy does not lead to short-term cost-cutting but rather moderate-term 
payoffs and long-term profitability improvements. In other words, organizational and 
financial efficiency develops over time (Gandolfi, 2013). 
Systemic change clearly differs from workforce reduction and organizational redesign. 
This implementation strategy changes organizational attitudes and values, triggering an 
overall organizational change (Luthans & Sommer, 1999). The systemic strategy allows 
for a more holistic view on the restructuring and enables the organization to widely adapt 
to the restructuring as an organizational change, limiting employee uncertainty and the 
negative influence on human capital (Gandolfi, 2013). 
Cameron, Freeman & Mishra (1991) describe the relation between the depth and the 
width of downsizing and implementation strategy as follows: a strategy is deeper the more 
actions are related to one implementation strategy, while a strategy is wider the less 
related downsizing activities it includes. 
 
4.6.3 Contemporary Downsizing Strategies 
Academia broadly distinguishes between the above-mentioned downsizing strategies to 
categorize the term according to a pool of research data and findings. Contemporary 
downsizing strategies partly vary from the previously described ones: non-selective 
layoffs and stealth layoffs. Both combine large-scale human resource reductions, 
becoming exceedingly popular over the last decade (Gandolfi & Littler, 2012). 
Large stealth layoffs are business as usual for some companies allowing them a RiW 
under the radar. Many companies such as IBM, Google or Hewlett-Packard follow this 
approach and successively lay of personnel discretely and undiscussed over a certain 
period. Fear about public disgrace, demotivated workers and the effects of the survivor 
syndrome steer corporate decision making to reduce workforce over an unconscious and 
stretched process (Gandolfi & Littler, 2012). 
The second kind, non-selective layoffs executing large-scale employee reduction gained 
importance shortly after the subprime crisis hit world economies through weakened 
financial markets (Gandolfi & Littler, 2012). The downsizing might result from an 
imbalanced cost base, compared to the individual revenue stream, that many force well-
known corporations to cut labor in rations of up to 25%. Rio Tinto, Johnson & Johnson,  
 Downsizing and Shareholder Value of German Corporations          20 
and Pfizer are well-discussed examples of companies that were hit hard by the credit 
squeeze in time of the financial crisis (Hashim & Bakar, 2003).1 
Cameroon (1994) studied downsizing and successive measurements within the U.S 
Automotive Industry between 1987 and 1990 according to their success. His findings 
state that key determinants of successful downsizing, still valid today in various 
industries. She concluded certain supporting factors, enabling organizational 
improvements: prior systemic analysis, incremental implications, transparent and 
continuous communication, all-level participation and engagement and a reduction in 
barriers leading to a higher effort within the workforce. Factors that impair the 
downsizing are the attrition of employees, work consolidation and increase in 
requirements without positive appraisal and compensation adjustment, as well as missing 
quality improvements. These findings extensively overlap with Gandolfi´s (2013) six 
tactics included in his strategy´s and archetypes, leading to a clear path of successful 
downsizing.  
 
4.6.4 Differentiation Between Active and Passive Workforce Restructuring 
When evaluating the necessity to downsize, based on human resources as cost drivers, 
economic and social effects need be considered. Therefore, strategic alignment of 
corporate and HR strategy need to adopt approaches and tools to allow for adaptable 
employee numbers (Buhner, Rasheed, & Rosenstein, 1997). These approaches are 
divided into active and passive, where active defines the active termination of working 
contracts, while passive stands for passive determination of working contracts. For active 
measurements, a division between one-sided singular decision of the corporation, and 
two-sided reached through employee and employer negotiation needs to be drawn. The 
following table shows the full scope of measurements: 
                                                 
1 The economic downturn led many banks to force credit pay-back, leaving corporations with desiccative 
credit financing in times of the downturn. This resulted in financial bottlenecks, making reductions in the 
fixed cost-base inevitable. Even though the measurement seems harsh, it is on the action list for many 
corporations in terms of securing financial survival when facing bankruptcy (Gandolfi & Littler, 2012). 
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Figure 1. Active vs Passive Downsizing Measurements; Adapted from Marr & Steiner (2003) 
A different perspective allows the dichotomy into the dimensions of social (weak) and 
economic (hard) efficiency impact. A hiring freeze combined with natural fluctuation is 
allocated to purely weak impact since no existing contracts need termination. This 
combination shows a far less negative impact on the image and does not need any 
agreement from unions or governmental side. Viewed from the hard perspective, these 
measurements do lack in forecasting certainty and might lead to negative employee 
selection whilst no new talent is included in the organization. On the active side, only 
partial retirement and part-time work do have weak impacts since no direct layoffs need 
to occur. Whereas all other active measurements go hand in hand with contract 
termination and union cooperation (Marr & Steiner, 2003). 
 
4.6.5 Downsizing Regulations and corporate adaptation in Germany 
Downsizing is greatly affected by multiple forms of protection and the social perception 
of lay-offs in a country. German mentality and its legal systems do support corporate 
downsizing, to a lower extend when comparing the multitude of job securing regulations, 
than in the US or China (Gerlach, Levine, Stephan, & Struck, 2006). Besides having 
contemporary almost full employment on a national scale, German corporations downsize 
roughly every third work day on average 800 employees (Friebel & Heinz, 2014). 
Germany represents a rather employee-friendly environment in terms of RiW, compared 
to other western countries with a comparable industrial stance. The employee-friendliness 
is visible, comparing w the payment of compensation for job loss according to seniority. 
Employee protection is enabled by the governmental degree of market orientation and 
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drives labor protectionism in Germany. The German labor market is perceived as a fair 
marketplace, conceding comparatively greater rights to employees and their long-term 
employment than improved corporate profitability, for instance, the US, UK or China 
(Gerlach et al., 2006). 
The legal aspects of corporate downsizing in Germany are combined in a triangulation 
between three major actors: the corporation, the work council, and the unions. This 
constellation varies from other countries and rather prolongs the downsizing process. The 
beginning of the layoff process itself takes between a minimum of two weeks up to seven 
months and distinguishes between single individual and enforced redundancy. A layoff 
is considered a downsizing according to Kündigungsschutzgesetz (KSchG) § 17 (1) 3 f., 
if at least 30 out of 500 employees, or six percent, are dismissed. This has to be combined 
with complete hearings of the works council, to derive with a legally binding allowance 
to downsize, also in a situation that might lead to bankruptcy, all parties have to agree on 
the RiW (Kündigungsschutzgesetz §17.(1), 2004). 
The foundation of the participatory process is the establishment of a social compensation 
plan, fostering equal opportunity layoffs, severance payments, and redeployment. In 
terms of mass layoffs bound to a social compensation plan, corporations must consider 
the duration of employment, the age of employees, necessary obligations, and 
maintenance payments linked to redeployment. These legal requirements are slowing 
down the process and locking-up financial and managerial resources (Gerlach et al., 
2006). To give a rough estimation of severance compensation the US, Canada and 
Germany are compared: while Germany requires a compensation of two weeks salary for 
every full year of employment with the company, the Canadian legal code provides a one-
week salary for every full year of employment, whereas the US code does not have any 
additional compensation in terms of layoffs or HR related downsizings (OECD, 2013). 
Downsizing is generally perceived as unfair among the workforce and society. 
Downsizers must deal with a negative impact on the brand image by customers. 
Additionally, the employer brand decreases as employees and potential employees 
perceive the corporate situation as difficult. News about corporate downsizing adds 
another degree of downsizing reality to the overall strategy. Media coverage tends to be 
negative supporting the affected employee side of the downsizing (Heinz & Zubanov, 
2016). 
Due to the number of legal requirements in the German context, the duration of the 
process, and the scope of compensation payments and brand devaluation, downsizing is 
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not considered to be as much of a management tool as in North America. The operational 
and financial implications are estimated to be more long-lasting and less rapid. As 
previously mentioned, downsizing frequently occurs in Germany, however, corporations 
must deal with similar developments and risks as in other economic jurisdictions. 
Nevertheless, the approach differs from original, rather rapid, downsizing. Comparability 
of German downsizing in the European and international context is limited (Gerlach et 
al., 2006). Consequently, legal circumstances would support rightsizing over downsizing 
as a restructuring tool in the German context. 
Therefore, downsizing in this context is characterized by the presence of institutional 
arrangements that complicate the introduction and effectiveness of unilaterally 
downsizing strategies, thus prioritizing the preferences of financial stakeholders 
(Bhankaraully, 2018). The extensive body of legal rights supporting the works council 
and their increased involvement in firm-level agreements or pacts militate against short-
term adjustment strategies based on the rapid and substantial reductions in the number of 
employees. This potentially perceived legal imbalance has a deep impact on the ability of 
corporate executives to implement defensive takeover measures in German corporations 
or subsidies (Gumbrell, McCormick and Hyman, 2006; Hassel, 2014; Muller-Jentsch, 
2003). Yet, corporations have a certain leverage, associated with corporate restructuring. 
Even in not-to-liberal market economies, such as Germany, servicing high levels of debt 
could lead to financial constraints and a loss of control to creditors or straightforward, 
bankruptcy (Atanassov and Kim, 2009). Operational and legal, high indebtedness 
generates strong incentives for corporate executives to confront employees to extract 
concessions. Simultaneously, employees, fearing partial company closure, relocation of 
activities or the reduction of activities within the company, are more likely to meet some 
of the downsizing related requests of the management (Schneper and Guillen, 2004). 
Consequently, the employee-friendly legal regulations in Germany reduce the impact of 
downsizing strategies, approaches, and tactics since certain steps and requirements must 
be undertaken successively and are legally binding. Downsizing is directly connected to 
restructuring and is seen as a valid method, that will be accepted if a certain catalogue of 
previous possibilities has been checked (KschG §17 f., 2004). These include a temporary 
reduction in working hours (Kurzarbeitszeit), unpaid leave for the workforce and 
executive employees, or a temporary reduction in salaries or cancellation of performance-
related compensation (Marr & Steiner, 2003). 
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4.6.6 The Effects of Downsizing on Corporate Profitability 
Even though improving the financial situation of a company is the number one reason 
and fundamental idea of downsizing, the measurable effects on corporate profitability 
from post-announcements differ in various studies. An in-depth analysis of prior studies 
can be found in Appendix 1.2. Some studies show financial and non-financial positive 
post-announcements effects: Elayan et al. (1998) highlight a 2% increase in ROE; Casico, 
Morris and Young (1999) asses a two percent increase in ROA; Chen at al. (2001) found 
an increase in median ROAs and operating margins; Chalos & Chen (2002) find positive 
adjusted OPFC, sales and ROA developments. Others like Love & Nohira (2005) or 
Munoz-Bullón & Sánchez-Bueno (2008) find no notable effect on profitability (ROA, 
ROS) at all. A significant negative effect of downsizing measurements post 
announcement is found by De Meuse in two consecutive long-term studies: De Meuse et 
al. (1994) and De Meuse et al. (2004). Another critical view lies in Mentzer´s (1996) 
study, where he finds no stable relationship between the numerical size of the downsizing 
and future profitability. In his study among Canadian companies (1986 – 1994), no 
statistically significant effects can be proven. By this, he questions the fundamental idea 
of why corporations undergo a downsizing. 
 
Historically, only 40% of downsizing corporations reach their target and reduce expenses 
and a solid 60% of corporations are not able to increase earnings post announcement 
(Estok, 1996). Similar effects are delivered by Cascio (1993), in a study on US MNCs, 
showing that not even half (46%) of the analysed companies were able to cut costs as 
much as previously expected while for one-third of companies profits increased post 
announcement. Even though financial performance and revenue development show 
mixed results, the selected downsizing strategy is the most important factor concerning 
its outcome, commonly agreed on. There are three downsizing categories, as mentioned 
in section 4.5.1: revenue refocusing, cost cutting and plant closures (Dewitt, 1998). 
Findings from Casico et al., (1997) highlight that the average downsizers do not deliver 
better financial performance post announcement. Nevertheless, asset downsizers do 
outperform stable employers and financial employment downsizers. Similar 
developments are supported by Chalos and Chen (2002), analysing the impact of each 
downsizing strategy on the financial performance. By using median adjusted data, they 
draw the following conclusions: firstly, downsizing companies deliver above-average 
financial performance (ROA) compared to the industry. Secondly, closing and cost 
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cutting strategies are less efficient than revenue refocusing, compared by OPFC. Thirdly, 
simple cost cutting is therefore outperformed by efficiency strategies, delivering higher 
financial performance.  
According to Love & Nohira (2005), the relation of absorbed slack (corporate savings for 
loss incurring situations and accruals) and financial post-announcement performance is 
positively linked. This is rather obvious since especially in revenue refocusing and cost 
cutting incur costs before improved results are to be expected. A study conducted about 
the different outcomes of pro- and reactive downsizing strategies shows the influence of 
both strategies on the financial performance and absolute absorbed organizational slack. 
Love & Nohira (2005) refer to absorbed slack as the ratio of administrative expenses 
(SG&A) to sales. Their study shows a significant positive correlation between proactive 
downsizing, absorbed slack, and financial performance before the implementation of the 
downsizing. Therefore, proactive strategies are acknowledged to be more efficient and 
companies holding a larger amount of organizational slack. Another factor is the width 
and depths of downsizing actions. Cameron et al., (1991) argues that the more actions 
favoring the same implementation strategy included in the downsizing, the better the 
results and higher the financial impact. This view is supported by the fact that 
organizational actions tend to have a higher depth than width (Cameron, 1994). 
The size of the downsizing measurement does not have a significant effect on the period 
following the downsizing announcement. Even though the relationship between the 
magnitude of layoffs and future financial performance is significantly insufficient, 
corporations downsizing less than three percent of their workforce show better 
performance than companies laying off more. Similar outcomes are found by comparing 
companies laying off less and more than 10% of their employees (De Meuse et al., 2004). 
A significant negative effect of downsizing more than five percent of the workforce is 
found by Casico et al., (1997) in their study on the overall SNP500 on all HR related 
downsizings. A significance threshold is defined for five percent and 15% of RiW over 
the period of one business year, to distinguish between downsizing and substantial 
downsizing. 
Therefore, the following classification might be drawn from existing academic research:  
downsizings with less than 10% outperform downsizings with more than 10%, and 
downsizings in between five to 15% outperform reductions above 15%. Thereupon, a 
logical conjecture would translate into, the lower the downsizing quantitatively, the better 
profitability will develop. 
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Thus, RiW occurs in wide arrays depending on the study and the sample, even though the 
size of the downsizing and its consistency over a certain period vary. While Love & 
Nohira´s (2005) sample results in a median downsizing of 7.1% in the year of the 
downsizing, only 4.5% are reduced the year after the announcement. Comparable US 
surveys show roughly similar reductions between 4.05% (Elayan et al., 1998) and 6.93% 
(Chen et al., 2001) over a two year period. The consistency of volume seems to be another 
factor that defines the outcome of the downsizing (De Meuse et al., 2004).  
5 Downsizing and Corporate Profitability 
Section five analyses the concept of firm performance by identifying and measuring 
corporate profitability. Therefore, financial KPIs are introduced to draw conclusions 
about corporate profitability. The impact of downsizing on firm performance, based on 
prior academic research is analysed, while measurements for individual firm performance 
are validated and selected. Successively, a list of profitability KPIs, to analyse the 
financial position of a downsizing company, is developed in the last part of this section.  
5.1 Corporate Profitability  
To define profitability, we look at the basic component, profit, first. “Profit”, defines a 
valuable return in the greater sense, usually “the excess of returns over expenditure in a 
transaction or series of transactions; especially: the excess of the selling price of goods 
over their cost” (Merriam-Webster, 2017).  
Corporate profits are synonymy used with retained earnings and serve as a market 
indicator as well as a measurement of financial business performance. When seen as a 
market indicator, the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (2017) defines profits a statistical 
metric, measuring the net income of publicly listed companies. This yields in National 
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) of any given country by including after-tax profits, 
profits from current activities, and book-based profits. When seen as a measurement of 
corporate business performance, profits account for the total income before tax 
deductions minus the implied cost to reach these profits (US Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, 2017). This allows setting profit equal to retained earnings of an organization 
after tax deduction.  
In terms of financial analysis, profits are used to measure the rate of return (ROR) in 
investments and help to analyse the relationship between earnings, assets, and equity 
valuation of a company (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2017). 
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Thus, profitability is calculated either as income-based or cashflow-based. The income-
based perspective divides profitability into two classes, first profits in relation to capital 
invested (return on assets), and second interest deducted profits in relation to a company´s 
invested equity (return on equity). The cashflow or accounting perspective is more 
diversified and clustered into four kinds of profitability. Firstly, return on assets within 
the periodic inflow of payments based on the sum of all equity, including debt, and assets. 
Secondly, the return on equity in a consecutive period, focusing on the generated return 
over equity invested and measured in interest gained. Thirdly, a company´s profit ratio, 
relating gained profits to necessary capital for business operations, not taking 
extraordinary expenses and deductions into account. And fourth, the net profit ratio, 
which divides periodic after-tax profits by their respective net sales (Breuer, 2013). 
 
Successively, profitability describes the ability to make a profit. It derives from all 
business activities of an organization and its entities, measuring how efficiently profit can 
be generated by including all available resources in the market. Thus, Horward and Upto 
(1961) define profitability very broad as the capability of any investment or financial 
undertaking to realise a return from its utilization. Whilst most organizations are 
structured in various layers and entities, business performance as a concept can be 
measured at different levels and approaches (Horward & Upto, 1961). This results in 
several levels of firm profits according to international financial reporting standards. For 
example, gross profit (GP), net profit (NP), or net operating profit after taxes (NOPAT). 
These are defined by the international financial reporting standard (IFRS) for all 
corporations taxable in the NIPA code (US) or similar IFRS bound jurisdictions such as 
countries in the European Union (IFRS Foundation, 2018). All organizations which are 
required to file trade, business, occupational or local taxes derived from corporate gains 
fall under the group of companies whose business results in corporate profit (Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, 2017). Therefore, corporate profitability provides a combined 
measure of present and future corporate financial health. In this role, it serves as an 
essential indicator of corporate and economic performance (Breuer, 2013). 
 
5.2 Financial Measures for Corporate Profitability 
KPIs are considered systems of financial and non-financial indicators characterizing 
development and prospects of a company. Aimed at the creation of transparency, 
reliability, and measurability, KPIs serve to establish a hold on tactical and strategical 
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company objectives for employees and executives (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). For some 
authors KPIs indicate compliance with performance levels, to set strategic goals for a 
companies and their subsystems (Strelnik, Usanova, & Khairullin, 2015). 
A system of KPIs translates a company´s strategy in a language of measurable economic 
and business-related indicators to guide and secure its implementation. However, Huselid 
(1995) sees a KPIs as an indicators assessing the degree of achievement of tactical and 
strategical company objectives in all relevant business areas from revenue forecasting to 
operational HR Management. 
Among the multitude of KPIs used to account for corporate profitability, not all are 
necessary for the analysis of downsizing measurements. As stated in section 4.4 a major 
goal of downsizers is to increase profitability through the financial implications of 
downsizing. Besides the given explanation for profit and profitability in the previous 
section, some downsizing studies define analysed profitability as the yearly operating 
profit or loss related to net-turnover (Kiviniemi, 2014). Oftentimes, these studies do not 
account for country-specific variations of accounting standards, but rather compare KPIs.  
Other financial indicators used for downsizing comparisons are related to corporate debt, 
e.g. debt solvency. It is defined as an existing long-term debt in relation to total assets 
and serves as a measurement of the total debt to equity ratio (John et al., 1992). While 
debt solvency allows an outlook on corporate performance and future financial survival 
of the firm, it does not account for workforce-oriented cost reductions. Even though 
reduced debt leverage will positively influence the corporate future performance through 
improved financial ratings, certain tax shields and the liquidity situation, Chalos and Chen 
(2002) support the reduced usability of debt related KPIs and pledge for a more focused 
perspective on equity. 
 
5.3 Relevant Financial Measurements in Downsizing Studies 
In an effort to forecast and measure the effectiveness and overall impacts on profitability, 
numerous statistics can be applied: Financial KPIs can be either income statement, 
balance sheet, or cashflow based, or measures combining elements from two or more of 
the categories (Love & Nohria, 2005). Based upon the frequency of occurrence in 
academic research, ROA and ROE, as well as profit margin is the most relevant statistical 
measurement. Further relevant income-based indicators include return on sales, or 
balance-sheet-based efficiency measurements e.g. asset turnover, sales or net income p.e. 
Comparable statistics used in academia are mostly income statement-based, such as profit 
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margin, current ratio, or balance sheet based e.g. sales productivity or operating margin. 
The following table shows the frequency of income statement and balance sheet based 
derived from previous studies:  
 
Figure 2: The Frequency of Utilized KPIs in Previous Academic Downsizing & Restructuring Studies; Own 
Illustration  
Most studies theorize on event-based research where the base year of the analysed 
financials is the year following the downsizing announcement. Effects on profitability 
usually build upon improved average or median outcomes of the sample. Most studies 
build upon regression analysis to point out the significance of the transformation.  
To select effective profitability measurements and derive with propositions about the 
profitability of downsizers, the most important financial measurements will be explained, 
deriving five out of 15 measurements for the corporate analysis in chapter seven. 
 
5.3.1 The Most Frequent Applied Downsizing Statistic ROA 
Return on Assets (ROA) is a measurement of profitability of every dollar invested, 
relating income to assets. Thereby, the ratio distinguishes between the profitability of any 
dollar invested by equity holders or equity lenders. Sometimes, the ratio is referred to as 
return on investment (ROI), when the overall return on all given investments is analysed 
(De Meuse et al., 1994). ROA is the most frequent ratio examining corporate profitability 
in downsizing studies (De Meuse et al., 1994; Mentzer, 1996; Casico et al., 1997; Elayan 
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et al., 1998; Chen et al., 2001; Chalos & Chen, 2002; Love & Nohria, 2005). Besides the 
regular ROA, some researchers use variations such as the ROA-market measure, the 
current performance divided by combined market-value of equity beginning-of-the-year 
and long-term book value (Love & Nohria, 2005).  
Chen et al. (2001) and Chalos & Chen (2002) find more positive effects of downsizing in 
the years following the announcement. Comparable to ROE developments, downsizers 
show declining ROA three years prior to the announcement. Post-announcement, the 
corporations in the sample deliver increasing ROA and show an elevated ROA, not far 
from the industry mean within a seven-year window. Chalos & Chen (2002) add another 
phenomenon also found when analysing COGS or OPFC ratios: revenue refocusing and 
cost cutting strategies lead to a significant post announcement effect, while plant closures 
do not hold this significant effect but still positively impact the ROA. De Meuse et al. 
(1994) support Chalos & Chen´s (2002) findings with similar effects on the post- and 
ante-announcement phase. Before downsizing, corporations have a four to six percent 
lower ROA compared to non-downsizers. After the announcement, over a period of two 
years, ROA significantly decreases one to two percent p.a. resulting in a poorer 
performance of downsizers. Furthermore, the study revealed that companies downsizing 
greater numbers of employees significantly underperform compared to lower numbers of 
layoffs. Tested thresholds were three and 10% benchmarks, both held for the comparison. 
Morris, Cascio, & Young (1999) underline these results inferring that ROA increases, the 
more employees a corporation has. Consequently, the positive relationship between ROA 







5.3.2 Analysing Return Based on Company Equity through ROE 
Return on Equity displays the relation of corporate profitability against every dollar 
invested by shareholders. The income-based ratio analyses the actual return to owners, 
based on their equity in the firm. The measurement is acknowledged to be the simplest 
test for the efficiency of downsizing activities. If the downsizing leads to an improved 
return on equity, the overall corporate goal, to create financial returns to its owners, is 
fulfilled (De Meuse et al., 1994).  
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Evidence for the positive effect of downsizing measurements is given by Elayan et al. 
(1998). The sample includes 1.362 announcements in between 1979 till 1991, showing 
that the average ROE decreased from 10.10% to 8.41% during the two-year period prior 
to the announcement. In the announcement year, the ROE averaged at 5.58%, before 
significantly increase to 6.61% in the year after and to 8.42% two years after the 
announcement. The same pattern was found in the average industry adjusted ROE, 







5.3.3 Additional KPIs for Profitability Analysis 
The frequent usage of corporate profit margin displays the effectiveness of this measure 
for the profitability analysis. By dividing profits through sales, the ratio can be applied as 
representing the cost of producing a dollar of final sales (De Meuse et al., 2004). Since 
profits are pre-tax income on the income statement, they cannot be taken simultaneously 
as net income. If labor costs per piece decrease due to downsizing, the profit margin is to 
rise and improve (Palmon, Sun, & Tang, 1997). De Meuse et al. (2004) highlight, that 
downsizers perform better compared to non-downsizers in an eight years period. 
 





Net income p.e., as well as sales p.e., are two income-based efficiency measurements. 
Both workforce-based KPIs track the ability to generate net income and sales more 
efficient. Net income p.e. provides the contribution p.e. to corporate profit, while sales 
p.e. analyse the percentage of sales provided by each employee (Elayan et al., 1998). 
According to Elayan et al., (1998), both ratios increase following a downsizing 
announcement. The median net income significantly increases over the second and third 
year after the announcement, within the firm and compared to the industry median net 
income. Corporate sales productivity cannot be raised as much as the net income, by the 
different downsizing strategies, but still significantly. As for OPFC and COGS ratios, net 
income and sales productivity bear statistically significant improvements. Plant closure 
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might result in positive but insignificant effects of higher corporate profitability (Chalos 
& Chen, 2002).  










Based on a numerical selection of measurement statistics, the consistency of statistics to 
cover income- and cashflow-based measurements is of importance to improve the validity 
of the developed propositions in chapter eight. On the income side ROA, ROE, net 
income p.e. and sales p.e. are selected directly related to corporate profitability. On the 
balance side, Profit Margin allows for a balance sheet measurement, directly relating the 
RiW to the overall financial well-being of a corporation.  
 
5.4 Downsizing, Industry Performance and Economic Uncertainty 
Every corporation is vastly influenced by the industry it is located in. The magnitude of 
effects, that arrive through the maturity of the industry, its cyclicality, and the general 
trend towards bullish or bearish industry development (Cameron et al., 1991). 
Industry performance needs to be considered when evaluating the success and impact of 
an organizational restructuring, therefore business cycle elements during RiW need to be 
considered. Marshall, Mccolgan, & Mcleish (2012) examined RiW during the financial 
crisis of 2008 to compare these two periods of economic growth in the UK. Their 
outcomes show statistical significance of boom periods (2005 - 2006) leading to positive 
excess returns (0.51 to 0.8%) within two days (+-) from the public announcement. 
Whereas downsizing announcements made during the crisis lead to significant negative 
excess returns (1.75 to 1.95%) in the same duration. Their most outstanding finding: the 
reason behind the downsizing is not a significant factor for the return, while the business 
cycle is. This undermines the idea that downsizing decisions during economic downturns 
signal weak investment opportunities while downsizing under prosperous economic 
phases enhance efficiency.  
Besides the positive highlighted perception of downsizing during boom areas and the 
rather negative during recessions, there is another meaningful factor concerning the state 
of the overall economy. Tuominen (2005) analyses the return differences between boom 
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and recession downsizers and concludes similar findings: downsizing during an economic 
downturn leads to negative abnormal returns, while layoff during phases of boom shows 
no abnormal returns. To account for industry performance capital intensity is included in 
the financial analysis of each case, besides a quick summary of the economic, and 
industry drivers. Capital intensity is an accepted differentiator between industries, as well 







For the proceeding of this paper, it is important to include the economic situation and 
general industry trends into the analysis of German Downsizings. A negative economic 
surrounding is perceived to have a neutral or negative effect, whereas an economic boom 
should positively influence profitability, these impacts will be taken into account. 
 
5.5 Concluding remarks on Downsizing Statistics 
Downsizers aim for increased efficiency when the estimated positive effects of the 
strategy and the expected cash savings outweigh the continuation of the status quo 
(Elayan et al., 1998). Downsizers oftentimes apply the strategy reactive to meet necessary 
adaptations in changing market environments. Securing profitability does play a vital role 
in the decision to downsize or continue operations whilst a RiW might reduce cash 
outflow drastically. Here, downsizers have, compared to non-downsizers, a lower overall 
profitability, and higher debt solvency. However, both indicators might be important 
factors behind the strategic decision to downsize, to achieve a healthier balance-sheet as 
well as cost base (De Meuse et al., 1994). In this function, the strategy is a rational 
economic response for companies in financial trouble (Mone, McKinley, & Barker, 
1998). Since downsizing aims at financial improvements, this effect should be 
measurable. Academic literature mostly bases its research on income-based indicators, 
ROA and ROE, and on balance-sheet-based, such as profit-margin, to measure 
downsizing effects. Even though there are numerous ways to capture efficiency increases, 
these three seem mostly preferred to analyse a company´s ability to produce a total return 
for equity holders on the total return. Even though empirical studies are inconclusive, 
Cascio et. al (1997) and Chalos & Chen (2002) find that Downsizers deliver improved 
financial performance post-announcement, compared to the industry average. They 
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conclude further, that revenue refocusing and efficiency programs as part of a downsizing 
strategy deliver superior financial results. According to Love & Nohria (2005), proactive 
downsizing outperforms reactive strategies, especially where higher cost bases indicate 
greater improvements on ROA. Contrary findings question the overall idea behind 
downsizing and prove no consistent relationship between the magnitude of the 
downsizing and improved future profitability (Mentzer, 1996). Some studies present 
evidence, showing no significant effect of downsizing on corporate profitability (De 
Meuse et al., 1994, & De Meuse et al., 2004). 
These opposing findings raise the questions why some downsizers perform better than 
others, and what would not have happened if the downsizing would not have been 
undertaken to improve financial performance? Therefore, when assessing individual 
research around the topic, it should be kept in mind, that different samples, industries, 
and business cycles might lead to mixed outcomes between comparable studies. 
Combined with country-specific differences in downsizing-related regulations and 
proceedings, financial implications for downsizers have a multitude of results. 
6 Methodology Chapter 
The following chapter covers the methodological techniques applied in the research 
process. Successively, the research method, data collection, the research progress in the 
respective field, and the establishment of the company sample are analysed. Saunder´s, 
Thornbill´s, and Lewi´s (2009) vastly used framework of a research onion (Figure 3) is 
visualized below and subsequently depicted from the outermost (philosophy) to the most 
inner (data collection and analysis) layer. Based on the application of the respective 
philosophy, the fundamental research approach is defined. Upon this foundation, the 
researcher decides on a research strategy as a third step, before the methodological choice 
and time horizon have to be defined. Lastly, the actual data collection and analysis 
conclude the procession within the framework. With the ´onion´ Saunders et al. (2009) 
introduce a framework, consisting of a series of stages to illustrate the applicable 
methodology of the research process. The commonly used framework is applied within 
this paper due to its consideration of various research methodologies and widely accepted 
applicability. Based on the above-stated reasoning, the following chapters determine the 
different layers of the underlying ´research onion´, throughout subsections. 
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6.1 Research Method 
Research frameworks provide a closer understanding of the chosen research methodology 
and the research procedure used in different studies. One frequently applied framework 
is Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill´s research onion (2009). The research onion combines 
five layers from the outermost to inner: research philosophy, theoretical approach, 
strategy, choices and time horizon (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2016). 
 
Figure 3. The Research Onion; From Saunders et al. ( 2009) 
The amount of research based on the proceedings of the research onion allows for a great 
provision of details and the ability of researchers to highlight their foregoing step by step 
(Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). 
 
6.2 Research Philosophy 
The philosophical background of the ´onion´ contains various assumptions about the 
system of beliefs, the assumptions as well as the applied worldview within the research 
process. Thus, philosophy is placed as the outermost layer of the ´onion´. The derived 
assumptions lead the applied research strategy and chosen methods (Saunders et al., 
2009). Further, Johnson and Clark (2006) support this view because researchers need to 
be aware of undertaken philosophical commitments derived from their choice of strategy.  
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The philosophies differ in their intended goals, while the concluded choice allows for 
efficient creation of knowledge. Major philosophies are grouped into Positivism, 
Realism, Interpretivisms, and Pragmatism. 
Positivism as a philosophy is based on observable knowledge with a limited role of the 
researcher since the main effort is the collection and successive objective interpretation 
of data. Findings within this philosophy must be observable, calling for a statistical 
analysis, as results are numerically quantifiable. Realism, the second philosophy, suggests 
the independence of the human mind from reality. The philosophy is split into direct and 
indirect Realism: while direct Realism lets the human portray the world based on human 
sense, the indirect philosophy is based on a human´s experience of the sensation of the 
world, even though they do not portray reality and the real world. Philosophy number 
three, Interpretivism, depends on the interpretation of gathered research elements and is 
based on the integration of human interest. Therefore, Interpretivism supports qualitative 
rather than quantitative data whilst there is more room or interpretation. Lastly, 
Pragmatism as a research philosophy combines the assumptions of Positivism and 
Interpretivism. The approach allows for qualitative and quantitative methods (Rubin & 
Rubin, 2011)  
The majority of data analysed in this paper is qualitative to facilitate the development of 
propositions. Therefore, Interpretivism as a research philosophy is chosen. Collected data 
relies mostly on trustworthy secondary data, supplied by the researched organizations. 
Interpretivism combines a range of downsides, such as room for bias towards the 
researcher or hard-to-generalize data whilst data is gathered from an individual point of 
view (Saunders et al., 2009). 
 
6.3 Research Approach 
Research is mainly conducted in two manners: the deductive and inductive research 
approach, to be compared in Appendix 1.3. A deductive research approach is based upon 
the development of theory and hypothesis, before these are tested and successively 
rejected or confirmed. Deductive reasoning is defined as deriving conclusions from 
formally built premises as the foundation for the later outcomes, even though the 
reliability and truthfulness of the premises must be secured. Deductive reasoning and the 
positivist approach do fit best since they can result in the formulation of hypotheses and 
it´s confirmation or rejection. 
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Contrary, the inductive research approach commences from the observation and 
continues with the analysis of patterns to derive and establish a theory. Intuitively, valid 
premises do not have to automatically lead to valid conclusions. Inductive Reasoning is 
found mostly with qualitative data, generating new theories, and adding fits into existing 
theories. 
A third, infrequently used approach is the abductive reasoning. It introduces a surprising 
or provocative fact, which serves simultaneously as a start and conclusion of the research 
process. Abductive reasoning neither approaches data from theory as the deductive 
approach, nor vice versa as the inductive approach, but combines both methods (Saunders 
et al., 2009).  
This paper is based upon two distinctive literature reviews as the basis of the underlying 
thesis, these literature parts cannot be utilized as the foundation of the hypothesis 
development. Even though both parts intervene with each other through the usage of 
profitability KPIs in Downsizing studies, they are mostly linked in the empirical part. 
Since the research aim has not been previously examined in its geographical and legal 
extent, data has to be gathered and analysed individually, before theoretical statements 
are developed. Thus, this study follows inductive reasoning to derive with propositions. 
 
6.4 Research Design 
The natural design of the study is exploration, following the exploratory study design, 
also known as Worldsupporter (n.d.). Therefore, the aim is data exploration to collect new 
insights within the scope of the subjacent objectives of this paper. 
 
6.5 Research Strategy 
Successively, a research strategy must be adopted in line with the previously chosen 
research philosophy and approach. A strategy can be obtained in one of the following 
ways: experiment, survey, case study, action research, grounded theory, ethnography, or 
archival research. Even though an in-depth analysis of all named options would be 
beneficial for the integrity of the paper, only the matching strategy based on previously 
selected layers is depicted. 
The suitable strategy for the chosen research design and research question, based upon 
the conceptualization of this paper is the case study analysis. This strategy can be 
adequately defined as research involving empirical analysis of selected contemporary 
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occurings midst their real-life context, while applying a manifold body of sources and 
evidence (Robson & McCartan, 2016). The importance of the context is highlighted by 
Yin (2009), clarifying that boundaries between the studied phenomenon and the case 
cannot be drawn clearly. In comparison to other strategies, case study research does not 
happen within a controlled context, as in experimental settings, or introduces a limitation 
to exploration and comprehension due to the number of variables collected as the survey 
strategy. 
Case study analysis benefits researchers through rich insights and understanding of the 
given context and the enacted proceedings (Morris & Wood, 1991). Commonly used for 
“why”, “what” and “how” questions, the case study is most frequently applied in 
explanatory research. Data collection is most often a mixture of various sources including 
observations, documentary analysis, interviews, or questionnaires. This combination is 
defined as a triangulation of various data collection techniques included in one study, to 
ensure maximal reliability. Alongside the strategy, two differentiations can be drawn: 
single versus multiple cases and holistic versus embedded case strategy. The deepness of 
analysis and prior research effort upon question and organization distinguishes between 
single and multiple case strategy. A single case design is often applied in unique or rather 
extreme cases. When the research object is a single organization and prior research 
phenomenon has not been previously considered, single case designs are selected. When 
two or more organizations are at the centre of the research, a multiple case strategy is 
selected to verify findings are individual or occur in more cases. The rationale behind 
reoccurring findings is the possibility of generalization of a certain phenomenon. The 
generalization from a singular case is almost impossible and lead the opinion that single 
case strategies need to have strong justifications. The second differentiation is drawn 
according to the underlying research object, namely the complete organization, or several 
of its sub-units. If researchers are concerned with the overall organization, and not logical 
subunits, a holistic case design is usually applied. Vice versa, if the strategy includes more 
than one unit of analysis within a single organization, the strategy is embedded, not taking 
into consideration the number of subunits or deepness of analysis (Yin, 2009). 
The case study design as research strategy is derived from the attributes of the afore 
implied selection. Since the scope of this paper has been studied with limited reach in 
geographical and legal terms, a multiple holistic case study design allows the generation 
of propositions from the collected and examined data (De Meuse et al., 2004). Firstly, 
data is conducted by documentary analysis, based on a theoretical sampling beforehand. 
 Downsizing and Shareholder Value of German Corporations          39 
Secondly, all metric KPIs are analysed in their respective category, which is derived from 
the previously undertaken assessment of a certain number of widely used financial 
metrics. Thirdly, propositions are development based on their evaluation. 
6.6 Choice of Data 
Upon the chosen research strategy, data can be examined in different ways through a 
mono, or multiple method approach. The chosen method thereby depends on the scope of 
the applied analysis technique: because a matching technique relies on the considered 
types of data, these will be explained before the methods are introduced: data expressed 
through words or images is qualitative, whereas data expressed numerical is quantitative 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Quantitative research examines large, random, or representative 
samples in a statistical, empirical, and experimental manner, typically collected through 
inanimate tools as scales, surveys, tests, questionnaires, and computers (Booth, Colomb, 
& Williams, 1995). In contrast, qualitative research undergoes fieldwork, physically 
analysing people, institutions, natural settings, and documents. Usually, all can be used 
single, even documents alone serve as qualitative study material (Bryman et. al, 2011). 
The mono method follows either quantitative or qualitative data collection without any 
mixture of the collection. The purely qualitative approach oftentimes applies a claim 
based on a constructivist or positivist perspective to develop theory from individual 
experience, or historical or social meanings. To allow this theory development, narratives, 
grounded theory or case studies are applied to develop themes from the data. Quantitative 
research choice utilizes primary postpositivist claims to develop knowledge or employs 
strategies of inquiry f. ex. experiments, surveys, and data collection for statistical 
analysis, based on predetermined instruments. 
In contrast, the 
multiple method 
subsumes multi and 
mixed methods with 
each of its 
implications as seen in 
Figure 4.: The mixed 
methods allow to 
study both types of data 
collection and analyses procedures within the chosen research design and without further 
restrictions. The mixed method research includes both types of data collection and 
Figure 4. Research Choice, From Sauder et. al (2009) 
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analysis procedures either parallel or sequential but in combination. The analysis is done 
deductively through statistical tools, e.g. median or quantiles, that may result in precise 
findings (Merriam, 1998). Mixed-model research includes quantitative and qualitative 
collection techniques and analysis while combining these with quantitative and 
qualitative approaches in prior and later phases of the research. 
The multi-method includes the qualitative and quantitative multi-method research, and  
relies on more data collection techniques with a restriction on either quantitative or 
qualitative data collection (Saunders et al., 2009). 
Besides the clear differentiation between methods, there is an inevitable connection 
between the utilized technique for data collection and the derived outcome. It is 
impossible to determine the nature of the relationships. All procedures and techniques 
produce varying effects that if mixed, cancel out each other’s shortcomings (Smith, 
1981). 
Consequently, the chosen method is a qualitative mono research method. Even though 
qualitative and quantitative data is collected, the analysis happens in a descriptive and 
comparing fashion for more than one type of data. The application of mixed method 
research is not considered supportive, due to limitations in data availability and in 
transparent quality. The mono qualitative approach allows to create a vivid picture of the 
multiple cases and the financial performance. 
 
6.7 Time Horizon 
Upon discussing the inner layer of research techniques, the time-horizon of the underlying 
study needs to be identified. Saunders et al (2009) articulate that the time-taken to 
research a phenomenon is independent of the chosen research methodology. Timewise, 
the horizon can be longitudinal or cross-sectional, indicating the pure length of the 
undertaken monitoring and its point in time. Longitudinal research analyses a 
phenomenon over time depicting its changes, aiming to research the dynamics of a certain 
problem. Cross-sectional studies take a phenomenon´s momentum at a certain point in 
time. Therefore, cross-sectional studies are applied to analyse certain phenomena over a 
specific time horizon. For most case studies, there is usually a longitudinal element: cases 
are examined over a fixed period, while data is collected periodically, year-on-year. This 
thesis applies a horizon of three years, to allow a cross sectional comparison.  
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6.8 Data Collection and Analysis 
6.8.1 Collected Data 
The collection of data, to gather information, can be undertaken in a primary and 
secondary manner. Primary data has been unpublished and is collected for a specific or 
unique purpose. Whereas secondary data has been previously published in studies, 
reports, journals and so forth (Booth, Colomb & Williams, 1995). The gathered data in 
the empirical part of this study is secondary since it originates from either secured but 
openly available corporate annual reports and academic studies, or the statistical database 
Bloomberg. Additionally, secondary data collection is applied when data is gathered 
within the literature review throughout the afore sections of this paper. 
In solving the question of how downsizing impacts corporate profitability, the 
fundamentals of downsizing, profitability and corporate performance are reviewed in 
chapter four to create an up-to-date picture of the research field in geographic context. 
Here, secondary sources of literature are used including studies, journal articles, and book 
section in the afore part of this papers. Secondly, corporate annual reports and academic 
studies are used to create a vivid picture about the overall corporate and industry 
performance during the time of the downsizing. This part relies on secondary sources that 
enable an analysis of the corporate performance from in- and outside. Thirdly, 
quantitative financial information about the case specific downsizing is collected through 
data from corporate annual reports in two cases, and from Bloomberg in four cases2. This 
secondary data serves as a basis for the quantitative analysis of corporate profitability in 
the selected time horizon in the last part of each case. By combining qualitative and 
quantitative data in a mixed fashion allows for a qualitative analysis based on quantitative 
results (Booth et al., 1995). 
 
6.8.2 Sampling 
The original sample includes all companies that were listed in the DAX between 2000 
and 2015. The DAX is defined as the large corporation stock index of Germany, listing 
30 corporations that can be exchanged, based on their market capitalization (Deutsche 
Börse, 2009). This company sample was based on the DAX for certain reasons: 
                                                 
2 For the Automotive industry, data was extracted from the annual report, due to the extraction difficulties, 
concerning the separation of Daimler form Daimler Chrysler´s financial results within the data sets of 
Bloomberg. Thus, corporate annual statement data was utilized to allow homogenous data. For all other 
cases Bloomberg data sets could be utilized. 
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The corporation must have been part of the DAX 30 in between 2000 and 2015 for at 
least three consecutive years. The corporation may have been excluded or entered the 
index throughout the whole period. So, all firms belong to the same stock market and 
have the same scrutiny and publication principles, demanded by the German Stock 
Exchange Bureau. They are generally confronted with similar regulations and situations 
in the stock market. Even though these companies operate in different industries, they 
belong to the same peer group, and probably face similar socio-cognitive considerations. 
Besides, their listing on the index fosters the application of the same set of accounting 
principles, minimizing distortions of financial measures. Additionally, a focus on large 
corporations allows greater comparability with previous studies, mostly focused on large 
public firms (Vicente-Lorente & Suarez-Gonzalez, 2007). Further, the DAX holds 
various industries, none account for more than 25% of the total value of the index. Even 
though many downsizing studies focus on the manufacturing sector (D. K. Datta, Basuil, 
& Radeva, 2010) the used sample includes the service industry as well. Downsizing 
among service corporations is especially relevant due to the strong reliance of human 
capital and the increasing importance of the service industry (Brauer & Laamanen, 2014). 
The result is a set of 34 companies who total to 450 company years that needed analysis. 
Through careful consideration of annual reports, focused on headcount, the selection was 
drawn according to the following factors: 
First, restructuring must be either financial or organizational, as both refer to a RiW. 
Portfolio restructuring will not be analysed as it does usually not take operationalized 
RiW into account, even though it is occurring side by side with organizational or financial 
(Bowman & Singh, 1993). Second, the company must have stated a restructuring activity 
within its annual statement or within a publicly available statement. This approach has 
been used in downsizing research and allows for a definite number of companies a rather 
accurate picture of the downsizing situation (Brauer & Laamanen, 2014). Third, almost 
all companies operate outside their home country, while being headquartered in Germany. 
This opens potential home country biases (Brauer & Laamanen, 2014). Therefore, the 
downsizing activities are solely focused on their separately analysed German reductions. 
Fourth, the percentage of workforce reduction must be significant. According to German 
Labor Law (KSchG), at least 30 out of 500 or six percent of the total workforce 
(Kündigungsschutzgesetz §17 (3), 2004) must be downsized. However, large-scale 
downsizing studies usually utilize five percentage (Casico, Young and Morris, 1997; 
Chen et al. (2001). This paper follows most downsizing studies to comply with prior 
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research in the field. Purely passive reductions solely based on natural fluctuation through 
prior pension agreements (Altersteilzeit) or regular termination of working contracts from 
the employer side are considered within the sample in the respective years since natural 
fluctuations, as passive downsizing happen continuously besides active RiW. 
To obtain relevant headcount information to derive with RiW in between 2000 and 2015, 
the previous 34 DAX members (Appendix table 1.4) were researched according to 
headcount, by using Bloomberg Professional Service and publicized annual reports. 
6.8.3 Analysis 
The underlying analysis on downsizing and corporate performance use different 
approaches. Historically, downsizing research frequently uses qualitative approaches, 
when analysing single industries and individual cases (Mirabal & DeYoung, 2005; 
Gandolfi, 2013). To answer the selected research questions about the extent to which 
downsizing influences the corporate profitability of German corporations, common 
statistics are measured and compared quantitatively. The selected quantitative statistics 
originate from three areas: 
• Workforce Performance: Employee change, Net Income p.e., and Sales  
productivity 
• Industry Performance: Economic situation, and capital intensity 
• Firm Performance: ROA, ROE, and Profit margin. 
 
Figure 5. Analysis Proceedings; Source: Own Illustration  
Business-related and downsizing-related indicators stem from the frequency analysis of 
income statement and balance sheet-based statistic in Chapter 5.3. Industry-related 
measurements include the company´s capital intensity, to account for respective industry 
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These findings are used as the numeric foundation for the later comparison and lastly the 
development of propositions. Propositions are formulated based on a descriptive 
evaluation of successful downsizings KPIs (e.g. increased profitability). When more than 
three out of six KPIs developed positive throughout the respective downsizing program, 
the restructuring is categorized as successful. 
The explorative approach undermines the research approach and the restrictions that 
accompany the research method. The chosen research approach, descriptive and 
explorative, allows to better document, describe, and help to answer the research issue. 
This follows a logical reasoning: German research on the topic is compared to the US, 
UK or France, partly underdeveloped, due to regulatory circumstances on its proceedings 
(Weiss & Ivars, 2001). 
 
6.9 Limitation on Data 
Firstly, Germany does not have any binding regulation or law, obligating corporations to 
publicly announce a downsizing or restructuring, as long as it is not directly linked to 
bankruptcy or holds significant influence on the stock itself (Gerhard & Merten, 2017). 
There is neither a governmental or economic registration of such passive downsizing 
measures nor a scientific database for research. This is driving need for research of 
secondary data from corporations, journals, service organizations, and other sources to 
realize a set of data on corporate downsizing measurements and their impact. 
A simple reason for the fragmented information is missing guidelines for workforce ad-
hoc publication requirements in Germany´s legal code. The Works Constitution Act and 
the Securities Trade Act treat downsizing as a measurement of restructuring and thereby 
labelling it an internal development that could or could not be issued (WpHG, 2018; 
KschG 2018).  
The resulting conflict does not only evolve in downsizing related topics but in general 
business terms, e.g. what needs to be treated as an insider information or to be released 
due to the obligation to notify shareholders. Gerhard & Merten (2017) state instances that 
could justify ad-hoc information according to § 111 S. 3 BetrVG: Changes in the 
operational and organizational structure, especially greater restructurings. These changes 
(Betriebsänderungen) might be outsourcing, spin-off, or offshoring activities, greater 
workforce reductions (sozialplanpflichtige Bertriebsänderung), and mergers of different 
segments to realize synergies and considerable reduction or decrease in labor cost. 
Nevertheless, information related to these topics does not have to be published and no 
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reliable database is established to facilitate quantitative research on the segment of 
reductions in the workforce (Bhankaraully, 2018). 
Secondly, the applied approach questions the generalizability of qualitative research or a 
case study. This is related to the significance of this type of research to theoretical 
propositions (Bryman 1988; Yin 2003). The sample size of six cases does not hold a 
significant amount of cases, to allow for a statistical significance test. Hence, this thesis 
follows a path, combining qualitative findings in a higher number, to allow for the 
identification of patterns and their impact on profitability. The established results are then 
combined with outcomes derived from the quantitative analysis. This paper relates a 
research project to existing theory to demonstrate that findings have a broader theoretical 
significance than the individual case or cases that form its foundation (Marshall & 
Rossman, 1999).  
 
6.10 Proposition Development  
Propositions are developed subsequently in chapter eight to answer the question on how 
downsizing impacts the profitability of German corporations intra- and inter-industry. 
Profitability is measured in various forms and manners (see chapter 5.3). Following the 
chosen analysis, the impact is measured on workforce, and business performance.  
Compared to the majority of downsizing research, using hypothesis and hypothesis 
testing, this paper is of a kind that develops propositions based on multiple holistic cases, 
to build a comparison to serve future qualitative studies (Mirabal & DeYoung, 2005; 
Gandolfi, 2013). The difference between hypothesis and propositions lies in the use of 
logical constructs. Both stand for logically conjectured relationships between two or more 
constructs. Hypothesis investigates variables derived from a testable statement, whereas 
propositions are broader mental configurations of a certain phenomenon in the form of 
an untested statement (Ban & Ry, 1993). 
Due to limitations, described in the previous part, the usage of propositions in the context 
of German downsizing research seems most appropriate in the current state. After 
theorizing around the data source, by applying the theoretical framework gained from the 
undertaken literature review, the specified outcomes of each case are described, before 
propositions are developed successively in an inductive manner.  
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7 Results 
7.1 General Results 
Downsizing in Germany is a frequently used practice among large corporations. These 
findings are based on the documentary analysis in the first chapter of the general results. 
Even though final propositions about the financial implications of the downsizing are 
drawn after the latter, case-based evaluation, the answer for the question on “How do 
German DAX members apply downsizing?” starts here with a general overview of 
findings, before the respective cases are developed and the second question “How do DAX 
members perform in a three-year period after a downsizing?” 
The sample was divided into eight categories, derived from the DAX categorization: 
Automotive & Manufacturing, Banking & Insurance, Chemicals, Consumer Goods & 
Retail, Energy, ICT & Datamanagement, Retail, Transportation & Tourism, and 
Resources. After analysing headcount and FTE for gradual shifts and negative 
developments over a three-year period, the respective downsizings were classified into 
Portfolio or Asset & Financial downsizing. All 34 companies engaged in organizational 
or asset downsizing activities, 23 of 34 corporations state the activity in their annual 
statement and only 17 of 34 (50 %) undertook a downsizing in Germany. A minority 
reduced more than five percent over a three-year timeframe in Germany, and just eight 
out of 34 downsized in an industry with a direct competitor between 2000 and 2015: 
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Overall, 23 corporations (67.5%) stated that asset or organizational downsizing has 
occurred in between 2000 and 2015. While only 50% of the sample reduced the amount 
of labor in Germany, less than 42% directly downsized more than five percent throughout 
the downsizing activity. Based on the selection of samples, only 13 cases ( 38.2%) of 
companies have a direct industry counterpart in the selected period, and only eight have 
a directly comparable business model during  the downsizing foregoing. 
Industry-wise, almost all industries included downsizers in the respective periods. One 
outlier, Consumer Goods & Retail, including Adidas AG and Metro Group does not hold 
significant downsizing potential. While Adidas AG could almost continuously increase 
its number of employees, Metro Group could steer its activities mainly without unforced 
redundancies (betriebsbedingte Kündigung), never reducing more than 6% within one 
business year in Germany. 
Companies labeled the measurements in various ways within their annual statements, 
from least to most commonly used terms: Social plan and transfer of human resource 
(Sozial Plan & Transfergesellschaft), corporate reorganization (Unternehmens-
reorganisation), downsizing (Mitarbeiterreduktion/ Verringerung der Anzahl von 
Mitarbeitern oder Äquivalenten), efficiency program (Programm zur 
Effizienzsteigerung). Timewise, most downsizings happened in two periods: first, 
following the financial crisis (2007/2008) with eight downsizings (40%), equally split 
between downsizings lasting from 2008 to 2009 and 2008 till 2010. Second, after the Dot-
Com Bubble (2000/2001) with seven downsizings from 2002 till 2004. Here 3 
downsizings occurred in 2003, two between 2002-2003 and another two between 2003-
2004. 
After analysing the overall sample quantitatively, the following set of companies in its 
industry sectors evolved for the mixed-method direct case comparison: 
Nr Industry Company 
1 Automotive BMW AG 
2 Automotive Daimler AG 
3 Banking & Insurance Commerzbank AG 
4 Banking & Insurance Deutsche Bank AG 
5 Banking & Insurance Deutsche Postbank AG 
6 Energy E.ON AG 
7 Energy RWE AG 
Figure 7. Sample of Selected Downsizers According to the Data Analysis, Source: Own Illustration 
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The Banking and Insurance sector offers four potential cases, derived from the direct 
comparability of business models. Hypo Real Estate is excluded as its model is based on 
real estate financing, while all others are based on commercial and investment banking. 
Additionally, Deutsche Bank is not included, as it takes the leading position in the 
German banking sector, accompanied by greatest market share and cash reserves that 
facilitate the restructuring. This allows analysis of the counterparts Daimler AG & BMW 
AG, Commerzbank &  Postbank, and RWE & E.ON in a successive periodical manner. 
 
7.2 Downsizing Multi-Case Analysis 
Based on the selected metric KPIs derived from a previously undertaken assessment of 
widely used financial metrics in chapter 5.3., downsizing programs of the established 
company set are analysed. Each section begins with an industry overview before selected 
cases are compared visually and finally verbally to understand, how DAX members 
perform in a three-year period after a downsizing. Each case is analysed top down: firstly, 
a company and restructuring description is given, secondly, the workforce adaptations 
and related indicators are described, thirdly the economic environment and changes in 
capital intensity are derived, and fourthly business performance is visualized and 
explained. Cases are compared intra-industry before the multiple downsizing cases are 
compared inter-industry to establish valid comparisons between cases. 
 
7.2.1 Downsizing in Automotive Corporations 
Automotive corporations usually depend heavily on the world economies stability and 
business cycles. Especially the German automotive industry exports the majority of its 
vehicles to European countries, USA and China (Schade et al., 2014). The economic 
situation for automotive corporations in Germany between 2000 and 2015 is 
characterized by the changing forms of mobility linked to the energy transformation, sales 
shocks caused by local market crisis in Asia and South America, and the global financial 
crisis, combined with regular business cycles dynamics. Market entry barriers are 
traditionally high as it requires technological leadership, combined with local sales-force 
and brand recognition (Mönnig, 2011). German car manufacturers could lead in the 
premium segment worldwide throughout the complete period with Audi, BMW, and 
Daimler, and Volkswagen, even though the industry underwent major cutbacks in 2004 
and 2008. The first downturn, imposed by a saturated market in Europe and North 
America, lowered demand for premium cars world-wide, blurred the market outlook for 
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German car manufacturers in 2004 before Asian demand sharply increased between 2004 
and 2007. The second occurred during the financial crisis of 2008/ 2009, sales of German 
car manufacturers dropped by 20% within a year and overcapacity reached an enormous 
magnitude. Losses could only be curbed due to cost reduction programs, dynamic 
production, and delivery schemes and flexible working law (Schade et al., 2014). The 
market environment was mixed between 2000 and 2010, even though after the period 
between 2004 to 2007, car sales roses steadily. This trend continued from 2011 onwards 
with sales records year-on-year. The following table gives a summary of the key facts of 
both downsizings: 
Company Name Daimler (Chrysler) AG BMW AG 
Downsizing Program Efficiency Increase Program 
“CORE” 
Strategy “Number ONE” 
Downsizing as a 
Restructuring Tool  
• Proactive or Reactive 
downsizing 



































• Active vs Passive 
















• Active & Passive 
• With forced 
redundancies 
Downsizing Period 2005 till 2008 2007 till 2010 








296.109 to 277.771 
(6.6%) 




107.539 to 100.041 
(~6.67%) 
107.539 to 95.453 
(~11.24% ) 
Table 4. Automotive Industry Downsizing Comparison; Source: Own Illustration  
Daimler AG: 
Daimler AG, former DaimlerChrysler till 2006, is a German manufacturer, distributor, 
and seller of cars, trucks, buses, and vans. The Stuttgart-based company was founded in 
1998 as DaimlerChrysler AG, after the merger with the US auto corporation Chrysler. 
The renaming to Daimler took place after the demerger of Chrysler in 2007. Besides its 
automotive and industry services, Daimler provides financial and other mobility services 
related to its automotive businesses (Bloomberg, 2018c). After the merger with Chrysler 
in 1998, the automotive giant struggled to accomplish previously assumed synergies and 
could not obtain the planned financial performance till 2001. The post-merger integration 
process was tranquilized by a magnitude of personal, managerial, operational, and 
strategic flaws, decreasing the operational and financial performance of the corporation. 
When the company finally reached the targeted synergies, board and management 
fostered a plan to increase quality and operational efficiency by reducing overall 
organizational slack and adopt a tighter corporate layout (Meyer et al., 2002). 
DaimlerChrysler introduced CORE, a program to increase efficiency in the second 
quarter of 2005 before Chrysler was sold to a US consortium under the leadership of 
Ceberus Capital in 2007. However, the demerger was not part of the efficiency program 
and was timed planned well ahead. CORE´s workforce adaptation was driven by five 
strategic goals: profitability, competitive workforce, forward-looking leadership, highly 
perceived employer brand, and a professional organization. In numbers, CORE aimed at 
a reduction in administration allowances by €1.5bn per year, an increase of the operating 
margin to seven percent, and an integration of a new management model throughout 
different entities by 2007. Structural changes included a consolidation and integration of 
administrative functions such as Finance, Controlling or R&D, while gradually 
introducing a thinned management structure. Since administrative expenses lay above an 
industry average, CORE was inevitable to reach the targeted profitability margin, and 
shrinking human resource capacities essential, to reduce human-related allowances. A 
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RiW of 8.000 employees in Germany plus a reduction in administrative functions by 20% 
(6.000 employees) worldwide (DaimlerChrysler AG, 2005). The following charts do 
show the performance of Daimler as part of the DaimlerChrysler corporation till its 
demerger in 2007 and continuous performance after, employee numbers are calculated 
for Daimler only from the annual statement and can be found in Appendix 1.5. Effects 
are adjusted and financial KPIs are calculated based on Daimler´s performance, excluding 
Chrysler in the years from 2004 to 2007, thus the corporation will be called Daimler in 
the following analysis. Daimler could reduce its workforce by 7.36% from 296.109 in 
2005 to 274.330  in 2008. The company mainly downsized in 2006 (6.6%), where the full 
amount of reductions could be realized by active measurements, through agreements to 
terminate work contracts. In the two years after, terminations lay at 2.18% and even an 
increase in workforce by 0.97% in 2008. Performance-oriented KPIs did not show a 
constant trend: while net income 
p.e. drastically shrank from 
€0.0163 mn to €0.0049 mn in 
2008, sales productivity rose 
between 2005 to 2006 from 
30.61% to 35.90%, before it fell to 
33.29% in 2008.  In the second half 
of 2005, the economic 
environment for Daimler brightened due to falling commodity prices and a stronger 
demand in North America, before the industry could announce a world-wide peak of 
production and sales in the second half of 2006 (DaimlerChrysler AG, 2006). The 
upcoming economic recession drastically changed the bright industry outlook. It started 
in the US before effecting Asia and lastly Europe at the beginning of 2007. During this 
time, Daimler outperformed its ceasing partner Chrysler and announced a financial and 
portfolio restructuring in 2006 before selling its majority in Chrysler at the end of 2007 
(Daimler AG, 2007). In this environment, capital intensity rose by 29.35% to 75.26% in 
2008, compared to 58.19% three years prior. Further financial metrics showed a mixed 
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ROA slightly increase from 2005 (2.54%) to 2007 (3.05%) but fell drastically in 2008 to 
just 1,04%. ROE shows a steep decrease from 13.44% in 2005 to solemnly 4.19% in 
2008. Profit margin firstly 
improved by 43.37% till 2007, 
before it fell to 2.99% in 2008. 
While Daimler´s sales increased by 
0.73% during the analysed period, 
its revenue decreased by 7.27% to 
€100.596 mn till 2008. Profit more 
than halved (-52.78%) during the 
three-year interval and sunk to €2.830 mn, and net income shrank by 71.66% to bottom 
out at €1.370 mn in 2008. Daimler´s total assets reduced by 30.24% to €132.219 mn, 
while Shareholder equity fell simultaneously to €32.724 mn. 
Daimler undertook its downsizing in a rather positive economic environment before the 
financial and later economic crisis occurred in 2007 and 2008. The overall development 
is heavily influenced by the recession and lowered all financial KPIs to a pre-crisis and 
pre-downsizing low. In this environment, Daimler could not improve its financial 
performance during the analysed period, thus, the downsizing is classified unsuccessful 
(Daimler AG, 2007; DaimlerChrysler AG, 2004, 2005, 2006).  
 
BMW AG: 
BMW AG is a Munich-based premium car producer and was established in 1918. 
Bayerische Motoren Werke AG is a manufacturer and seller of luxury cars, and further 
motor-driven vehicles. The major product portfolio of BMW spans various segments, 
from luxury sedans to convertibles, sports cars, and touring motorcycles worldwide 
(Bloomberg, 2018a). The group introduced a strategic program to redirect its business 
segments and adapt to shifting market demands in 2007, shortly before the global 
financial crisis. Till 2020, BMW fostered a leading position in the premium car segment, 
manufacturing, and selling more than two mn cars p.a. Besides, it established a leading 
market position in the premium e-mobility segment for individual mobility. The program 
“Number ONE” targeted to increase profitability between eight to 10% (ROCE above 
26%) to enhance value long-term by establishing services and profitable product 
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the realization of new business models and a strategic transformation of its existing 
product portfolio inherent with an organizational redirection (BMW AG, 2007). 
Shortly after the announcement of the strategic redirection, the company faced a slump 
in commodity and service markets, especially in the US and Europe orders were called 
off. Shortly after most Asian countries, especially China, experienced the recession and 
the declining demand for luxury sedans and sports cars in the second half of 2008 (BMW 
AG, 2008). The company´s management highlighted the importance of the program in 
the upcoming crisis during and after the crisis and could forecast the importance of a more 
dynamic corporate structure for the upcoming period of economic growth from 2010 
onwards. Successively,  BMW reduced its workforce in 2008 by seven percent (7.498 
FTE), while not imposing a hiring freeze. The simple announcement of a RiW more than 
doubled the year-on-year fluctuation to 5.9%, before another 3.811 employees left the 
company in 2009. At the end of 2010, the RiW resulted in an 11.24% lower workforce. 
Workforce performance shows a 
clear downturn between 2007 and 
2010: Net income p.e. dropped 
from €0.029 mn to €0.022 mn in 
2009 before jumping to €0.034 mn 
in 2010. Sales productivity in the 
meantime rose from 64,15% before 
the start of Number ONE to 
75.49% in 2010, increasing by 17.68% in three years.  The economic environment for 
BMW between 2007 and 2009 was negative due to the global recession, heavily curbing 
the number of cars sold. The sale of premium cars and motorcycles sunk in 2008 by 4.3% 
& 0.8%, and in 2009 by 10.4% and 14.4%  successively (BMW AG, 2009). In this 
environment, BMW was able to decrease capital intensity by 13.94% to 57.37% in 2010 
from 66.67% three years prior. 
Further financial metrics do show a 
comparable trend to workforce 
performance from 2007 to 2010. 
First, ROA decreases from 3.54% to 
0.21% in 2009, before rising to 
2.97% in 2010. ROE develops 
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55.49% to 3.92% before rising to 45.63% in 2010. During the strategic restructuring, 
BMW´s sales increased by 4.45% to €72.058 mn, revenue increased by 7.96% to 
€60.477mn in 2010. Profit rose by 24.86% to €4.836mn in 2010 while net income rose 
by 3.19% to €3.234 mn in 2020. Total assets and shareholder equity, both increased 
during the period. Assets improved by 22.33% to €108.867 mn and shareholder´s equity 
even rose by 25.50% during the transformation, which featured a RiW of 11.24%. BMW 
undertook its successful downsizing in a negative economic environment, where the 
overall financial development was heavily influenced by the recession of 2007/2008 
(BMW AG, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010). 
 
Comparison: Both automotive corporations, Daimler and BMW underwent 
organizational restructuring in a time when the financial recession occurred, and world 
car sales heavily dropped in 2008. Daimler began their CORE downsizing in 2005 and 
finished three years later, at the peak of the financial crisis. BMW´s Number ONE 
program started in the year before the financial crisis and ended in 2010 when the world 
economy was rising again. The annual changes in workforce signify the magnitude of the 
downsizing and have been lower during the year of the announcement for both 
corporations. Daimler and BMW downsized most employees within the first (6.19% & 
6.97%) and second year (2.18% & 
3.81%) during the period. The third year 
shows a slight plus for both the 
corporation´s workforce. When 
comparing workforce related indicators 
net income p.e. and sales productivity, 
both differ: Daimler´s net income p.e. 
continuously shrank by €0.011 mn and dropped in the last year of the restructuring to 
$0.005 mn. BMW´s net income p.e. fell the two years after the announcement from €0.29 
mn to €0.002 mn before improving to 
€0.34 mn at the end of the systemic 
change. For Daimler, net income fell 
overall, whereas BMW increased its net 
income p.e. by €0.005 mn while 
restructuring. BMW´s outcome for its 
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slightly dropping during the restructuring, 
before increasing at the end of the 
program. Daimler´s sales productivity 
could not sustain a positive trend and 
leveled out after year two of the 
downsizing. Even though, both companies 
could increase their sales productivity, 
Daimler, by 2.7% and BMW by 11.3%. 
Categorizing the economic situation and industry cyclicity, the capital intensity of both 
companies is compared: Daimler shows a gradual increase during the period of its 
downsizing to reach 75.3%, an increase of 
17.1%. BMW reduced capital intensity by 
9.3% to 57.4% in year three after the 
announcement. Both corporations 
introduced their downsizing program in 
different economic environments: 
Daimler´s program lasted from 2005 to 
finish in 2008 during the global recession, whereas BMW started in 2007 and finished 
the program during the global recovery in 2010. These yields varying effects on the 
performance of their profitability: 
Daimler´s ROA starts at 2.5%, decreases 
shortly in the first year after the downsizing 
before rising to 3.1% in year two and falling 
to the lowest value in three years of 1.0% 
after. For BMW, the drop is by far higher. 
ROA fell from 3.5% in the year of the 
announcement to 0.2% in year two and grows to 3.0% in the third year after the 
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A similar development can be observed for both companies ROE: Daimler´s ROE slowly 
shrinks from the announcement year 
(13.4%) to 10.8% in the first and second 
year after and fell to a three-year low of 
4.2% in the last year of the period. BMW´s 
ROE shows a large drop the year after the 
announcement, from 55.5% to 3.9% in the 
second year after the announcement before 
jumping to 45.6% in the last year of the restructuring. Both companies ROE fell by around 
9.3% while undergoing the downsizing. Lastly, the profit margin steadily grows for 
Daimler in the analysed period from 6.38% 
to 9.17% before it fell in the last year to 
4.2%, a reduction of 9.26% during the 
restructuring. BMW´s profit margin 
follows a similar pattern than ROA and 
ROE, falling from 5.61% to 0.53% in the 
first year after the announcement and 
jumping back at 6.71% in the last year of the program, an increase of 1.1% during the 
analysed period. Therefore, BMW AG leads the intra-industry comparison and allows to 
classify its downsizing as more successful. 
 
7.2.2 Downsizing in Banking and Insurance 
The economic and overall industrial situation for German banks between 2000 and 2007 
needs to be divided into a capital recession till 2004 followed by a banking boom to last 
till the outbreak of money shortage within the financial crisis of 2007. Overall, balance 
sheet totals rose from €6.148 BN in 2000 to almost €8.1 bn (7.956bn) in 2008, signaling 
higher market activity in a positive surrounding (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2017). 
Macroeconomic evidence of the down- and upturn lies within the changes of the European 
key interest, and savings rate of private households in Germany. Both can be compared 
in Appendix 1.6. German banking is on international competitive levels, leaving minimal 
institutional voids and a high customer penetration (commercial and retail), categorizing 
the industry as saturated and mature, but continuously disrupted by technical innovation 
and regulatory loosening. While Postbank reduced human capital within the latter period 
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improved banking performance in the aftermath of the dotcom bubble. The following 
table gives a summary of the key facts of both downsizings: 
Company Name Commerzbank AG Postbank AG 
Downsizing Program Project “Kostenoffensive“ Project “PEOPLE” 
Downsizing as a 
Restructuring Tool  
• Proactive or Reactive 
downsizing 









• Proactive downsizing 
 









• Proactive downsizing 
 
• Rationalization  
 










• Active vs Passive 






• Active & passive 






adjustment strategy  
• Active & passive 
• Without forced 
redundancies 








10.228 to 8.697 (14.97%) 
  
10.228 to 9.235 (9.7%) 
 
 
26.693 to 25.303 (5.2%) 
 
26.693 to 22.681 (15.03%) 
Table 5. Banking Industry Downsizing Comparison; Source: Own Illustration 
Commerzbank: 
Commerzbank AG is a DAX founding member, attracting deposits and offering retail and 
commercial banking services. The bank offers mortgage loans, securities brokerage, and 
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asset management services, private banking, foreign exchange, and treasury services 
worldwide (Bloomberg, 2018b). It is international active and operates offices in more 
than 40 countries (2001) to serve its almost 4 mn private and over 0.5 mn business clients. 
The bank considered itself a Germany centric bank focused on retail, business, and 
corporate clients, within retail- & investment banking and the obligatory financial market 
operations to serve these clients. Commerzbank has a long-standing history, developing 
from a traditional and regional savings bank to a global player totaling to more than half 
a billion (€501.312 mn) on its balance sheet (Commerzbank AG, 2002). 
Commerzbank saw itself in a negative economic environment in 2000/2001 with reduced 
stock market activity, decreased provision fees and trading income, and a negative 
macroeconomic environment for banking in Germany. Even though its online business 
“Comdirect Bank” was the leading online brokerage in Germany, technical banking 
solutions revolutionized the market in the aftermath of the dotcom bubble. A falling target 
interest rate, paired with higher savings volumes, versus higher stock trading activity 
before 2000, left the bank in a rather negative environment, and called for leaner 
organization and processes (Commerzbank AG, 2001). The company introduced a 
strategic turnaround program “CB 21” in 2000, as a result of falling margins and pursued 
a structural cost reduction project “Kostenoffensive”. The project aimed to facilitate 
organizational restructuring over a period of three years till 2003 targeting five core areas: 
Reduce cost base to increase the bottom line, filter bad loans successively, start a pricing 
campaign based on cost reduction and margin increase, leaner organizational structure, 
and spin-off non-strategic business units. Successively, Commerzbank introduced a 
hiring freeze in the first quarter of 2001 before publicly announcing the reduction of its 
employee base by 3.400 (or 9.96%) over a period of three years, to antagonize negative 
company performance. In the first year of the announcement solemnly 522 FTEs could 
be reduced, while in the second year 2.796 employees left Commerzbank. This was 
accompanied by a reduction in personnel expenses by 21.07% over the three-year 
spanning RiW left expenses at €2.420 mn. The advancement was enabled through 
individual and collective reductions in paid working time, natural fluctuation, internal 
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Consequently, net income p.e. could only be increased over the full three years after the 
downsizing, to €0.03 mn p.e. in 2004. This left sales productivity at a rather low level of 
0.44%, down from 0.71% in 2001, 
a decrease of 37% in total or minus 
12.3% p.a. Commerzbank pursued 
the downsizing in a positively 
influenced macroeconomic 
economic setting. In 2001, 
Commerzbank faced a shocked 
industry and a phase of market 
correction with falling inter-banking interest in the beginning. However, the recession´s 
turning point occurred end of 2001, Commerzbank´s economists claimed the recessions 
dip has been reached and announced a positive outlook for the next three years 
(Commerzbank AG, 2001, 2002). As stated, capital intensity in the banking sector is 
rather low, but Commerzbank could decrease its capital intensity from 5.5% in 2001 to 
3.6% three consecutive years after the downsizing. Thus, overall capital intensity could 
be lowered by 33% resulting in an improved utilization of assets, due to the efficiency 
project. Further financial metrics showed a negative trend two years following the 
announcement of project “Kostenoffensive”, leveling off in 2003 with an ROA of 
negative €0.005 mn, the lowest value for Commerzbank, three years before or after the 
announcement of the restructuring.  
By far higher declines are 
measured for ROE and Profit 
Margin. In case of ROE, values are 
falling till they reach negative 
€0.22 mn in 2003, while the 
margin fell to a decade low of 
minus 19.72%, clearly showing 
signs of the negative business 
development in 2002/2003 as well as high costs for the turnaround. Even though the drop 
was significant, all financial results climbed till 2004 concluding in improved levels, 
compared to pre-downsizing values: ROA improved by €0.00186 mn, while profit margin 
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The prescribed strategic action turned Commerzbank´s financial performance positive, 
supporting an increase in profit of €291 mn or 285.29%. Simultaneously, it allowed a 
decrease in the average assets by 16.66% and fostered a core RiW of 9.96%. The 
multilayer restructuring was undertaken in a rather difficult industry environment. Still 
Commerzbank succeeds, showing strong and stable results in all analysed KPIs 
(Commerzbank AG, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004). 
 
Postbank AG: 
Postbank AG is a German bank, providing banking and financial services for retail, 
business, and corporate clients. The bank gradually increased its span and service 
portfolio and operates in retail, business, corporate and the financial market segment. The 
bank grew steadily to become one of Germany´s biggest retail banks, operating over one 
thousand finance centres all over Germany, including a Luxemburg branch (Bloomberg, 
2018d). Postbank´s developed from a state-owned bank of the German Federal Mail to a 
privatized banking player serving over 15 mn online and offline customers in Germany. 
The bank could obtain stable financial performance in the period from 1995 till 2001 
when the dot-com bubble burst, and stock broking and most transaction banking areas 
were negatively influenced, reaching a balance sheet total of €133,9 mn. Postbank saw 
itself in a rather positive economic environment from 2004 to 2006, performing above 
the industry average in terms of customer acquisition, the introduction of technical 
banking solutions, and transaction banking. Simultaneously, the company introduced new 
IT operating systems, leaving a certain portion of its employees outplaced from their 
position within certain processes (Postbank AG, 2003). Postbank´s board introduced a 
structural efficiency program in 2001, to bring the bank closer to profitability and margin 
goals while preparing it for a gradually multi-channel banking transfer in its retail banking 
and locating the bank as one of the top three corporate banks in Germany.  
Postbank´s path has been gradually upward and successful since 1995, where 
organizational structures and processes could be streamlined while organizational and 
financial slack could be minimized. From 1999 onwards, the bank pursued a turnaround 
program, planned to streamline operations and set a new focus on transaction banking 
(Postbank AG, 2001) before RiW were imposed in 2004. Postbank needed a strategic 
redirection of its HR Management to cope with the changing internal and external demand 
and growing size of its business. To be “fit for Future” and increase efficiency and quality 
of HRM from 2004 onwards, employees had to be reduced numerically or moved to 
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different operations. Optimized organizational structures within the resort of HR were 
targeted, to be able to tailor workforce adaptations in an increasingly dynamic banking 
market. Besides, RiW of almost 10% in Germany during the downsizing period, 
qualitative development capacities were gradually expanded among employees and 
managers, to cope with increased efforts (Postbank AG, 2003).  
As part of the program, labor-related adaptations were publicized in 2000 and finally 
implemented in 2001. Solemnly 5.2% were downsized within the first year of the 
Rightsizing (active and passive), gradually lowering employee base and reducing 15.03% 
(4.012) over a three-year period. Employees, whose position were redundant, were 
transferred into a limited service and transfer enterprise “interServ” to enable socially 
acceptable RiW. Net income p.e. 
for Postbank´s German operations 
increased steadily from €0.06 mn to 
€0.11 mn in 2007. Similar 
developments can be seen for sales 
productivity, where the amount 
rose by 75% from €0.66 mn in 2001 
to €1.16 mn in 2007.  
Postbank pursued the downsizing in a positively influenced economic setting with a 
growing industry and increasing globally spanning networks of banking operations. 
Capital intensity within the banking sector is comparably low since capital deployed is 
by far less than for other industries. Postbank increased its capital intensity from 4.04% 
in 2004 to 4.32% three years after the downsizing, even though the year after showed a 
drastic reduction in capital intensity, falling to a low of 3.98%. Financially, Postbank 
could increase all financial metrics, except ROA, here a reduction of 2.11% between 2001 
and 2004 occurred. This can be explained due to increasing assets, as part of Postbank´s 
overall growth strategy, throughout 
all analysed business years. ROE 
and Profit Margin allow for a 
successful transformation of 
organizational structures: While 
ROE increased 38% from €0.137 
mn in 2001 to €0.189 mn, profit 
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8.1% in 2004.The outcome is a positive downsizing within the given timeframe. Postbank 
pursued a strategic organizational transformation, and increased profits exactly by 100% 
in a rather positive industrial environment between 2004 and 2006, before going IPO in 
2004. The bank continued its efforts to be “fit for the Future”, in a positive economic 
environment until the financial crisis in 2007 (Postbank AG, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005). 
 
Comparison: Both corporations heavily downsized their operations during the years after 
the announcement. The annual employee change is one of the driving forces behind the 
development of profitability (Moore & Sonan, 2014). Overall, Postbank decreased the 
number of employees in two consecutive years of the four analysed, while Commerzbank 
reduced the workforce in two non-consecutive years. Commerzbank underwent a RiW of 
10.33% and 11.11% in the two years 
following the announcement, while 
Postbank reduced overall FTEs in the year 
of the announcement by 13.09% and year 
two after the announcement (7.69%), while 
gaining some 8.33% in the year between 
and after, due to portfolio expansion. Net 
income p.e., and Sales productivity result in similar developments for both counterparts: 
Postbank could increase both KPIs over the 
three-year measurement period to gain a 
plus of €0.05 mn to €0.11 mn in sales 
productivity, and even a plus of €0.5 mn in 
net income p.e., thus, both indicators signal 
a positive performance. In the meantime, 
Commerzbank could not perform 
comparably and even decreased both values. Net income p.e. decreased by €0.15 mn to a 
negative productivity of €0.08 mn in the 
last year of the downsizing. However, 
Sales productivity for Commerzbank 
decreased relatively less, falling to €0.45 
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To categorize the economic situation and industry cyclicity, the company’s capital 
intensity is compared: noticeable about Commerzbank is its shrinking intensity from 
5.46% to 3.64. Postbank slightly increased 
its capital intensity from 4.04% to 4.32% in 
the third year after the prescribed 
rightsizing. Postbank´s restructuring took 
place in a rather difficult economic setting, 
while Commerzbank could undergo its 
transformation in a more positive 
economic setting. 
When comparing both programs, we see differences in the performance of profitability: 
ROA developed for Postbank slightly 
negative, thus overall stagnating at €0.005 
mn, while Commerzbank´s ROA first 
developed negative till a turning point of €-
0.005 mn in year 2, before rising in the 
third year after the Rightsizing 
announcement. ROE for both companies 
shows similar results than ROA with a 
rather stagnating performance of 
Postbank´s return between €0.14 mn and 
€0.19 mn in the last year of the program “fit 
for Future”. Commerzbank on its behalf, 
shows a dip in return, before coming back 
into profitable levels in the third year after 
the downsizing. Commerzbank´s downsizing let to an ROE of €-0.218 mn in year two 
before jumping to €0.84 mn in the last year of the program “Kostenoffensive”. 
Lastly, profit margins develop similar to 
the previous two indicators, showing 
overall growing margins for Postbank from 
6.56% up to 8.13% in the three years after 
the announcement. Commerzbank shows a 
dip of -19.72% in year two, comparable to 
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margin with 3.46%. is around 7.7 times higher than in the announcement year. 
Consequently, Postbank´s downsizing is classified as the more succesfull organizational 
restructuring. 
 
7.2.3 Downsizing in Energy Corporations 
The economic situation for energy corporations in Germany between 2000 and 2015 is 
characterized by the changing forms of energy source linked to the energy transformation, 
prescribed by the German government (Destatis, 2018), and the economic recessions after 
2000 and 2007. At the beginning of 2000, energy corporations were in a gradually 
changing but stable market environment, mainly influenced by changing resource prices 
and slow economic stimulus including stable energy consumption and slow price 
increase. While the first years after 2000 were mainly used for national and international 
consolidation, times were rougher after 2005 with the upcoming energetic transformation, 
the target reduction in CO² emission and new energy sources. Energy corporations needed 
large sums for restructuring and dismantling of prior heavily utilized power sources such 
as coal and atomic power plants in the second part of the period (Lehr et al., 2008). 
Increasing energy prices in a more transparent market, enabled by new entrants, heated 
the playing field of former large corporations. Besides, the energy industry in Germany 
was on a leading edge, comparable to international levels, and could be categorized as 
mature due to a phase of consolidation throughout 2000 till 2015. The following table 
gives a summary of the key facts of both downsizings: 
Company Name RWE AG E.ON AG 
Downsizing Program Multi Energy Multi Utility 
Cost reduction program 
Eon 2.0 
Downsizing as a 
Restructuring Tool 
• Proactive or Reactive 
Downsizing 















• Reactive downsizing 
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• Subcategories 














• Active vs Passive 





adjustment & Systemic 
strategy 
• Active & passive 






adjustment & Systemic 
strategy 
• Active & passive 
• With forced 
redundancies 








72.191 to 55.407 (-23.2%) 
 
72.191 to 37.782 (-47.7%) 
 
 
35.133 to 31.548 (-10.2%) 
 
35.133 to 22.290 (-36.56%) 
Table 6. Energy Industry Downsizing Comparison; Source: Own Illustration  
RWE AG: 
RWE AG is a leading German energy and utility corporation that operates mainly in 
Europe but was active in most parts of North America. It generates, distributes, and trades 
electricity to municipal, residential, commercial, and industrial customers. Besides, RWE 
produces natural gas & oil, mines coal, and operates in gas & water distribution and 
delivery. RWE operates mainly in Europe (Bloomberg, 2018f). 
The company grew to be one of three leading energy corporations in Germany through 
continuous acquisitions and reached a leading position when merging with VEW, a 
Dusseldorf based energy distributor and network operator, in 2000/2001, to improve its 
business segment energy, gas, and recycling. Prior, a phase of national and international 
acquisitions, e.g. Thames Water in the UK, allowed RWE to focus on its two main cores: 
multi utility and multi energy (RWE AG, 2001). The consolidation was fostered by a 
reduction in non-core sectors such as engagements within telecommunication or oil & 
gas refinery and distribution. After 2000, RWE consequently implemented a new 
corporate structure and increased efficiency throughout a streamlining program to reduce 
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costs (“Kostensenkungsprogramm”) and overhead till 2004. The downsizing succeeded 
a period of increase in workforce till 2000 mounting at 114.557 employees within 
Germany. The active and passive RiW shrank workforce simultaneously to downsize 
from 80.205 in 2001 by 12.500 (18,46%) till 2004 in Germany. Major reductions 
successively happened in 2001 (4.700), 2002 (4.003), and 2003 (3.914) (RWE AG, 2001, 
2003). RWE utilized two applications to reduce its employee base, firstly streamline 
process and structures to increase efficiency within its new and consolidated corporate 
structure, and secondly reduce operational workforce within entities to lower operating 
expenses by 15 % from €45.542 mn in 2000 to €38.682 mn in 2004. With a shrinking 
workforce, net income p.e. developed negative till 2003 (-29%) before jumping to 0.386, 
almost tripling in a year. The jump 
occurred mainly due to the 
deconsolidation of business entities 
and the realization of two stock 
blocks (Heidelberger Druck-
maschienen & Hochtief), but also 
due to lower personnel expenses. 
Sales productivity shows a dip of 
around 22% within 2002/2003 as well, but increases to pre-downsizing levels in 2004, 
reaching €0.76 mn, just 2.6% lower than in 2001.  
The economic environment for RWE´s downsizing seems rather positive since no binding 
costly and obligation to transform the energy business occurred before 2005 and the 
corporation could restructure proactively after a period of consolidation to be more 
aligned with future market demand. The board of directors and management were both 
tuned positive about the improving market environment from 2002 onwards (RWE AG, 
2005). Capital intensity in the energy sector takes a rather high value due to large-scale 
investments, rather high maintenance cost and long-lasting investment horizons. RWE 
could reduce its capital intensity from 64.4% in 2001 to 42.6% in 2004, lowering it by 
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Financial metrics showed similar developments in the analysed period: ROA decreased 
from 2001 to 2003 by 43.9% to 
stand at €0.01 mn but increased the 
year after to €0.022 mn. ROE on its 
behalf shows similar results 
steadily decreasing by 13.33% till 
2003 to level out at €0.105 mn in 
2004, increasing by 82% to €0.19 
mn. However, RWE´s profit 
margin shows a clearer upward trend throughout the overall downsizing and restructuring, 
almost tripling from 3.49% in 2001 to reach 9.34% in the financial year 2004. While sales 
and revenue shrank in a year on year comparison by 32.99% and 18.6% from 2001 till 
2004, RWE´s profit increased by 79.35% and net income could improve by 58.30%. 
RWE´s shareholder equity only increased marginally by 0.58% until 2004. 
During RWE´s restructuring, a cost reduction, inherent to a RiW, enabled the corporation 
to improve its financial metrics above pre-downsizing values. The downsizing took place 
in a rather positive environment whilst 2001 was the year after the 2000 recession and 
energy corporations were lesser influenced compared to technological or financial 
institutions. RWE succeeded in consolidating its prior acquisitions and portfolio 
reorganization. It downsized successfully in Germany reducing its workforce by 18.46%, 
while increasing its average assets by 23.06% (RWE AG, 2001, 2003, 2005). 
 
E.ON AG: 
E.ON SE, former E.ON AG, is a German based energy company operating in Germany, 
Europe and overseas. Founded in 1923 and still based in Essen, Germany, its core 
business is built around energy networks, customer solutions, and renewables. Besides 
energy distribution to public entities and residents, as well as small, medium, and large-
sized enterprises. In its renewables unit, E.ON manages renewable assets, offers services 
for maintenance and consulting, and holds strategic partnerships for electric vehicle 
charging infrastructure, grid services, and energy storage solutions (Bloomberg, 2018e). 
The company introduced a reactive restructuring in 2010, announcing the official start of 
“E.ON 2.0” in 2011. The energy company was largely affected by falling commodity 
prices, the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2007/2008, and the energetic transformation 
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renewable energy corporation, in- and outside Germany, E.ON heavily invested in 
renewable assets and built a service portfolio around these future growth sectors. 
Consequently, structural changes and organizational downsizing was inevitable, as 
determined by the board (E.ON, 2011). E.ON´s consequent and active transformation was 
accompanied by a centralization of supporting functions and should decrease variable 
cost by €2 bn to a maximum of €9 bn in 2014. Major adaptations were undertaken in 2011 
and 2012, to increase operational efficiency, and support cross-selling opportunities 
between entities to allow for a sustainable increase in short-term performance and secure 
long-term competitiveness. As a result, costs should be reduced by lowering personnel 
expenses and optimizing pension reserves (E.ON, 2013).  
Thus, the amount of personnel deployed decreased by 36.56% in Germany, taking active 
and passive downsizing 
measurements and structural 
changes into account. The number 
of employees fell from 35.133 
inside Germany in 2011 to 22.290 
at the end of the fiscal year 2014. 
Major reductions occurred from 
2012 (-3.585) and in 2013 (-7.919), 
even though the high reduction in 2013 was only partly due to implications of E.ON 2.0 
and partly derived from the sale of E.ON´s service entity Arena One.  
Net income p.e. dropped 52.99% from 0.262 in 2011 to 0.123 in 2014, a sign of 
continuous restructuring. Sales productivity in contrast increased by 57.81% reaching 
5.06% in 2013 and 5.07% in 2014 showing the effects of increased p.e.. 
The economic environment for E.ON between 2011 and 2014 was rather negatively 
influenced. The regulatory driven market environment and energetic transformation 
weigh heavily on the company throughout its restructuring. Costs or tax for conventional 
energy production increased in some countries, while the economic activity was seen as 
rather low from 2010 till 2012 by the board of directors (E.ON, 2012). In this 
environment, capital intensity rose by 20% to 88.82% in 2014, compared to 73.89% three 
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Further financial metrics do not 
show consistent positive trends 
from 2011 until the end of the 
downsizing in 2014. ROA 
decreases throughout the period by 
63.72% from 6.1% to 2.2%, with a 
negative ROA only in 2012, 
dropping to negative 1.1% in 2012, 
the year with highest provisions. ROE decreased to a smaller extent of 55.77% from 
23.21% in 2011 to 10.27% in 2014. Similar to the ROA, the ROE for 2012 was negative 
at 3.94%. E.ON´s profit margin rose over the whole period of the downsizing from 
19.25% to 34.85%, increasing by 81.05% in the analysed period. During the downsizing, 
E.ON´s sales increased by 0.12% to €113.095 mn, revenue increased by merely 1.45% to 
€114.592 mn in 2014. Profit rose by 81.28% to 3.941 in 2014 contrary to net income, 
which shrank to €2.743 mn in 2014. Total assets and shareholder equity, both decreased 
during the period. Assets went down 17.78% and shareholder´s equity even fell by 
31.57% during the downsizing, which featured a RiW of 36.66% in Germany. E.ON 
undertook its downsizing in a rather negative economic environment, during a time of 
high regulatory impact on energy market and companies. The overall development is not 
influenced much by the recession 2007/2008 even though, the board of directors classifies 
the situation during the restructuring as tight (E.ON, 2011, 2012, 2015).  
 
Comparison: The annual employee change, seemed to be one of the driving forces 
behind the changes in financial indicators: 
RWE downsized constantly above 5% p.a. 
with a maximum of 23.25% in the second 
and 21.35% in the third year of the 
announcement, totaling 47.7% of its 
German employee base. E.ON downsized 
in the meantime 36.56% of its German 
workforce. Since E.ON 2.0 started in the second half of 2011, the downsizing effects in 
the fiscal year 2011 are close to zero. However, in the two years following the 
announcement, large-scale RiW by 10.20% in year two, and even 25.10% in year three 
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RWE´s and E.ON´s workforce-related 
downsizing KPIs show mixed results. 
Sales productivity and net income p.e., 
develop similar for both energy 
companies: RWE could increase its sales 
productivity by 92% to €1.17 mn, up 
from €0.67 mn and grew its net income 
p.e. in the same period from 1% to 5%. 
E.ON´s sales productivity rose in the 
meantime from €3.22 mn to €5.07 mn, 
and its net income p.e. fell from 26% to 
12%, a rather negative overall result. 
Categorizing the economic situation and 
industry cyclicity, the capital intensity of 
both companies is compared: Both show 
gradual improvements during the period 
of downsizing. RWE increased capital 
intensity by three percent to 40.6% in 
year four after the announcement. E.ON 
even increased capital intensity by 15% 
to 88.8% in the last year of the prescribed 
downsizing. Both corporations introduced their downsizing program in different 
economic environments, RWE from 
2001 till 2004 and E.ON from 2011 till 
2014, allowing for varying effects on the 
performance of profitability: 
RWE´s ROA shows a constant positive 
trend from 1.1% to 4.1% during its 
downsizing period, whereas E.ON´s 
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ROE for both companies shows similar outcomes than ROA and a positive trend for 
RWE´s profitability. ROE on its behalf 
grew from 10.5% to 27.3% in the three 
years after the announcement. On the other 
side, E.ON shows mixed developments for 
its ROE during the downsizing period, 
even reporting negative 3.9% ROE in year 
two of the downsizing. Profit margin only 
partly holds similar results than ROA and 
ROE. RWE also shows a positive trend in 
its profit margin gradually increased from 
1.92% to 3.48%. However, E.ON´s profit 
margin increased in the year after the 
downsizing from 7.08% to 9.34% before 
falling to 7.99% by the end of the period. 
Successively, RWE´s downsizing program is classified as more successful than E.ON´s. 
 
7.3 Downsizing Inter-Industry Case Comparison 
In a third step, downsizings are analysed inter-industry, based on the selected qualitative 
findings and metric KPI changes in percentage over the three-year period. This serves to 
answer the third research question: “How do DAX downsizers perform within an inter-
industry comparison in Germany?” and is derived from the previous assessment in 
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The table summarizes all industries analysed including directly competing companies and 
their downsizing programs. Firstly, the classification of downsizing strategies with modes 
and subcategories are compared in section A. Secondly, the downsizing implementation 
for all companies favoring archetypes, implementation strategies and the reduction path 
are listed in section B. Thirdly, workforce downsizing KPIs are measured in section C. 
Fourthly, the economic outlook and changes in capital intensity are outlined in D, before, 
fifthly, business performance is compared in section E.  
The strategic classification behind the inter-industry analysis shows, there are as many 
proactive than reactive downsizings and the ratio is exactly one per intra-industry sample. 
For restructuring modes, according to Enderwick (1989), two-thirds are based on 
rationalization, while one third includes an additional internationalization. Subcategories 
according to Dewitt are divided equally into retrenchment and downscoping. Here, both 
banking cases utilize retrenchment, while both energy cases utilize downscoping, and 
only automotive cases mix both subcategories. The same diversification holds when 
analysing subcategories according to Charlos & Chen (2002): banking applies cost 
cutting, energy cases apply revenue refocusing, and automotive applies both 
subcategories. For all cases, the definition of rightsizing can be applied, since none of the 
cases does downsize above the self-defined targets in their annual reports. Thus, 
Rightsizing will not play a role in the consecutive formulation of propositions, whilst no 
effect could be determined. 
When comparing the different aspects of the downsizing implementation among different 
industries, 83,33% choose a reinforcement, the less radical approach of both. In only one 
case evidence could be found for reorientation. Pure implementation strategies are fair 
divided between organizational adjustment and a combination of organizational 
adjustment and systemic strategy were no clear border can be drawn since the strategy 
holds elements of both. A distinct finding for the RiW is that almost all analysed cases 
mix active and passive reductions throughout their downsizing. The question if reductions 
were forced or could be handled without forced reductions can be answered with 83.33% 
used forced reductions, while only one case could achieve the target, without any 
evidence for forced RiW. Subsequent, workforce downsizing and workforce performance 
are examined. The span of total employee change in percentage is large, from -7.69% up 
to -47.70% throughout the full period of three years after the downsizing announcement. 
The arithmetic mean of all cases results in an average downsizing of -21.28%, two 
downsizings are below 10%, and always one is in the next 10% steps. Energy concludes 
 Downsizing and Shareholder Value of German Corporations          75 
the greatest employee changes, with the highest values, both above 36%. Changes in the 
net income p.e. vary from negative 201.08% to positive 271.35%, averaging 
arithmetically at 3.74%. A clearer picture appears, comparing sales productivity. One out 
of six cases show a negative development, thus the average stands at a plus of 35.81% 
over the three-year period. Energy identifies with the greatest improvements in sales 
productivity, followed by automotive. 
Next is industry performance with a clear split in negative and positive economic 
surroundings throughout the downsizings. Here, positive and negative environments are 
equal among the three industries. Capital intensity, the second indicator for industry 
performance shows mixed results, including two reductions in capital intensity and four 
increases in capital intensity, where energy corporations increased capital intensity in 
both cases. The average lies at a growth of 3.02% and signifies, that more capital needs 
to be allocated to operations than before, or a decrease in efficiency occurred.  
Lastly, business performance among the six cases determines a mixed picture of results. 
Commerzbank shows increases due to the transition from recession to boom, thereby 
distorting all result of business performance. ROA develops positive for only two 
companies, and automotive is the single industry, reducing ROA in both cases. An even 
split occurs measuring ROE, where one half shows a positive and one half a negative 
development. Interestingly, banking could increase its ROE in both cases and automotive 
decreased in both cases, even though the increase in banking is much larger than the 
decrease in automotive. Lastly, the profit margin pictures a broader increase in business 
performance. 83.33% of cases develop positive and increase their profit margin over time. 
One out of six profit margins fell by -53.12%, while the arithmetic average of the sample 
shows a clear improvement of 125.05%. If we exclude Commerzbank´s drastic increase, 
the developments for ROA (-35.19%), for ROE (-26.12%) and Profit Margin (16.68%) 
are more comparable to prior studies (Chalos & Chen, 2002; Munoz-Bullón & Sánchez-
Bueno, 2008). 
Thereafter, the inter-industry comparison brought mixed performance for net income p.e., 
while the comparison for sales productivity shows a clear positive trend. Same counts for 
capital intensity within the industry performance, where an increasing capital intensity is 
derived from the comparison. Numerically, ROA decreases in four out of six cases but 
does not show a clear trend, except for automotive. However, ROE develops positive in 
four out of six cases and is completely positive for the banking industry. Profit margins 
increase in the banking and energy industry, while automotive shows mixed outcomes. 
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To derive with overall results towards the success or failure of a downsizing, only those 
downsizings that increased more than half of their indicators are counted as successful, 
shown in green at the end of the table. Therefore, four out of six cases downsized 
successfully in the respective evaluation. A similarly mixed result occurs when 
comparing solemnly positive and negative KPI developments. We can conclude, that 20 
of the 36 KPIs developed positive, what accounts for 56% of KPIs. Thus, an overall 
slightly positive trend of financials during the Downsizing is visible: 
n = 6 Positive KPI Negative KPI % Positive KPIs 
Net Income p.e. 3 3 50,00% 
Sales Productivity 5 1 83,33% 
Capital Intensity 2 4 33,33% 
ROA 2 4 33,33% 
ROE 3 3 50,00% 
Profit Margin 5 1 83,33% 
∑ 20 16 56% 
% 56% 44% 1 
Table 8. KPI Development During Downsizings; Source: Own Illustration 
8 Downsizing Propositions for German Corporations 
In the following chapter, propositions are developed from the analysed results. In total 
five propositions, including three sub-propositions are developed. These examine the 
downsizings, its effects on profitability, and its success in the geographic context. 
Propositions are constructed step by step, starting from the impact of “Downsizing as a 
Strategy” including the defined and analysed strategic classifications of downsizing. 
These are structured into proactive or reactive downsizings, and the downsizing 
subcategory according to Dewitt as well as according to Chalos & Chen. Consequently, 
the impact of “Downsizing Implementation” components impact, namely implementation 
strategies, active vs passive, and with or without forced redundancies, are utilized to 
establish propositions. Lastly, propositions based on workforce reduction and economic 
situation, including all relevant aspects of the prior analysis, combine the set of factors of 
downsizing on profitability for German MNCs.  
8.1 The Strategy Behind Downsizing Matters 
The division of downsizing into proactive and reactive approaches show similar outcomes 
on a corporate restructuring as well on organizational restructuring level. Companies that 
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utilize a proactive downsizing approach do perform better than companies underlying a 
prescribed or reactive downsizing in the German context. This finding is congruent with 
Love and Nohira´s (2005) analysis of cost reduction and financial performance of pro- 
versus reactive downsizers: 
Proposition 1) Proactive downsizers in Germany show a better financial 
performance compared to reactive downsizers. 
 
In the analysed sample, the positive effect of proactive downsizing is realized by 
comparing successful with unsuccessful downsizing. All as proactive classified 
downsizings are successful while none of two reactive downsizings are. Besides, when 
taking capital intensity and profit margin as an indicator for profitability, the same picture 
establishes. Love & Nohira (2005) prove similar results with ROA and SGA expenses to 
derive with better performance of proactive downsizers. 
Proactive downsizing occurs oftentimes in a positive economic environment, that benefits 
corporations in a way that they will have a better environment to improve profitability 
versus a negative economic situation. In the respective analysis, all companies 
downsizing during positive economic circumstances showed an increase in profit margin 
above their direct industry counterparts, indicating a higher efficiency and thus a higher 
profitability. Whereas, sample companies that underwent a reactive downsizing in a 
negative economic environment increased profitability to a lower extent. They increased 
their capital intensity and showed the least improvement in ROE, during the restructuring. 
These results support prior findings on the impact of proactive downsizings and the 
economic environment, including recessions in and outside a singular country (Chen et 
al., 2001).  
 
8.2 The Implications of Revenue Focusing and Downscoping 
Besides the divestiture of approaches, different subcategories classify the downsizing and 
respective relations. For all companies combining cost cutting and retrenchment, the 
magnitude of reduction was lower than for the subcategories of revenue refocusing and 
downscoping. Since retrenchment and cost cutting clearly target a cost reduction, the 
magnitude of their RiW is smaller in Germany. This is feasible due to the incurred cost 
for HR related downsizings in Germany as stated in chapter 4.6.5. The cost of RiW is 
much higher in Germany, compared to other countries such as the USA because severance 
pay, or compensation packages are legally binding. This, in turn, restricts German 
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companies in the usage of downsizing as a fast and easy way to reduce cost, not serving 
as a fast possibility to increase profits: 
Proposition 2a) Downsizings categorized as retrenchment (Dewitt, 1998), and cost 
cutting (Charlos & Chen, 2002), downsize less than companies that apply 
downscoping (Dewitt, 1998), and revenue refocusing (Charlos & Chen, 2002) in the 
German context. 
 
This finding is undermined by the fact, that the development for capital intensity within 
the analysis is mixed. While downscoping and cost cutting lead to the highest reduction 
in capital intensity, it was accountable for the largest increase simultaneously. 
Thus, the expected cut in the cost base by instant RiW-related costs (Gandolfi, 2013) 
cannot be continued to an expected increase in profitability. Therefore, the quick solution 
for an increase in profitability inside the geographic frame will not be retrenchment and 
cost cutting. 
Even though the RiW for retrenchment and cost-cutting combinations are lower in the 
sample, it does not show a contrary development for profitability in the subcategories 
downscoping and revenue refocusing. This development includes the assumption, that 
lower RiW lead to more profitability, due to lower costs for the RiW. When comparing 
the magnitude of a downsizing in chapter 4.6.6, the magnitude does show a negative 
correlation with post-downsizing performance.  
Proposition 2b) Downsizings that are categorized as downscoping and revenue 
refocusing do not result in a better financial performance than applying cost cutting 
and retrenchment. 
 
Downscoping and revenue refocusing companies did downsize with a lower magnitude, 
as the combination stands for a clear focus on core operations. In the country-specific 
frame, none of the groups performed purely successful or unsuccessful downsizings. 
Even though sales productivity and profit margin increased for retrenchment and cost-
cutting companies, there is no clear evidence or direct correlation between the 
subcategory and higher profitability.  
In contrast to Farrell and Mavondo (2005), the findings of this study do not show any 
clear subcategory winner in terms of positive effects on profitability. No weak correlation 
between cost cutting and financial performance could be established and no clear mid- to 
long-term effects on corporate profitability could be proven. 
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Additionally, this does not support the opinion that cost cutting strategies are less efficient 
than revenue refocusing by Chalos & Chen (2002). In the analysed sample, none of the 
subcategories reached a clear and constant increase in all KPIs.  
 
8.3 Downsizing Implementations 
Taking a closer look at implementation, a clear separation into organizational adjustment 
and a mix of organizational adjustment and systemic strategy is to be noticed. Mixing 
both strategies does not hold more successful restructurings than applying only one of the 
two. Even though, a mixture shows a clear positive trend in sales productivity and profit 
margin, capital intensity increased and further financial KPIs do not play in accordance. 
Proposition 3a) Cmpanies that apply organizational adjustment and a systemic 
change implementation in Germany, do not outperform companies applying 
solemnly one implementation strategy. 
 
Both implementation strategies are defined as organizational redesign and take a certain 
duration until they are implemented. Corporations following a redesign target a long-term 
change that does not majorly include cost savings. Indicators for organizational redesign 
are e.g. forced redundancies since some positions or even whole business units are 
diminished, or increasingly capital intensive. This is another indicator for an 
organizational redesign approach due to its costly fundamental changes in corporate 
culture or the organizational structure. 
Both indicators occur for all cases in the sample and do only partly support Gandolfi´s 
theory (2013), that downsizings alone do not help in improving corporate performance, 
while a combination of redesign and an RiW holds for a positive significant relation. 
A step further down in the implementation process lies the process of reducing the 
workforce actively or passively. German corporations that combine active and passive 
downsizing measurements with forced redundancies during the downsizing, did not 
perform better than purely passive downsizings, without forced RiW in any case. Vice 
versa, corporations that rely on passive downsizing without forced RiW did not 
outperform active downsizers: 
Proposition 3b) Corporations that combine active & passive downsizing with 
forced redundancies do not outperform corporations applying passive without 
forced reductions. 
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The application of active and passive RiW is typically for German procedures when it 
concerning corporate downsizings. As forced redundancies might cost a significantly 
more, as stated in chapter 4.6.5. Therefore, a company should apply forced redundancies, 
if active downsizing is applied in the context of Germany. The positive impact of passive 
redundancies on the cost side of a downsizing procedure is transparent since no severance 
pay or compensation must be fulfilled. 
 
8.4 Impact of the Magnitude of Downsizing in Germany 
The question, if a downsizing´s magnitude does have a clear impact in general, has been 
heatedly discussed prior to this paper and is at the core of a vast amount of studies (Hitt 
et al., 1994; Elayan et al., 1998; De Meuse et al., 2004). However, no clear relationship 
between the magnitude of the reduction and the successive increase in profitability could 
be measured in the German context: 
Proposition 4a) The magnitude of Downsizing does not stand in direct 
correlation to the increase in profitability. 
 
In the analysed sample, no magnitude stands in any correlation to increased profitability 
in one or more of the researched KPI´s. All show mixed financial performance, from 
lowest to highest magnitude, and no clear trend towards profitability. Even though lowest 
downsizing magnitudes show certain increases, there is no clear trend for a positive 
improvement in profitability compared to downsizings with higher a magnitude. 
Comparing successful with unsuccessful downsizings, the proposition is tightened. 
These results do not fit with De Meuse et al.´s (2004) findings of better performing 
downsizers with lower RiW. However, this conclusion is not daunting since the 
reductions occur over a period of up to three years, and a direct correlation of downsizing 
used to cut costs and increased profitability is not inevitably proven( Gandolfi 2013). 
The sample also shows no clear differentiation between RiW of less or more than 10%. 
The 10% threshold has been selected by De Meuse et al. (2004) to prove that lower 
Downsizings outperform higher: 
Proposition 4b) Companies downsizing less than 10% do not show a greater increase 
in profitability than companies downsizing more than 10%. 
 
Because the same number of downsizings are classified as unsuccessful in the magnitude 
of greater and lower than 10%, a clear trend cannot be established. Similar to the 
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magnitude in proposition 4a), there is no clear evidence of a better performance of 
downsizings with less than 10% compared to above 10%. While below 10% downsizers 
improve their sales productivity, above 10% downsizings all increase their profit margin. 
It appears, that the size of the downsizing measurement might not influence the period 
following the downsizing announcement. However, the relationship between a RiW of 
less than 10% and improved financial results by De Meuse et al. (2004) might not be 
supported in the German context. 
 
8.5 The Influence of Industry and Economic Setting on Financial 
Performance 
Lastly, the divestiture of economic setting into positive and negative, according to 
economy and industry is seen as predetermined for the outcome of the downsizing: 
Proposition 5) Companies that downsize in a positive economic environment 
do outperform downsizings in negative economic settings in the German context. 
 
Four out of six downsizings in the analysis occurred in a positive environment, their 
success is convincing since all are classified successful while downsizing within a 
negative economic setting fall into the category unsuccessful. Besides the economic 
environment and successful completion, profit margins also increase for downsizings in 
a positive environment, while they only do so for one out of two cases in a negative 
economic environment. This relation is at least weak, as negative economic surrounding 
foster less positive KPIs. The magnitude of a corporate downsizing did not show a clear 
trend for profitability in Germany, while the economic situation and industry trends do. 
This proposition is congruent with Marshall, Mccolgan, & Mcleish (2012), and Tuominen 
(2005), according to whose research, downsizing during an economic recession leads to 
negative abnormal returns, while layoff during boom phases phase shows no abnormal 
return. 
9 Reflection 
The last section on the conducted research and analysis reflects the results throughout the 
thesis to further elaborate on the underlying research topic. 
This thesis confronted the reader with the effects of downsizing measurements on 
corporate profitability by using a multi-case analysis to answer how downsizing impacts 
the profitability of German corporations downsizing more than five percent of their 
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workforce. To begin with, a numeric comparison about the application of KPIs in 
downsizing studies was created, to allow for a transparent selection of KPIs for the 
proceedings of this paper. In a second step, following the selection of six downsizing 
cases, a qualitative evaluation, to classify each program, was undertaken. Upon this, six 
financial KPIs were analysed per case, and statistically compared over a period of three 
years, to compare each programs success individually and intra-industry. Lastly, an inter-
industry comparison, including a descriptive statistical evaluation built the foundation for 
the final proposition development. 
The results of this paper show a mixed effect of downsizing on profitability and greatly 
depend on the economic surrounding and magnitude of the decrease in workforce, each 
company faced when undergoing the organizational restructuring. A slight positive effect 
on the profitability of downsizers could be measured and verified, similar to comparable 
academic studies (Morris et al., 1999; Chalos & Chen, 2002; De Meuse et al., 2004). 
The analysed sample, selected upon transparent criteria, is large enough for an inter-
industry case comparison, based on qualitative findings. Reasons to follow a qualitative 
approach on case basis is inherent in the quality and amount of data available. In contrast 
to the amount of US database, no comparable downsizing disclosure database exists in 
Germany, what makes quantitative analysis harder (Bhankaraully, 2018). This default is 
one of the reasons for the limited number of quantitative downsizing studies in Germany. 
Even though, downsizing academia fosters quantitative regression-based analysis, the 
qualitative character of this study allows for qualitative insights and concluding drivers 
of case-specific profitability development. 
Cases were grouped by industry, each case clarifying the necessity of downsizing within 
the given industry setting and corporate situation. The only industry in the sample, to 
allow a clear positive classification is banking & insurance since both cases analysed were 
successful, even though different KPIs developed positively. Strategic classification for 
both programs is similar and sub strategies are of same classified. Banking & Insurance 
is the sole industry, downsizing both operations in a positive economic environment. 
However, it is questionable, if the RiW is the direct cause of the success even though 
prior research underlines the success of downsizing in banking & insurance and further 
service corporations (Moore & Sonan, 2014). Besides, the figures for Commerzbank´s 
business performance would be categorized as an outlier, thereby distorting results, 
because the financial KPIs are many times higher than its counterparts. 
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For energy corporations, downsizings are highest among all industries and utilize the 
same subcategories, archetypes, and implementation strategies. Even though this is 
comprehensible since energy companies developed from producer and supplier to enabler 
of the energetic transformation, what is bound to costly investments (E.ON, 2012). 
Energy corporations underwent the transformation categorized as an organizational 
adjustment in both cases. This might allow the conclusion, that implementation strategy´s 
seems feasible, especially for energy. However, the derived performance varies most 
among energy cases and reflects the difficulties alongside their corporate transformation. 
The industry with the largest indifferences in their approach is Automotive. Both 
downsizings foster different strategies and their objectives are fundamentally different, 
even though both occur only within five years between 2005 and 2010. Performance 
reflects the different approaches and varies largely between the two. What either seems 
to affect profitability in a negative way is the sole passive RiW during Daimler´s CORE 
program, or the fact, that the company finished its efficiency program on the peak of the 
financial crisis, leaving five out six analysed factors to decrease. 
Comparability of cases is established by the magnitude of factors analysed, and leads to 
the assumption, that Daimler´s downsizing would have been successful if it was not 
affected by the recession. The relation and ensuing dependence between an individual 
indicator, e.g. economic setting and profitability are not focus of this study. The 
proceedings of this paper are empirical-driven to facilitate an overview and the 
development of applicable and testable statements.  
Results of the industry comparison in chapter 7.2 undermine the relevance of downsizing 
for each company and hold positive developments, e.g. profit margin, for all companies, 
combined with the overall positive development of KPIs (56%). Key is the application of 
organizational adjustment over pure workforce reduction strategies, prevalent in the 
multi-case analysis. To be highlighted is the multiple uses and repetitive schemes among 
downsizings, e.g. pooling of rationalization, retrenchment, and cost cutting and their 
varying performance. No clear scheme or pathway for successful downsizing in the given 
sample could be determined, besides a positive economic environment. The combination 
of positive economic settings and successful downsizing supports prior research on the 
field (Tuominen 2005; Marshall, Mccolgan, & Mcleish 2012). What needs to be taken 
into consideration is the export-dependency of many German industries, with inherent 
global operations of German corporations in the analysis of the economic and industry 
setting. The critical evaluation arrived from the company´s own assessment and respected 
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industry reports but could have been arrived on a single neutral evaluation, to allow for 
higher comparability and reliability. 
The amount of six confounding indicators analysed from workforce performance (Net 
Income per Employee, Sales Productivity), industry performance (capital intensity), and 
business performance (ROA, ROE, and Profit Margin), does give a full and vivid picture 
of the case and situation of the downsizing. All variables have been utilized in prior 
research settings in the extant literature (De Meuse & Dai, 2013). The number of 
indicators facilitated a clear comparison of programs between direct competition, to 
assess the success of a downsizing qualitatively and quantitatively. Selection wise, clear 
criteria were developed and followed to derive with managerial and academic applicable 
statements in chapter eight. Nevertheless, the selection of six parameters does only enable 
comparability to a certain extent, because the three groups of KPIs originate from 
different corporate controlling systems inside the company. The case design facilitates a 
qualitative understanding of the corporate situation but does foster quantitative results 
only to a certain extent, due to the limited sample size and case character of the analysis. 
Even though, effects could be analysed on a broader scale, selecting only one to two of 
the chosen indicators would have supported an in-depth analysis of profitability as seen 
in quantitative studies targeting effects on profitability (Cameron et al., 1991; Munoz-
Bullón & Sánchez-Bueno, 2008; Kets de Vries & Balazs, 2014). 
The developed propositions do support existing theory to a large extent. Hence, 
propositions 1), 4a), 4b), and 5) do support prior research in and outside the German 
context. These refer to the performance of proactive downsizing, the magnitude of 
downsizing, and economic surrounding and financial performance. Contrary, 
Propositions 2) and 3) are influenced on a country-specific context since the application 
of certain strategies and proceedings depends on regulations. As demonstrated in chapter 
4.6.5 the applicability of certain downsizing strategies and approaches is limited within 
the German context, due to legally binding compensations and a great involvement from 
the employee side. The addressed liberalization towards more employer-friendly 
downsizing regulations did partly influence the results of this study. 
10 Conclusion 
Downsizing in Germany occurs in a multitude of variations. Larger organizational 
restructurings rely on individual corporate circumstances and externally driven 
developments such as legal, industrial and technological changes. The inherent reduction 
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in personnel can be a positive or negative influence on corporate profitability. Behind any 
reduction in human resource lies an approach, including strategies, sub-strategies, 
archetypes, proceedings, and processes. These determine the outcome of a downsizing 
while being determined by the legal conduct of a country. Even though downsizing 
perceptibility is greatest for corporations that heavily downsize, the constant and ongoing 
downsizing activities are part of economic cycles and strategic adjustment in Germany.  
 
“The thing that people need to remember is that downsizing may be back on the front 
pages, but the downsizing never slowed down. Downsizing has been a constant and 
regular feature of the new working world, and it will continue to be.” 
Bruce Tulgan, founder and CEO of RainmakerThinking (Datta et al., 2010, P.1). 
 
Indicators help management to establish a realistic picture of the outcomes of strategic 
reduction activities, as corporate decision making depends on a variety of aspects. The 
expected organizational, operational, and financial targets justify downsizing decisions 
and large-scale layoffs, even though the achievability is not guaranteed, and outcomes 
vary largely. Downsizing affects corporations on multiple layers, described in this paper. 
The focus on German downsizings and their impact on corporate profitability are 
underlining the importance of a distinct decision-making process towards utilized 
downsizing approach and timing. The corporate situation, the magnitude of reduction, the 
downsizing approach, the combination of workforce adaptations, and the economic 
environment propose distinct positive or negative downsizing environments for 
corporations. 
The cases analysed in this paper heavily vary in size, approach and outcome, but target a 
similar final state: increased financial performance. The combination of financial 
performance indicators and the classification of different organizational restructuring 
programs supports the existing body of downsizing-supportive research. This helps to 
refine academia towards a closer analysis of case-specific implementations, derived from 
individual downsizing programs, and general theory development. Since, the underlying 
aim of this thesis was to investigate the impact of RiW on corporate profitability, clear 
effects can be determined and aligned with prior research, while accounting for case-
specific singularities in the German context. 
To conclude, the undertaken research depicts a positive effect of downsizing on corporate 
profitability in a broader sense. Overcoming challenges through organizational 
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downsizing, inherent in a strategic redirection, is a feasible course of action in Germany. 
The legal conduct does support the minimization of simple cost-cutting reductions and 
impedes cost-driven measurements. Because downsizings are time-consuming and costly 
in Germany, corporations need to work strategically if they want to improve profitability 
and not offset costs and benefits. 
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12 Appendix 
1.1 Archetype Categorization 
Reinforcement (convergence) approach Reorientation Approach 
• Continuous downsizing and 
redesign 
• Lower-level, less radical 
approaches 
• Stability in management, 
technology, and systems 
• Changes in work rather than 
structure 
• Reinforced mission and strategy 
• Focus upon doing things better 
• Emphasise upon efficiency 
• Downsizing proceeds redesign 
• Discontinuous downsizing and 
redesign 
• Higher-level, more radical 
approaches 
• Change in management, 
technology, and systems 
• Changes in structure rather than 
work 
• Redesign mission and strategy 
• Focus upon doing better things 
• Emphasis upon effectiveness 
criteria 
• Redesign precedes downsizing 
Table 9. Archetype Categorization according to Gandolfi (2013) 
 
1.2 Overview Previous Studies on Downsizing and Profitability 
Source (Author) Timeframe & 
Market 
Short Description Main Results 
Cascio (1993) 1991 U.S. Survey done by Wyatt 
including 1,005 
companies to study 
the economic impact 
of downsizing. 
Costs decreased for 
46% of the companies 
over time. Less than 
33% of firms stated that 
profits increased. 




Sample includes 100 
Fortune 100 firms 
from 1987. Five 
measures of financial 
performance; profit 
margin, ROA, ROE, 
Strong evidence that 
layoffs do not introduce 
financial improvement 
in two-year horizon. 
Financial performance 
of downsizers declined. 
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asset turnover and 
market-to-book ratio. 
Estok (1996) 1994 Canada Watson Wyatt studied 
downsizings of 148 
major Canadian 
companies. 
40% failed to reduce 
expenses while 60% 
could not gain higher 
earnings. 
Mentzer (1996) 1986-1994 
Canada 
Sample size 82 – 122 
of Canada´s largest 
500 companies. Two 
measures of financial 
performance; ROA 
and net profit change. 
No consistent 
relationship between 
extent of downsizing 
and profitability in the 
future. 




5,479 (n = 537).  
occurrences in S&P 
500 with employment 
change Performance 
Measure = ROA. 
Organizational 
downsizing leads to 
lower profitability, asset 
downsizing = 
improving profitability. 
Increases in ROA for 
companies with large 
increases (or small 
declines) in human 
resources. 




N = 140 layoff 
announcements. 
Financial perfor-
mance measured by; 
ROA, ROE, and profit 
margin. 
Low profitability firms 
downsize.  Downsizing 
related to declining 
demands result in 
declining profitability. 
Surprising efficiency 
motivated reductions in 
workforce result in 
higher profitability. 




N = 646 layoff 
announcements. 
Layoffs increase 
corporate efficiency and 
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Financial perfor-
mance measure; ROE, 
net income per 
employee, and sales 
per employee. 
its workforce. Result is 
significant, 2% increase 
in ROE. 




N = 3,628 companies 
missioned by U.S. 
Labor Departmenent. 




firms downsize. Thus, 
workforce downsizers 
show decreased 
profitability in two-year 
period, while asset 
downsizers deliver two 
percent higher ROA. 




N = 302 companies 
and 349 announced 
layoffs. Financial 
profitability measured 
by ROA and operating 
margin. 
Results in consistent 
improvements in 
financial performance 
subsequent three years 
after downsizing. 
Financial measure is 
ROA (median) and 
operating margins  









are COGS, OPCF, 
ROA, sales 
productivity, profi-
tability, and debt 
solvency. 
cost cutting  and 
revenue refocusing 
strategies result in 
positive abnormal 
adjusted (industry) 
returns for OPCF and 
ROA. Plant closure 
delivers mixed results. 




N = 100 (Fortune 500) 
from 1989 with 78 
Layoff announcers do 
not outperform to non-
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downsizers. Financial 
performance measures 
are asset efficiency, 
market-to-book ratio, 
profit margin, ROA, 
ROE. 
layoff companies within  
an eight-year 
timeframe. 




N = 100 largest 
industrial (Fortune 
500) companies in 
1977. Focus on three-
year performance from 
year of the 
announcement.  
Financial perfor-
mance measure are 
ROA and ROA-
Market. 
Downsizing does not 
impact large industrial 





et al. (2011) 
1993-2005 
Spain 
N = 2,053 Spanish 
manufacturing firms 
with 17,645 obser-
vations of downsizings 
between 10 and 200 
employees. Financial 
performance measures 
are ROA and ROS. 
Corporate performance, 
productivity and 
profitability do not 
improve through 
downsizing, with or 
without accounting for 
the size of the 
downsizing. 
Table 10. Overview Previous Studies on Downsizing and Profitability; Source: Stated above 
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1.3 Research Tables and Figures 
 
The deductive process in research approach from research methodology, adapted from 
Saunders et al. (2009). 
 
 
Inductive process in research approach from research methodology, adapted from 
Saunders et al. (2009). 
 
 
1.4 Overview of German DAX members between 2000 and 2015 
Nr. Company Name Industry DAX Listing Period 
1 Adidas Consumer Goods 2000-2015 
2 Allianz Banking & Insurance 2000-2015 
3 BASF Chemicals 2000-2016 
4 Bayer Chemicals 2000-2015 
5 Beiersdorf Chemicals 2008-2015 
6 BMW Manufacturing 2000-2015 
7 Commerzbank Banking & Insurance 2000-2015 
8 Continental Chemicals 2003-2015 
9 Daimler (prev. DaimlerChrysler) Manufacturing 2000-2015 
10 Deutsche Bank Banking &Insurance 2000-2015 
11 Deutsche Börse Banking &Insurance 2002-2015 






Observation/ Test Pattern Theory
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13 Deutsche Postbank Banking, Insurance 2006-2009 
14 Deutsche Telekom ICT 2000-2015 
15 E.ON (prev. VEBA & VIAG) Energy 2000-2015 
16 EPCOS Manufacturing 2000-2002 
17 Fresenius Medical Care Chemicals 2000-2015 
18 Henkel Chemicals 2000-2015 
19 
Hypo Real Estate (prev. Hypo 
Vereinsbank) Banking & Insurance 2000-2008 
20 Infineon ICT 2000-2015 
21 K&S Resources  2008-2015 
22 Linde Group Chemicals 2000-2015 
23 Lufthansa Transport, Tourism 2000-2015 
24 MAN Manufacturing 2000-2010 
25 Merck Chemicals 2007-2015 
26 Metro Group Consumer Goods 2000-2010 
27 MLP Financial Services 2000-2003 
28 Munich Re (prev. Münchner Rück) Banking, Insurance 2000-2015 
29 RWE Energy 2000-2015 
30 SAP ICT 2000-2015 
31 Siemens ICT, Manufacturing 2000-2015 
32 Thyssen (prev. Thyssenkrupp) Manufacturing 2000-2015 
33 TUI Transport, Tourism 2000-2008 
34 Volkswagen Manufacturing 2000-2015 
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1.5 Adjusted Daimler employee numbers and changes 
 
(DaimlerChrysler AG, 2005; Daimler AG, 2008) 
 



















2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 % Changes
Cars 105.857 104.345 99.343 97.526 97.303 -8%
Nutzf 135.238 135.347 122.637 120.035 119.670 -12%
Vertrieb 48.029 48.773 46.952 49.078 49.127 2%
FS 11.224 11.129 10.718 6.743 7.116 -37%
Total 300.348 299.594 279.650 273.382 273.216 -9%
Size of workforce per segment and year
Daimler AG





















12.1 Company Data Analysis 





Change Y3/ Y0 Daimler AG BMW AG
Economic situation Negative Positive
Capital Intensity 29,35% -13,94%
ROA -59,27% -15,64%
ROE -68,86% -17,77%
Profit Margin -53,12% 19,54%
Employee Change pa -7,36% -11,24%
Net income per employee -69,41% 16,26%
Sales productivity 8,73% 17,68%
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2.2 Analysis Automotive Corporation Inputs 
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Change Y3/ Y0 Commerzbank AG Postbank
Economic Situation Positive Positive
Capital Intensity -33,35% 6,98%
ROA 2171,98% -2,11%
ROE 2210,46% 37,90%
Profit Margin 666,07% 23,95%
Employee Change pa -20,32% -7,69%
Net income per employee -210,80% 67,85%
Sales productivity -36,88% 74,81%
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2.4 Analysis Banking & Insurance Corporations Inputs 
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Change Y3/ Y0 RWE AG E.ON AG
Economic Situation Positive Negative
Capital Intensity 8,85% 20,22%
ROA 328,24% -63,72%
ROE 159,32% -55,77%
Profit Margin 12,82% 81,05%
Employee Change pa -30,92% -36,56%
Net income per employee 271,53% -52,99%
Sales productivity 92,73% 57,81%
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2.6 Analysis Energy Corporations Inputs 
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2.7 Company Data Sets 
All Data sets derived from Bloomberg LP (2018) are displayed unmodified. However, 
due to limited space available within the scope of this appendix, blank listings inside the 
data set is excluded. 
For Automotive, data was extracted from the annual report, due to the extraction 
difficulties, concerning the separation of Daimler form Daimler Chrysler financial results. 
Thus, for both data sets, data was derived from the annual statement, to allow for similar 
corporate adjustments. 
 
Data set Daimler AG 
Daimler AG ten-year Summary  
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Financial Performance per Segment Daimler AG 
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Continuation Financial Performance per Segment Daimler AG 
 
(Daimler AG, 2008) 
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Data set BMW AG 
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Continuation BMW AG 10 Year Financial Summary 
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Sales Revenue BMW AG 
 
(BMW AG, 2006) 
 
 





 Downsizing and Shareholder Value of German Corporations       119 
Continuation of Sales Revenue BMW AG 
 
(BMW AG, 2010) 
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Data set Commerzbank AG 
Balance Sheet Commerzbank AG 
 
  
Commerzbank AG (CBK GY) - Standardized Balance Sheet
In Millions of EUR except Per Share FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004
12 Months Ending 12/31/1998 12/31/1999 12/31/2000 12/31/2001 12/31/2002 12/31/2003 12/31/2004
Total Assets
  + Cash & Cash Equivalents 3.232,9 6.184,0 5.082,0 5.948,0 6.612,0 5.711,0 3.634,0
  + Interbanking Assets 57.952,9 49.796,0 74.440,0 63.282,0 54.260,0 51.657,0 86.719,0
  + ST And LT Investments 73.136,2 105.685,0 142.862,0 204.574,0 202.808,0 177.105,0 177.598,0
  + Total Loans 185.242,1 204.351,0 225.582,0 220.722,0 148.857,0 138.773,0 150.586,0
    - Reserve for Loan Losses 4.646,6 5.132,0 5.184,0 5.538,0 5.293,0 5.510,0 5.305,0
  + Net Loans 180.595,5 199.219,0 220.398,0 215.184,0 143.564,0 133.263,0 145.281,0
  + Net Fixed Assets 2.073,8 2.265,0 2.621,0 3.374,0 2.505,0 2.063,0 1.766,0
  + Total Intangible Assets 385,5 582,0 1.517,0 1.484,0 1.151,0 802,0 801,0
    + Goodwill — — 1.417,0 1.380,0 1.040,0 690,0 697,0
    + Other Intangible Assets — — 100,0 104,0 111,0 112,0 104,0
  + Investments in Associates 735,7 1.003,0 443,0 852,0 3.584,0 2.300,0 -2.379,0
  + Customer Acceptances & Liab 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
  + Other Assets 4.230,9 5.962,0 7.984,0 7.466,0 11.234,0 10.984,0 9.078,0
Total Assets 321.607,7 369.693,1 454.904,0 501.312,0 422.134,0 381.585,0 424.877,0
Liabilities & Shareholders' Equity
  + Demand Deposits 27.525,4 26.358,0 36.631,0 36.589,0 33.108,0 34.294,0 36.482,0
  + Interest Bearing Deposits 66.061,5 64.684,0 71.023,0 79.809,0 62.592,0 65.706,0 68.582,0
    + Saving Deposits 9.404,7 10.234,0 9.679,0 10.704,0 12.073,0 12.273,0 16.892,0
    + Time Deposits 56.656,8 54.450,0 61.344,0 69.105,0 50.519,0 53.433,0 51.690,0
  + Other Deposits 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
  + Total Deposits 93.586,9 91.042,1 107.654,0 116.398,0 95.700,0 100.000,0 105.064,0
  + ST Borrowings & Repos 105.790,4 126.611,0 170.320,0 171.566,0 140.750,0 110.383,0 132.391,0
    + Secs Sold Under Repo 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
  + LT Debt 84.663,3 108.947,0 118.306,0 138.714,0 76.203,0 78.269,0 79.165,0
  + Other Liabilities 26.913,4 31.267,0 44.868,0 61.530,0 99.411,0 82.629,0 97.234,0
Total Liabilities 310.953,9 357.867,1 441.148,0 488.208,0 412.064,0 371.281,0 413.854,0
  + Preferred Equity and Hybrid Capital 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
  + Share Capital & APIC 6.332,3 6.725,0 7.438,0 7.606,0 7.541,0 6.020,0 6.027,0
  - Treasury Stock 1,0 0,0 255,0 102,0 32,0 9,0 10,0
  + Retained Earnings — — — — 3.322,0 3.286,0 3.533,0
  + Other Equity 3.728,3 4.416,0 5.340,0 4.256,0 -2.023,0 -206,0 204,0
Equity before Minority Interest 10.059,7 11.141,0 12.523,0 11.760,0 8.808,0 9.091,0 9.754,0
  + Minority/Non Controlling Interest 594,1 685,0 1.233,0 1.344,0 1.262,0 1.213,0 1.269,0
Total Equity 10.653,8 11.826,0 13.756,0 13.104,0 10.070,0 10.304,0 11.023,0
Total Liabilities & Equity 321.607,7 369.693,1 454.904,0 501.312,0 422.134,0 381.585,0 424.877,0
Reference Items
Accounting Standard IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS
Shares Outstanding 82,7 85,7 89,0 90,4 90,5 99,7 99,2
Number of Treasury Shares 0,1 0,0 1,4 1,0 2,0 0,6 0,7
Pension Obligations 1.268,5 1.360,0 1.432,0 1.499,0 1.516,0 1.432,0 1.495,0
Book Value per Share 121,66 130,05 140,76 130,09 97,37 91,14 98,34
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 6,30 6,30 6,50 6,20 7,30 7,30 7,50
Net Debt 129.267,9 179.578,0 209.104,0 241.050,0 156.081,0 131.284,0 121.203,0
Tangible Common Equity Ratio 3,01 2,86 2,43 2,06 1,82 2,18 2,11
Tangible Common Equity to Risk-Weighted Assets — — — — — 6,10 6,64
Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio 8,70 9,70 9,90 10,30 12,30 13,00 12,60
Real Estate Loans 33.955,9 43.380,0 53.512,0 58.963,0 25.718,0 26.855,0 27.283,0
Earning Assets 316.331,2 359.832,0 442.884,0 488.578,0 405.925,0 367.535,0 414.903,0
Non-Performing Assets 5.668,0 5.836,0 6.292,0 6.905,0 5.163,0 5.220,0 —
Off-Balance Sheet Commitments 72.581,0 76.414,0 101.721,0 102.657,0 75.063,0 65.568,0 61.529,0
Number of Employees 32.470,00 34.870,00 39.044,00 39.481,00 36.566,00 32.377,00 32.820,00
Source: Bloomberg
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Income Statement Commerzbank AG 
 
Commerzbank AG (CBK GY) - Adjusted Income Statement
In Millions of EUR except Per Share FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004
12 Months Ending 12/31/2001 12/31/2002 12/31/2003 12/31/2004
Net Revenue 8.004,0 6.249,0 6.644,0 6.754,0
+ Net Interest Income 3.578,0 3.075,0 2.691,0 2.920,0
  + Total Interest Income 22.568,0 17.974,0 11.682,0 11.281,0
    + Interest Income 22.163,0 17.770,0 11.487,0 11.062,0
    + Investment Income 405,0 204,0 195,0 219,0
  - Total Interest Expense 18.990,0 14.899,0 8.991,0 8.361,0
  + Trading Securities G/L 1.479,0 400,0 1.028,0 884,0
  + Commissions & Fees Earned 2.566,0 2.416,0 2.505,0 2.587,0
  + Other Operating Income (Losses) 381,0 358,0 420,0 363,0
- Provision for Loan Losses 927,0 1.321,0 1.084,0 836,0
Net Revenue after Provisions 7.077,0 4.928,0 5.560,0 5.918,0
- Total Non-Interest Expense 6.777,0 5.747,0 5.214,0 5.083,0
  + Commissions & Fees Paid 299,0 296,0 369,0 337,0
  + Other Operating Expenses 6.478,0 5.451,0 4.845,0 4.746,0
Operating Income (Loss) 300,0 -819,0 346,0 835,0
- Non-Operating (Income) Loss 257,0 -447,0 2.326,0 39,0
  + (Income) Loss from Affiliates -3,0 -58,0 -85,0 -93,0
  + Other Non-Op (Income) Loss 260,0 -389,0 2.411,0 132,0
Pretax Income (Loss), Adjusted 43,0 -372,0 -1.980,0 796,0
- Abnormal Losses (Gains) — — 104,0 132,0
Pretax Income (Loss), GAAP 43,0 -372,0 -1.980,0 796,0
- Income Tax Expense (Benefit) -114,0 -103,0 249,0 353,0
Income (Loss) from Cont Ops 157,0 -269,0 -2.229,0 443,0
- Net Extraordinary Losses (Gains) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Income (Loss) Incl. MI 157,0 -269,0 -2.229,0 443,0
  - Minority Interest 55,0 29,0 91,0 81,0
Net Income, GAAP 102,0 -298,0 -2.320,0 362,0
  - Preferred Dividends 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Net Income Avail to Common, GAAP 102,0 -298,0 -2.320,0 362,0
Net Income Avail to Common, Adj 102,0 -298,0 -2.320,0 362,0
  Net Abnormal Losses (Gains) — — — 132,0
  Net Extraordinary Losses (Gains) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Basic Weighted Avg Shares 89,5 89,0 90,8 99,0
Basic EPS, GAAP 1,14 -3,36 -25,53 3,66
Basic EPS from Cont Ops 1,14 -3,36 -25,53 3,66
Basic EPS from Cont Ops, Adjusted — — -24,39 4,99
Diluted Weighted Avg Shares 89,5 89,0 90,8 99,0
Diluted EPS, GAAP 1,14 -3,36 -25,53 3,66
Accounting Standard IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS
Net Interest Income Less Provisions 2.651,0 1.754,0 1.607,0 2.084,0
Net Revenue - Net of Commissions Paid — — 6.275,0 6.417,0
Total Revenue 26.994,0 21.148,0 15.635,0 15.115,0
Operating Margin 3,75 -13,11 5,21 12,36
Pretax Margin 0,54 -5,95 -29,80 11,79
Profit Margin 1,27 -4,77 -34,92 5,36
T12 Net Interest Margin 0,77 0,69 0,70 0,75
Sales per Employee 683.721,28 578.351,47 482.904,53 460.542,35
Dividends per Share 2,40 0,60 0,00 1,50
Total Cash Common Dividends 216,7 54,0 0,0 150,0
Pre-Tax Pre-Provision Profit 1.227,0 502,0 1.430,0 1.671,0
Efficiency Ratio 84,08 91,57 77,21 73,96
Actual Loan Losses (Net) 701,0 859,0 843,0 1.024,0
Reinvested Earnings -114,7 -352,0 -2.320,0 212,0
Source: Bloomberg
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Data set Postbank 
Balance Sheet Postbank 
 
  
Deutsche Postbank AG (DPB GR) - Standardized Balance Sheet
In Millions of EUR except Per Share FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007
12 Months Ending 12/31/2001 12/31/2002 12/31/2003 12/31/2004 12/31/2005 12/31/2006 12/31/2007
Total Assets
  + Cash & Cash Equivalents 1.360,0 1.306,0 1.622,0 1.125,0 968,0 1.015,0 3.352,0
  + Interbanking Assets 37.402,0 37.774,0 34.071,0 23.820,0 17.801,0 16.350,0 24.560,0
  + ST And LT Investments 55.201,0 56.669,0 52.280,0 53.160,0 65.794,0 76.562,0 78.478,0
  + Total Loans 44.278,0 43.929,0 43.310,0 47.739,0 52.873,0 87.182,0 92.064,0
    - Reserve for Loan Losses 621,0 588,0 597,0 667,0 776,0 1.155,0 1.154,0
  + Net Loans 43.657,0 43.341,0 42.713,0 47.072,0 52.097,0 86.027,0 90.910,0
  + Net Fixed Assets 1.022,0 977,0 960,0 926,0 726,0 858,0 768,0
  + Total Intangible Assets 93,0 139,0 168,0 168,0 223,0 2.505,0 2.415,0
    + Goodwill — 19,0 21,0 28,0 51,0 1.626,0 1.631,0
    + Other Intangible Assets — 120,0 147,0 140,0 172,0 879,0 784,0
  + Investments in Associates — — — 18,0 15,0 17,0 22,0
  + Customer Acceptances & Liab 0,0 0,0 0,0 — — — —
  + Other Assets 1.081,0 884,0 805,0 1.983,0 2.671,0 1.570,0 2.430,0
Total Assets 139.816,0 141.090,0 132.619,0 128.254,0 140.280,0 184.887,0 202.913,0
Liabilities & Shareholders' Equity
  + Demand Deposits 18.351,0 16.614,0 20.227,0 21.255,0 21.940,0 23.525,0 26.589,0
  + Interest Bearing Deposits 43.937,0 50.032,0 53.714,0 59.264,0 56.541,0 77.791,0 84.107,0
    + Saving Deposits 24.291,0 29.053,0 33.739,0 36.158,0 37.988,0 53.015,0 51.911,0
    + Time Deposits 19.646,0 20.979,0 19.975,0 23.106,0 18.553,0 24.776,0 32.196,0
  + Other Deposits 30,0 19,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 —
  + Total Deposits 62.318,0 66.665,0 73.941,0 80.519,0 78.481,0 101.316,0 110.696,0
  + ST Borrowings & Repos 23.480,0 33.051,0 25.177,0 14.733,0 30.433,0 45.978,0 52.201,0
    + Secs Sold Under Repo 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 —
  + LT Debt 43.981,0 31.250,0 23.085,0 20.780,0 18.866,0 22.275,0 24.106,0
  + Other Liabilities 5.130,0 5.714,0 5.536,0 7.456,0 7.439,0 10.111,0 10.685,0
Total Liabilities 134.909,0 136.680,0 127.739,0 123.488,0 135.219,0 179.680,0 197.688,0
  + Preferred Equity and Hybrid Capital 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
  + Share Capital & APIC 1.569,0 1.569,0 1.569,0 1.569,0 1.570,0 1.570,0 1.570,0
  - Treasury Stock 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 —
  + Retained Earnings 3.343,0 3.338,0 3.591,0 3.196,0 3.256,0 3.746,0 4.358,0
  + Other Equity -65,0 -511,0 -294,0 0,0 234,0 -111,0 -705,0
Equity before Minority Interest 4.847,0 4.396,0 4.866,0 4.765,0 5.060,0 5.205,0 5.223,0
  + Minority/Non Controlling Interest 60,0 14,0 14,0 1,0 1,0 2,0 2,0
Total Equity 4.907,0 4.410,0 4.880,0 4.766,0 5.061,0 5.207,0 5.225,0
Total Liabilities & Equity 139.816,0 141.090,0 132.619,0 128.254,0 140.280,0 184.887,0 202.913,0
Reference Items
Accounting Standard IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS
Shares Outstanding 164,0 164,0 164,0 164,0 164,0 164,0 164,0
Number of Treasury Shares 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 — — —
Pension Obligations 545,0 563,0 572,0 584,0 585,0 1.115,0 1.143,0
Future Minimum Operating Lease Obligations — — 264,0 — 84,0 147,0 156,0
Book Value per Share 29,55 26,80 29,67 29,05 30,85 31,74 31,85
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 6,70 6,90 6,60 8,50 8,30 5,50 6,90
Net Debt 28.699,0 25.221,0 12.569,0 10.568,0 30.530,0 50.888,0 48.395,0
Tangible Common Equity Ratio 3,40 3,02 3,55 3,59 3,45 1,48 1,40
Tangible Common Equity to Risk-Weighted Assets — — — — 6,92 2,88 3,71
Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio 10,80 10,60 10,80 10,90 10,70 8,10 9,60
Real Estate Loans 10.520,0 10.668,0 11.200,0 17.259,0 19.088,0 45.565,0 50.306,0
Earning Assets 136.881,0 138.372,0 129.661,0 124.719,0 136.468,0 180.094,0 195.102,0
Non-Performing Assets 246,0 475,0 424,0 475,0 612,0 926,0 918,0
Off-Balance Sheet Commitments 13.970,0 12.625,0 14.144,0 1.110,0 18.471,0 23.490,0 25.064,0
Number of Employees 10.430,00 10.230,00 8.700,00 10.006,00 8.185,00 18.572,00 21.474,00
Source: Bloomberg
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Income Statement Postbank 
 
 
Deutsche Postbank AG (DPB GR) - Adjusted Income Statement
In Millions of EUR except Per Share FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006
12 Months Ending 12/31/2001 12/31/2002 12/31/2003 12/31/2004 12/31/2005 12/31/2006
Net Revenue 2.599,0 2.606,0 2.668,0 2.926,0 3.176,0 4.522,0
+ Net Interest Income 1.605,0 1.852,0 1.653,0 1.559,0 1.679,0 2.135,0
  + Total Interest Income 6.776,0 6.458,0 5.610,0 5.263,0 5.354,0 7.631,0
    + Interest Income 3.677,0 3.555,0 3.194,0 4.964,0 4.959,0 5.083,0
    + Investment Income 3.099,0 2.903,0 2.416,0 299,0 395,0 2.548,0
  - Total Interest Expense 5.171,0 4.606,0 3.957,0 3.704,0 3.675,0 5.496,0
+ Total Non-Interest Income — — — — — —
  + Trading Securities G/L 154,0 116,0 258,0 500,0 452,0 564,0
  + Commissions & Fees Earned 484,0 517,0 539,0 706,0 801,0 1.623,0
  + Other Operating Income (Losses) 356,0 121,0 218,0 161,0 244,0 200,0
- Provision for Loan Losses 102,0 137,0 154,0 185,0 205,0 337,0
Net Revenue after Provisions 2.497,0 2.469,0 2.514,0 2.741,0 2.971,0 4.185,0
- Total Non-Interest Expense 2.061,0 2.070,0 2.015,0 2.096,0 2.133,0 3.245,0
  + Commissions & Fees Paid 76,0 62,0 72,0 94,0 102,0 216,0
  + Other Operating Expenses 1.985,0 2.008,0 1.943,0 2.002,0 2.031,0 3.029,0
Operating Income (Loss) 436,0 399,0 499,0 645,0 838,0 940,0
- Non-Operating (Income) Loss 93,0 0,0 2,0 -3,0 119,0 -1,0
  + (Income) Loss from Affiliates — — — -3,0 -1,0 -11,0
  + Other Non-Op (Income) Loss 93,0 0,0 2,0 0,0 120,0 10,0
Pretax Income (Loss), Adjusted 343,0 399,0 497,0 648,0 719,0 941,0
- Abnormal Losses (Gains) — — — 0,0 128,0 15,0
  + Impairment Of Goodwill — 0,0 0,0 — — —
Pretax Income (Loss), GAAP 343,0 399,0 497,0 648,0 719,0 941,0
- Income Tax Expense (Benefit) 152,0 259,0 144,0 212,0 226,0 245,0
Income (Loss) from Cont Ops 191,0 140,0 353,0 436,0 493,0 696,0
- Net Extraordinary Losses (Gains) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Income (Loss) Incl. MI 191,0 140,0 353,0 436,0 493,0 696,0
  - Minority Interest 1,0 8,0 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0
Net Income, GAAP 190,0 132,0 352,0 435,0 492,0 695,0
  - Preferred Dividends — — 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Net Income Avail to Common, GAAP 190,0 132,0 352,0 435,0 492,0 695,0
Net Income Avail to Common, Adj 190,0 132,0 352,0 435,0 492,0 695,0
  Net Extraordinary Losses (Gains) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Basic Weighted Avg Shares 164,0 164,0 164,0 164,0 164,0 164,0
Basic EPS, GAAP 1,16 0,81 2,14 2,65 3,00 4,24
Basic EPS from Cont Ops 1,16 0,81 2,14 2,65 3,00 4,24
Basic EPS from Cont Ops, Adjusted 1,16 0,81 2,14 2,65 4,02 4,36
Diluted Weighted Avg Shares — 164,0 164,0 164,0 164,0 164,0
Diluted EPS, GAAP — 0,81 2,14 2,65 3,00 4,24
Diluted EPS from Cont Ops — 0,81 2,14 2,65 3,00 4,24
Diluted EPS from Cont Ops, Adjusted — 0,81 2,14 2,65 4,02 4,36
Reference Items
Accounting Standard IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS
Net Interest Income Less Provisions 1.503,0 1.715,0 1.499,0 1.374,0 1.474,0 1.798,0
Net Revenue - Net of Commissions Paid 2.523,0 2.544,0 2.596,0 2.832,0 3.074,0 4.306,0
Total Revenue 7.770,0 7.212,0 6.625,0 6.630,0 6.851,0 10.018,0
Operating Margin 16,78 15,31 18,70 22,04 26,39 20,79
Pretax Margin 13,20 15,31 18,63 22,15 22,64 20,81
Profit Margin 7,31 5,07 13,19 14,87 15,49 15,37
T12 Net Interest Margin 1,21 1,35 1,23 1,23 1,29 1,35
Sales per Employee 744.966,44 704.985,34 761.494,25 662.602,44 837.018,94 539.414,17
Dividends per Share — — — 1,25 1,25 1,25
Total Cash Common Dividends — — — 205,0 205,0 205,0
Pre-Tax Pre-Provision Profit 538,0 536,0 653,0 830,0 1.043,0 1.277,0
Efficiency Ratio 78,68 78,93 74,85 70,69 66,07 70,34
Actual Loan Losses (Net) — — — 12,0 14,0 13,0
Reinvested Earnings — — — 230,0 287,0 490,0
Source: Bloomberg
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RWE AG (RWE GR) - Standardized Balance Sheet
In Millions of EUR except Per Share FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006
12 Months Ending 12/31/2000 12/31/2001 12/31/2002 12/31/2003 12/31/2004 12/31/2005 12/31/2006
Total Assets
  + Cash, Cash Equivalents & STI 10.151,0 14.453,0 10.602,0 11.796,0 12.539,0 11.775,0 19.582,0
    + Cash & Cash Equivalents 2.812,0 3.842,0 2.143,0 2.181,0 1.526,0 1.431,0 2.794,0
    + ST Investments 7.339,0 10.611,0 8.459,0 9.615,0 11.013,0 10.344,0 16.788,0
  + Accounts & Notes Receiv 7.076,0 — 7.737,0 7.472,0 7.419,0 8.325,0 8.876,0
  + Inventories 3.135,0 3.643,0 3.505,0 3.285,0 2.043,0 2.257,0 2.226,0
    + Raw Materials — 1.176,0 1.306,0 — 1.244,0 1.143,0 1.283,0
    + Work In Process — 923,0 827,0 — 340,0 306,0 82,0
    + Finished Goods — 1.266,0 1.110,0 — 386,0 734,0 849,0
    + Other Inventory — 278,0 262,0 — 73,0 74,0 12,0
  + Other ST Assets 2.105,0 24.171,0 7.795,0 8.069,0 5.963,0 15.421,0 10.772,0
Total Current Assets 22.467,0 42.267,0 29.434,0 30.622,0 27.964,0 37.778,0 41.456,0
  + Property, Plant & Equip, Net 17.491,0 32.310,0 33.984,0 36.210,0 34.518,0 36.089,0 26.034,0
    + Property, Plant & Equip 59.006,0 — 88.843,0 91.131,0 88.776,0 90.061,0 76.474,0
    - Accumulated Depreciation 41.515,0 — 54.859,0 54.921,0 54.258,0 53.972,0 50.440,0
  + LT Investments & Receivables 8.372,0 8.370,0 5.274,0 3.141,0 3.747,0 3.818,0 3.446,0
  + Other LT Assets 16.659,0 8.502,0 31.581,0 29.169,0 27.141,0 31.773,0 22.519,0
    + Total Intangible Assets — 8.502,0 18.518,0 — 14.379,0 18.551,0 14.901,0
    + Goodwill 1.130,0 7.750,0 14.454,0 15.658,0 14.379,0 15.613,0 12.318,0
    + Other Intangible Assets — 752,0 4.064,0 — 0,0 2.938,0 2.583,0
    + Deferred Tax Assets — — — — 3.243,0 — —
    + Investments in Affiliates 7.356,0 4.614,0 4.030,0 3.674,0 2.665,0 2.617,0 2.271,0
    + Misc LT Assets 9.303,0 -4.614,0 9.033,0 25.495,0 6.854,0 10.605,0 5.347,0
Total Noncurrent Assets 42.522,0 49.182,0 70.839,0 68.520,0 65.406,0 71.680,0 51.999,0
Total Assets 64.989,0 91.449,0 100.273,0 99.142,0 93.370,0 109.458,0 93.455,0
Liabilities & Shareholders' Equity
  + Payables & Accruals 5.398,0 — 4.968,0 5.019,0 6.066,0 7.497,0 8.148,0
    + Accounts Payable 5.398,0 — 4.968,0 5.019,0 6.066,0 7.497,0 8.148,0
  + ST Debt 479,0 — 5.951,0 7.645,0 4.895,0 5.994,0 3.710,0
    + ST Borrowings 467,0 -19,0 5.874,0 7.574,0 4.834,0 5.973,0 3.695,0
    + ST Capital Leases 12,0 19,0 77,0 71,0 61,0 21,0 15,0
  + Other ST Liabilities 13.672,0 6.206,0 14.821,0 16.086,0 10.895,0 18.545,0 15.084,0
    + Misc ST Liabilities 13.672,0 6.206,0 14.821,0 16.086,0 10.895,0 18.545,0 15.084,0
Total Current Liabilities 19.549,0 6.206,0 25.740,0 28.750,0 21.856,0 32.036,0 26.942,0
  + LT Debt 1.333,0 11.408,0 23.935,0 24.145,0 22.488,0 21.458,0 15.672,0
    + LT Borrowings 1.103,0 11.156,0 23.306,0 23.594,0 21.955,0 21.198,0 15.591,0
    + LT Capital Leases 230,0 252,0 629,0 551,0 533,0 260,0 81,0
  + Other LT Liabilities 34.550,0 62.706,0 41.674,0 37.182,0 37.833,0 43.607,0 36.730,0
    + Misc LT Liabilities 34.550,0 62.706,0 41.674,0 37.182,0 37.833,0 43.607,0 36.730,0
Total Noncurrent Liabilities 35.883,0 74.114,0 65.609,0 61.327,0 60.321,0 65.065,0 52.402,0
Total Liabilities 55.432,0 80.320,0 91.349,0 90.077,0 82.177,0 97.101,0 79.344,0
  + Preferred Equity and Hybrid Capital — 0,0 0,0 — 0,0 0,0 0,0
  + Share Capital & APIC 3.037,0 — 2.728,0 2.728,0 2.728,0 2.728,0 2.728,0
  - Treasury Stock — 62,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
  + Retained Earnings — 7.730,0 6.429,0 4.856,0 6.290,0 7.714,0 10.557,0
  + Other Equity 3.329,0 62,0 -2.728,0 -571,0 638,0 989,0 154,0
Equity Before Minority Interest 6.366,0 7.730,0 6.429,0 7.013,0 9.656,0 11.431,0 13.439,0
  + Minority/Non Controlling Interest 3.191,0 3.399,0 2.495,0 2.052,0 1.537,0 926,0 672,0
Total Equity 9.557,0 11.129,0 8.924,0 9.065,0 11.193,0 12.357,0 14.111,0
Total Liabilities & Equity 64.989,0 91.449,0 100.273,0 99.142,0 93.370,0 109.458,0 93.455,0
Reference Items
Accounting Standard IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS
Shares Outstanding 525,0 571,9 564,3 564,3 564,3 564,3 564,3
Number of Treasury Shares — 7,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Pension Obligations 11.536,0 13.915,0 13.376,0 12.303,0 11.853,0 11.997,0 11.584,0
Future Minimum Operating Lease Obligations 2.710,0 1.429,0 980,0 1.602,0 647,0 556,0 528,0
Capital Leases - Total 242,0 271,0 706,0 622,0 594,0 281,0 96,0
Options Granted During Period 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 — — 392,1
Options Outstanding at Period End 5.956,3 14.896,5 13,6 12,7 — — 938,1
Net Debt -8.339,0 -3.045,0 19.284,0 19.994,0 14.844,0 15.677,0 -200,0
Net Debt to Equity -87,26 -27,36 216,09 220,56 132,62 126,87 -1,42
Tangible Common Equity Ratio — -0,93 -14,79 — -5,98 -7,83 -1,86
Current Ratio 1,15 6,81 1,14 1,07 1,28 1,18 1,54
Number of Employees 152.132,00 162.340,00 132.607,00 127.028,00 97.777,00 85.928,00 68.534,00
Source: Bloomberg
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RWE AG (RWE GR) - Adjusted Income Statement
In Millions of EUR except Per Share FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006
12 Months Ending 12/31/2001 12/31/2002 12/31/2003 12/31/2004 12/31/2005 12/31/2006
Revenue 50.366,0 43.487,0 37.169,0 40.996,0 38.186,0 41.169,0
  - Cost of Revenue 6.396,0 — — — — —
Gross Profit 43.970,0 — — — — —
  + Other Operating Income — 2.172,0 1.402,0 3.260,0 1.022,0 880,0
  - Operating Expenses 40.644,0 41.019,0 33.513,0 38.682,0 34.188,0 37.786,0
    + Selling, General & Admin — 203,0 — — — —
    + Selling & Marketing — 203,0 — — — —
    + Prov For Doubtful Accts — — — -1.508,0 — —
Operating Income (Loss) 3.326,0 4.640,0 5.058,0 5.574,0 5.020,0 4.263,0
    + Interest Expense, Net — 644,0 — — 742,0 509,0
    + Interest Expense — 1.949,0 2.247,0 — 2.048,0 2.710,0
    - Interest Income 572,0 1.305,0 1.116,0 — 1.306,0 2.201,0
    + Foreign Exch (Gain) Loss — -57,0 -74,0 — — —
    + (Income) Loss from Affiliates -544,0 -494,0 -73,0 -298,0 -529,0 -409,0
Pretax Income (Loss), Adjusted 2.194,0 2.722,0 3.108,0 3.935,0 3.156,0 3.537,0
  - Abnormal Losses (Gains) — — — 58,0 934,0 -191,0
    + Impairment of Goodwill — 59,0 68,0 533,0 759,0 —
Pretax Income (Loss), GAAP 2.194,0 2.722,0 3.108,0 3.935,0 3.156,0 3.537,0
  - Income Tax Expense (Benefit) 450,0 1.367,0 1.187,0 1.521,0 1.086,0 966,0
Income (Loss) from Cont Ops 1.744,0 1.355,0 1.921,0 2.414,0 2.070,0 2.571,0
  - Net Extraordinary Losses (Gains) 0,0 0,0 985,0 — -385,0 -1.442,0
Income (Loss) Incl. MI 1.744,0 1.355,0 936,0 2.414,0 2.455,0 4.013,0
  - Minority Interest 394,0 305,0 -17,0 277,0 224,0 166,0
Net Income, GAAP 1.350,0 1.050,0 953,0 2.137,0 2.231,0 3.847,0
  - Preferred Dividends 0,0 0,0 — 0,0 0,0 0,0
Net Income Avail to Common, GAAP 1.350,0 1.050,0 953,0 2.137,0 2.231,0 3.847,0
Net Income Avail to Common, Adj 1.350,0 1.050,0 953,0 2.137,0 2.231,0 3.847,0
  Net Abnormal Losses (Gains) — — — 58,0 — —
  Net Extraordinary Losses (Gains) 0,0 0,0 985,0 — -385,0 -1.442,0
Basic Weighted Avg Shares 544,7 564,2 564,2 564,2 564,2 564,2
Basic EPS, GAAP 2,48 1,86 1,68 3,79 3,96 6,82
Basic EPS from Cont Ops 2,48 1,86 3,43 3,79 3,27 4,27
Basic EPS from Cont Ops, Adjusted 2,48 1,86 — 3,89 4,35 3,93
Diluted Weighted Avg Shares 544,7 564,2 564,2 564,2 564,2 564,2
Diluted EPS, GAAP 2,48 1,86 1,68 3,79 3,96 6,82
Diluted EPS from Cont Ops 2,48 1,86 — 3,79 3,27 4,27
Diluted EPS from Cont Ops, Adjusted 2,48 1,86 — 3,89 4,35 3,93
Reference Items
Accounting Standard IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS
EBITDA 6.839,0 8.867,0 9.281,0 9.354,0 8.056,0 7.288,0
EBITDA Margin (T12M) 13,58 20,39 24,97 22,82 21,10 17,70
EBITA 2.428,0 5.929,0 6.382,0 6.751,0 5.633,0 4.875,0
EBIT 3.326,0 4.640,0 5.058,0 5.574,0 5.020,0 4.263,0
Gross Margin 87,30 — — — — —
Operating Margin 6,60 10,67 13,61 13,60 13,15 10,35
Profit Margin 2,68 2,41 2,56 5,21 5,84 9,34
Sales per Employee 310.250,09 327.938,95 292.604,78 — 444.395,31 600.709,14
Dividends per Share — 1,00 1,25 1,50 1,74 3,49
Total Cash Common Dividends — 619,0 703,0 843,6 984,0 1.968,0
Personnel Expenses 13.513,0 7.527,0 7.530,0 6.122,0 4.969,0 4.620,0
Depreciation Expense 4.411,0 2.938,0 2.899,0 2.603,0 2.423,0 2.413,0
Rental Expense — — — — 249,0 103,0
Source: Bloomberg
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E.ON SE (EOAN GR) - Standardized Balance Sheet
In Millions of EUR except Per Share FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014
12 Months Ending 12/31/2008 12/31/2009 12/31/2010 12/31/2011 12/31/2012 12/31/2013 12/31/2014
Total Assets
  + Cash, Cash Equivalents & STI 7.845,0 7.619,0 9.452,0 8.642,0 8.091,0 8.734,0 6.336,0
    + Cash & Cash Equivalents 3.671,0 4.210,0 6.143,0 3.852,0 2.816,0 4.527,0 3.191,0
    + ST Investments 4.174,0 3.409,0 3.309,0 4.790,0 5.275,0 4.207,0 3.145,0
  + Accounts & Notes Receiv 14.468,0 11.619,0 15.881,0 18.143,0 16.168,0 14.352,0 11.843,0
    + Accounts Receivable, Net 14.416,0 11.577,0 15.819,0 18.065,0 16.104,0 14.257,0 11.800,0
    + Notes Receivable, Net 52,0 42,0 62,0 78,0 64,0 95,0 43,0
  + Inventories 4.774,0 4.518,0 4.064,0 4.828,0 4.734,0 4.147,0 3.356,0
    + Raw Materials 2.614,0 2.258,0 2.163,0 2.160,0 2.156,0 2.134,0 1.821,0
    + Work In Process — 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
    + Finished Goods 94,0 150,0 287,0 180,0 189,0 165,0 103,0
    + Other Inventory 2.066,0 2.110,0 1.614,0 2.488,0 2.389,0 1.848,0 1.432,0
  + Other ST Assets 21.020,0 15.812,0 16.827,0 19.038,0 14.870,0 9.517,0 21.090,0
    + Derivative & Hedging Assets — 7.556,0 7.567,0 9.863,0 4.489,0 4.154,0 10.199,0
    + Assets Held-for-Sale — 2.273,0 2.043,0 620,0 5.261,0 1.031,0 5.770,0
    + Taxes Receivable — 1.925,0 2.678,0 4.680,0 910,0 1.030,0 1.745,0
    + Misc ST Assets — 4.058,0 4.539,0 3.875,0 4.210,0 3.302,0 3.376,0
Total Current Assets 48.107,0 39.568,0 46.224,0 50.651,0 43.863,0 36.750,0 42.625,0
  + Property, Plant & Equip, Net 56.480,0 60.327,0 60.870,0 55.869,0 54.173,0 50.083,0 41.273,0
    + Property, Plant & Equip 114.956,0 120.563,0 123.498,0 117.999,0 113.259,0 106.965,0 96.703,0
    - Accumulated Depreciation 58.476,0 60.236,0 62.628,0 62.130,0 59.086,0 56.882,0 55.430,0
  + LT Investments & Receivables 11.274,0 6.322,0 7.260,0 8.523,0 8.438,0 7.994,0 8.314,0
    + LT Marketable Securities 5.017,0 3.670,0 3.903,0 4.904,0 4.746,0 4.444,0 4.781,0
    + LT Receivables — 2.652,0 3.357,0 3.619,0 3.692,0 3.550,0 3.533,0
  + Other LT Assets 40.963,0 46.397,0 38.527,0 37.829,0 33.952,0 37.503,0 33.478,0
    + Total Intangible Assets 24.007,0 25.566,0 22.658,0 21.455,0 20.309,0 19.314,0 16.694,0
    + Goodwill 17.311,0 16.901,0 14.588,0 14.083,0 13.440,0 12.666,0 11.812,0
    + Other Intangible Assets 6.696,0 8.665,0 8.070,0 7.372,0 6.869,0 6.648,0 4.882,0
    + Deferred Tax Assets 2.248,0 4.640,0 3.303,0 5.299,0 5.564,0 7.497,0 6.255,0
    + Derivative & Hedging Assets — 2.365,0 3.068,0 1.901,0 1.944,0 2.545,0 3.517,0
    + Investments in Affiliates 8.931,0 12.803,0 8.544,0 8.233,0 5.679,0 7.618,0 6.582,0
    + Misc LT Assets 5.777,0 1.023,0 954,0 941,0 456,0 529,0 430,0
Total Noncurrent Assets 108.717,0 113.046,0 106.657,0 102.221,0 96.563,0 95.580,0 83.065,0
Total Assets 156.824,0 152.614,0 152.881,0 152.872,0 140.426,0 132.330,0 125.690,0
Liabilities & Shareholders' Equity
  + Payables & Accruals 0,0 6.278,0 7.594,0 9.296,0 6.850,0 4.208,0 2.982,0
    + Accounts Payable — 4.635,0 5.016,0 4.871,0 5.459,0 2.485,0 2.185,0
    + Accrued Taxes — 1.643,0 2.578,0 4.425,0 1.391,0 1.723,0 797,0
    + Other Payables & Accruals 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
  + ST Debt 16.022,0 7.120,0 3.611,0 5.885,0 4.007,0 4.673,0 3.883,0
    + ST Borrowings — 7.076,0 3.590,0 5.823,0 3.945,0 4.630,0 3.839,0
    + ST Capital Leases — 44,0 21,0 62,0 62,0 43,0 44,0
  + Other ST Liabilities 0,0 24.455,0 26.511,0 30.949,0 25.722,0 23.632,0 28.777,0
    + Deferred Revenue 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
    + Derivatives & Hedging — 7.307,0 7.214,0 9.140,0 5.567,0 4.337,0 9.908,0
    + Misc ST Liabilities 35.933,0 17.148,0 19.297,0 21.809,0 20.155,0 19.295,0 18.869,0
Total Current Liabilities 51.955,0 37.853,0 37.716,0 46.130,0 36.579,0 32.513,0 35.642,0
  + LT Debt 25.036,0 30.657,0 28.880,0 24.029,0 21.937,0 18.051,0 15.784,0
    + LT Borrowings — 30.456,0 28.453,0 23.313,0 21.050,0 17.181,0 15.015,0
    + LT Capital Leases — 201,0 427,0 716,0 887,0 870,0 769,0
  + Other LT Liabilities 41.389,0 40.118,0 40.700,0 43.100,0 43.090,0 45.128,0 47.551,0
    + Pension Liabilities — 2.884,0 3.250,0 3.245,0 4.945,0 3.418,0 5.574,0
    + Deferred Revenue 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
    + Deferred Tax Liabilities 6.277,0 7.529,0 7.157,0 6.786,0 6.781,0 7.904,0 5.720,0
    + Derivatives & Hedging — 2.885,0 1.647,0 2.417,0 1.739,0 2.445,0 3.868,0
    + Misc LT Liabilities 35.112,0 26.820,0 28.646,0 30.652,0 29.625,0 31.361,0 32.389,0
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E.ON SE (EOAN GR) - Standardized Balance Sheet
In Millions of EUR except Per Share FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014
12 Months Ending 12/31/2008 12/31/2009 12/31/2010 12/31/2011 12/31/2012 12/31/2013 12/31/2014
Total Noncurrent Liabilities 66.425,0 70.775,0 69.580,0 67.129,0 65.027,0 63.179,0 63.335,0
Total Liabilities 118.380,0 108.628,0 107.296,0 113.259,0 101.606,0 95.692,0 98.977,0
  + Preferred Equity and Hybrid Capital 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
  + Share Capital & APIC 15.742,0 15.748,0 15.748,0 15.748,0 15.741,0 15.734,0 15.078,0
    + Common Stock — 2.001,0 2.001,0 2.001,0 2.001,0 2.001,0 2.001,0
    + Additional Paid in Capital — 13.747,0 13.747,0 13.747,0 13.740,0 13.733,0 13.077,0
  - Treasury Stock 3.549,0 3.530,0 3.531,0 3.530,0 3.505,0 3.484,0 2.502,0
  + Retained Earnings 22.181,0 26.609,0 29.026,0 23.796,0 22.868,0 23.306,0 16.842,0
  + Other Equity 110,0 1.552,0 410,0 -277,0 -146,0 -1.833,0 -4.833,0
Equity Before Minority Interest 34.484,0 40.379,0 41.653,0 35.737,0 34.958,0 33.723,0 24.585,0
  + Minority/Non Controlling Interest 3.960,0 3.607,0 3.932,0 3.876,0 3.862,0 2.915,0 2.128,0
Total Equity 38.444,0 43.986,0 45.585,0 39.613,0 38.820,0 36.638,0 26.713,0
Total Liabilities & Equity 156.824,0 152.614,0 152.881,0 152.872,0 140.426,0 132.330,0 125.690,0
Reference Items
Accounting Standard IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS
Shares Outstanding 1.904,5 1.905,5 1.905,4 1.905,5 1.906,8 1.907,8 1.932,7
Number of Treasury Shares 96,5 95,5 95,6 95,5 94,2 93,2 68,3
Pension Obligations 3.559,0 2.884,0 3.250,0 3.245,0 4.945,0 3.418,0 5.574,0
Future Minimum Operating Lease Obligations 1.378,0 1.228,0 1.762,0 2.175,0 1.711,0 1.269,0 1.555,0
Capital Leases - Total 247,0 245,0 448,0 778,0 949,0 913,0 813,0
Options Granted During Period 0,3 1,4 1,4 — — — —
Options Outstanding at Period End 0,8 1,7 2,5 — — — —
Net Debt 28.196,0 26.488,0 19.136,0 16.368,0 13.107,0 9.546,0 8.550,0
Net Debt to Equity 73,34 60,22 41,98 41,32 33,76 26,05 32,01
Tangible Common Equity Ratio 7,89 11,66 14,59 10,87 12,20 12,75 7,24
Current Ratio 0,93 1,05 1,23 1,10 1,20 1,13 1,20
Cash Conversion Cycle — — 51,24 53,26 46,30 48,08 47,38
Number of Employees 93.538,00 88.227,00 85.105,00 78.889,00 72.083,00 61.327,00 58.811,00
Source: Bloomberg
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E.ON SE (EOAN GR) - Adjusted Income Statement
In Millions of EUR except Per Share FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014
12 Months Ending 12/31/2008 12/31/2009 12/31/2010 12/31/2011 12/31/2012 12/31/2013 12/31/2014
Revenue 86.753,0 79.974,0 92.863,0 112.954,0 132.093,0 119.688,0 113.095,0
    + Sales & Services Revenue — 81.875,0 94.812,0 115.046,0 133.997,0 121.452,0 114.592,0
    Growth (YoY) — — 15,8 21,3 16,5 -9,4 -5,6
    + Other Revenue — -1.901,0 -1.949,0 -2.092,0 -1.904,0 -1.764,0 -1.497,0
Gross Profit — — — — — — —
  + Other Operating Income 15.454,0 19.635,0 12.483,0 12.237,0 9.837,0 3.885,0 9.943,0
  - Operating Expenses 96.867,0 95.663,0 97.829,0 123.017,0 136.708,0 119.967,0 119.097,0
    + Selling & Marketing — — 284,0 — — — —
    + Research & Development — 62,0 61,0 59,0 56,0 42,0 30,0
    + Depreciation & Amortization — 3.663,0 3.767,0 3.712,0 5.078,0 3.561,0 3.580,0
    + Other Operating Expense — 91.938,0 93.717,0 119.246,0 131.574,0 116.364,0 115.487,0
Operating Income (Loss) 5.340,0 3.946,0 7.517,0 2.174,0 5.222,0 3.606,0 3.941,0
  - Non-Operating (Income) Loss — 238,0 -1.679,0 3.702,0 774,0 863,0 1.456,0
    + Interest Expense, Net 1.893,0 2.273,0 2.303,0 2.094,0 1.420,0 1.992,0 1.811,0
    + Interest Expense 3.052,0 2.873,0 2.956,0 2.810,0 2.611,0 2.572,0 2.692,0
    - Interest Income 1.159,0 600,0 653,0 716,0 1.191,0 580,0 881,0
    + Foreign Exch (Gain) Loss 0,0 246,0 -241,0 734,0 -251,0 -10,0 500,0
    + (Income) Loss from Affiliates -912,0 -815,0 -927,0 -594,0 -816,0 -258,0 -243,0
    + Other Non-Op (Income) Loss — -1.466,0 -2.814,0 1.468,0 421,0 -861,0 -612,0
Pretax Income (Loss), Adjusted 2.583,0 3.708,0 9.196,0 -1.528,0 4.448,0 2.743,0 2.485,0
  - Abnormal Losses (Gains) 4.193,0 -7.792,0 133,0 1.383,0 1.174,0 -336,0 4.883,0
    + Merger/Acquisition Expense — — 200,0 — — — —
    + Abnormal Derivatives — 1.100,0 2.700,0 -1.805,0 -500,0 777,0 540,0
    + Disposal of Assets — -151,0 -54,0 -132,0 -114,0 -127,0 -111,0
    + Early Extinguishment of Debt — — 65,0 34,0 — — —
    + Asset Write-Down 114,0 129,0 1.111,0 2.975,0 1.301,0 1.841,0 5.239,0
    + Impairment of Goodwill 3.468,0 — 1.067,0 160,0 328,0 138,0 128,0
    + Impairment of Intangibles — 170,0 596,0 356,0 240,0 378,0 -50,0
    + Restructuring — 443,0 621,0 1.387,0 618,0 550,0 496,0
    + Sale of Investments — -5.034,0 -3.349,0 -674,0 -456,0 -1.973,0 -842,0
    + Unrealized Investments — 353,0 48,0 188,0 79,0 84,0 72,0
    + Other Abnormal Items — -4.802,0 -2.872,0 -1.106,0 -322,0 -2.004,0 -589,0
Pretax Income (Loss), GAAP 2.583,0 11.500,0 9.063,0 -2.911,0 3.274,0 3.079,0 -2.398,0
  - Income Tax Expense (Benefit) 834,0 2.858,0 1.946,0 -1.036,0 698,0 718,0 570,0
    + Current Income Tax 1.919,0 2.009,0 1.681,0 1.004,0 -191,0 1.397,0 -46,0
    + Deferred Income Tax -1.085,0 849,0 265,0 -2.040,0 889,0 -679,0 616,0
Income (Loss) from Cont Ops 1.749,0 8.642,0 7.117,0 -1.875,0 2.576,0 2.361,0 -2.968,0
  - Net Extraordinary Losses (Gains) 128,0 -27,0 836,0 -14,0 -37,0 -98,0 162,0
    + Discontinued Operations — -27,0 836,0 -14,0 -37,0 -98,0 162,0
    + XO & Accounting Changes — 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Income (Loss) Incl. MI 1.621,0 8.669,0 6.281,0 -1.861,0 2.613,0 2.459,0 -3.130,0
  - Minority Interest 338,0 249,0 428,0 358,0 424,0 368,0 30,0
Net Income, GAAP 1.283,0 8.420,0 5.853,0 -2.219,0 2.189,0 2.091,0 -3.160,0
  - Preferred Dividends 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
  - Other Adjustments 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Net Income Avail to Common, GAAP 1.283,0 8.420,0 5.853,0 -2.219,0 2.189,0 2.091,0 -3.160,0
Net Income Avail to Common, Adj 1.283,0 2.895,0 7.096,7 -1.209,2 3.076,6 1.797,1 478,5
  Net Abnormal Losses (Gains) 2.839,2 -5.498,0 407,7 1.023,8 924,6 -195,9 3.476,5
  Net Extraordinary Losses (Gains) 128,0 -27,0 836,0 -14,0 -37,0 -98,0 162,0
Basic Weighted Avg Shares 1.862,0 1.905,0 1.905,0 1.905,0 1.906,0 1.907,0 1.923,0
Basic EPS, GAAP 0,69 4,42 3,07 -1,16 1,15 1,10 -1,64
Basic EPS from Cont Ops 0,76 4,41 3,51 -1,17 1,13 1,05 -1,56
Basic EPS from Cont Ops, Adjusted 2,28 1,52 3,73 -0,63 1,61 0,94 0,25
Diluted Weighted Avg Shares 1.862,0 1.905,0 1.905,0 1.905,0 1.906,0 1.907,0 1.923,0
Diluted EPS, GAAP 0,69 4,42 3,07 -1,16 1,15 1,10 -1,64
Diluted EPS from Cont Ops 0,76 4,41 3,51 -1,17 1,13 1,05 -1,56
Diluted EPS from Cont Ops, Adjusted 2,28 1,52 3,73 -0,63 1,61 0,94 0,25
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Continuation of E.ON balance sheet: 
 
  
E.ON SE (EOAN GR) - Adjusted Income Statement
In Millions of EUR except Per Share FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014
12 Months Ending 12/31/2008 12/31/2009 12/31/2010 12/31/2011 12/31/2012 12/31/2013 12/31/2014
Reference Items
Accounting Standard IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS IAS/IFRS
EBITDA 12.192,0 7.489,0 13.974,0 5.668,0 10.300,0 8.811,0 12.664,0
EBITDA Margin (T12M) 14,05 9,36 15,05 5,02 7,80 7,36 11,20
EBITA 9.131,0 4.278,0 10.696,0 2.407,0 7.178,0 5.638,0 9.434,0
EBIT 5.340,0 3.946,0 7.517,0 2.174,0 5.222,0 3.606,0 3.941,0
Gross Margin — — — — — — —
Operating Margin 6,16 4,93 8,09 1,92 3,95 3,01 3,48
Profit Margin 1,48 3,62 7,64 -1,07 2,33 1,50 0,42
Sales per Employee 927.462,64 906.457,21 1.091.157,98 1.431.809,25 1.832.512,52 1.951.636,31 1.923.024,60
Dividends per Share 1,50 1,50 1,50 1,00 1,10 0,60 0,50
Total Cash Common Dividends 2.857,0 2.858,0 2.858,0 1.905,0 2.097,4 1.145,0 966,0
Capitalized Interest Expense — 280,0 316,0 312,0 308,0 200,0 162,0
Personnel Expenses 5.130,0 5.158,0 5.281,0 5.947,0 5.166,0 4.604,0 4.147,0
Depreciation Expense 3.061,0 3.211,0 3.278,0 3.261,0 3.122,0 3.173,0 3.230,0
Rental Expense 232,0 230,0 263,0 273,0 243,0 254,0 210,0
Source: Bloomberg
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